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General Introduction 
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Business format franchising is a form of interorganizational cooperation that originates 
from the business sector. It is increasingly used in a variety of healthcare services to 
reach positive results. In a franchise system contractual arrangements are made 
between two firms: the franchisor and the franchisee. In exchange for a payment, the 
franchisor offers a business format that consists of a brand name, support systems, 
and a specification of the healthcare services that must be delivered in local units. 
Franchisees provide healthcare services in local units using the business format, the 
own local market knowledge, and the own resources (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Falbe 
& Welsh, 1998; Komoto, 2005). Thus, franchising combines central management of a 
business format and local entrepreneurship (Cox & Mason, 2007; Sorenson & Sørensen, 
2001). Some franchise systems also include units owned by the franchisor. These units 
are operated by managers that are employed by the franchisor and that use the same 
business format as the franchisees. So, a franchise system consists of a franchisor, the 
franchisees, the business format, the franchise contract and, in some systems, unit 
managers with the company-owned units they operate (Croonen, 2005). In this thesis 
the concept ‘unit actors’ is used to commonly refer to franchisees and unit managers 
(including their units), while the terms ‘franchisees’, ‘unit managers’ and ‘professionals’ 
are used to refer to actor groups separately.  
 Franchising is stated to be a promising model for the healthcare sector. Websites 
and trade magazines promise that franchising will help individuals in realizing their 
dream of being able to deliver the highest quality of care in a satisfying, supportive 
work environment (FranchiseBusinessReview, 2010; Fusco, 2012; Jongen, 2010, 2011; 
Meijer, 2013). Moreover, potential franchisees are promised to benefit from a strong 
competitive position with a shared strong brand name and to earn good incomes 
(FranchiseBusinessReview, 2010; Fusco, 2012; Jongen, 2010, 2011; Kennedy, 2012). 
Franchise experts and websites for entrepreneurs even argue that franchising in 
healthcare services is among the top 10 of franchise trends and entrepreneurial 
opportunities, with senior care and home healthcare providing the largest potential for 
growth (FranchiseBusinessReview, 2010; Stapp, 2010; Kennedy, 2012; Paraprofessional 
Healthcare Institute, 2010; International Society of Franchising Conference Panelsession 
Global Franchising, 2012). The large Dutch ING Bank recently described franchising as a 
promising model to rigorously improve the client-centeredness, efficiency, effectiveness 
and transparency of healthcare (ING, 2013). However, this interest in franchising in 
practice has not been paralleled with a large-scale scientific interest in healthcare 
franchising. 
 Insights from other industries suggest that the choice for franchising does not 
automatically lead to success. Scholars have estimated that between 50 and 85 percent of 
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the franchise initiatives fail on the long term (Bates, 1998; Shane & Foo, 1999; Lafontaine 
& Shaw, 1998). Moreover, at times, media report about conflicts between franchisors 
and franchisees of apparently successful franchise systems (e.g., Engeman, 2014; 
Franchiseplus, 2012, 2013; Kan, 2013; Keuning, 2014). Also in the healthcare sector, a 
subset of theoretically promising franchise initiatives ultimately went out of business or 
did not acquire the expected number of units (e.g., Pozniak, 2006; Shift Consultants, n.d.). 
 Thus, the key question seems not whether franchising in healthcare can be valuable. 
Key is how one can make the theoretically promising franchise model really work 
in practice. Practitioners that use or consider using franchising in healthcare need 
information about the structural designs and the processes that can help them to be 
successful, and which structural designs and process dynamics may hinder success. 
Therefore, the overall aim of this thesis was to explore how franchises in healthcare can 
be structurally designed and operated so as to achieve positive strategic, organizational, 
professional and client-related results.
Expected and expressed advantages of franchising in healthcare
The advantages of franchising that are theoretically assumed by scholars and described 
in the ‘popular’ literature differ for clients/customers, franchisors, and unit actors. Clients 
could profit from the business-orientation that franchising brings to healthcare. The 
clients’ needs and wants regularly are pivotal in the thinking and processes in franchise 
formulas, as it is in business (Jongen, 2010, 2011; Hogan et al., 2006). The transparency 
and uniformity in product and service delivery may also reduce the clients’ search 
costs for care (Pozniak, 2006). Quality monitoring and standardization of best practices 
can help ensuring that clients receive the best available care (Knott et al., 2009; ING, 
2013; Montagu, 2002). Clients can receive this care in their own localities through the 
combination of central support and decentralized franchised units. 
 Franchisors frequently set up a healthcare franchise for ideological reasons. They 
developed a good concept – often based on dissatisfaction with the impossibilities of 
large-scale traditional healthcare organizations – and want to spread it to ensure that 
as many individuals as possible can receive care within this particular concept (Jongen, 
2010, 2011; Hogan, 2006; ING, 2013). Healthcare organizations also set up a franchise 
because they want to spread their concept to gain a stronger competitive position 
toward clients, insurers, the government and other organizations, and as such enlarge 
their chance of survival and solid financial performance (Jongen, 2010, 2011; ING, 2013). 
Spreading the concept via franchising can have several advantages for franchisors in 
comparison to setting up only company-owned units. First, the use of franchisees can 
facilitate growth in the number of units because they bring financial and managerial 
resources (Knott et al., 2008). Second, they can use the innovative entrepreneurial 
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capabilities and motivation of franchisees as they are assumed to have larger incentives 
to perform well than have employed managers (Jalan & Kumar, 2009; Knott et al., 2008). 
Third, they can benefit from the franchisees’ in-depth knowledge of the local market 
(Jalan & Kumar, 2009). 
 Many franchisees choose to work in a franchise system to be better able to fulfill 
the needs and wants of clients (Hogan et al., 2006; Jongen, 2010, 2011; Weijers, 2013). 
Others choose for franchising to gain a stronger position in the market, enlarge their 
chance of survival, achieve cost advantages and/or create a satisfying work environment 
for healthcare professionals. They expect to achieve these advantages through a 
combination of decentralized entrepreneurship and centralized support in purchasing, 
marketing, ICT, administration, on-suite guidance, training etcetera. Through this 
combination, they can benefit from economies of scale – and thus cost advantages 
– and are able to strongly focus on delivering care rather than being busy with non-
care business activities (Jongen, 2010, 2011; Hogan et al., 2006; Knott et al., 2008; ING, 
2013; Meijer, 2013; Gebhart, 2006; Pozniak, 2006; Weijers, 2013). The franchisor support 
also speeds starting-up or adapting units (Pozniak, 2006). Franchisees are said to have 
bigger chances of survival and good incomes through operating in a tried-and-tested 
concept with a recognizable brand name that can pull clients to franchise practices 
(Gebhart, 2006; Fusco, 2012; Pozniak, 2006; Bishai et al., 2008). Franchisees can also 
benefit from the knowledge and experience from the franchise network (Jongen, 2010, 
2011) and can use best practices and innovations from the franchisor headquarters that 
can maintain their competitive advantage and help them to deliver the best quality care 
efficiently (Gebhart, 2006; Hogan et al., 2006; Knott et al., 2008). Finally, the support and 
the opportunities for knowledge exchange among care professionals in the same field 
may provide healthcare professionals with a more pleasant, satisfying and supportive 
work environment (Agha et al., 2007; Jongen, 2010, 2011). It is assumed that most of 
these advantages also apply to unit managers, except for those related to independent 
entrepreneurship, survival and risk-taking. 
Potential problems with franchising 
Franchising is also associated with potential problems. For franchisors a franchise 
system can be difficult, expensive and time consuming to manage. Some uniformity 
is essential to achieve economies of scale and to build a recognizable brand name 
linked to a particular quality and cost level, but the autonomous nature of healthcare 
professionals can make standardization difficult (Pozniak, 2006; Montagu, 2002). 
Franchisors continuously have to ensure that franchisees keep going in the right 
direction and must monitor the quality of the healthcare services. This is especially hard 
in case of professionals providing complex medical services, while the quality of the 
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brand name depends on the quality of the services provided by franchisees (Jalan & 
Kumar, 2009; Knott et al., 2008; Montagu, 2002). As independent franchisees cannot 
be steered as directly as employed managers, there also is an increased reputation risk 
when franchisees fail to deliver good care (ING, 2013; Montagu, 2002). There may also 
be a risk of contradiction of interests between some franchisors seeking standardization 
and minimization of costs to maximize profits and franchisee-professionals aiming to 
provide high quality care that may not be the same for each patient (Pozniak, 2006). 
 Unit actors run the risk of being harmed by other franchisees failing to deliver good 
care (ING, 2013; Montagu, 2002) and by profit-seeking franchisors (Pozniak, 2006). Such 
a too strong focus on commercial interests can also harm the clients. The uniformity 
requirement in franchising may clash with the professionals’ desire for autonomy, 
which can lower the professionals’ work satisfaction and the quality of care for services 
that need customization rather than standardization (Montagu, 2002). These risks are 
primarily present when the actual care provision is heavily controlled. The guidelines 
and monitoring of franchisors can also bound unit actors from implementing own ideas, 
developing an own identity, and implementing products and services that fit best with 
the needs and wants of professionals and clients (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Knott et 
al., 2008; Hogan et al., 2006). Finally, the fees and royalties paid to the franchisor lower 
the franchisees’ financial performance and may not always be worth the money; once 
in the system, the support can be disappointing (Gebhart, 2006; Christensen & Curtiss, 
1977). 
 
Research questions 
The key question in this thesis is how one can make the theoretically promising franchise 
model really work in the healthcare sector. Therefore, the overall question of this thesis is: 
How are the structural design and process dynamics of healthcare franchises related to 
achieving positive strategic, organizational, professional and client-related results?
The structural design comprises all the structural and procedural aspects of the franchise 
arrangement. Process dynamics of franchises refer to the actors’ individual behavior and 
the interaction with each other in the system, as well as to the dynamical processes that 
evolve in daily practice. Results are defined as the consequences of an activity, plan or 
process within franchise systems. As franchising in healthcare has hardly been a subject 
of scientific investigation, the conceptualization of these key concepts ‘structural 
design’, ‘process dynamics’ and ‘results’ receives attention in this thesis. The empirical 
studies in this thesis apply a managerial and organizational perspective to study the key 
question. They thus focus on how one can make franchising work from the perspective 
of franchisors and unit actors. Studying the question from the perspectives of these two 
groups was important for obtaining a comprehensive understanding of how healthcare 
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franchises can be operated successfully because the franchisor and unit actors have 
different roles and interests and must make the franchise system successful together 
(Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004; Elango & Fried, 1997). 
 The studies covered in this thesis have been set up around four sub-questions 
to answer the overall question. The first question concerns the conceptualization 
of franchising in healthcare. Scientific insight is lacking regarding how franchise 
organizations in healthcare are structurally designed and operated. In other words, it 
was unknown what the key characteristics and elements of healthcare franchises are 
that practitioners can use to determine the structural design and process dynamics in 
their system, and that scholars can use to investigate success factors in franchising. 
1) How are franchises in healthcare being designed and operated? Which configurations 
/ types of franchises can be distinguished? 
The second question concerns the results achieved in healthcare franchises:
2) Which results can be achieved in healthcare franchises from the perspective of 
franchisors and unit actors?
Next, the studies were focused on identifying the main structural design elements and 
process dynamics in franchise systems that promote or hamper achieving positive 
results with franchising in healthcare. 
3) Which structural design elements and process dynamics are related to achieving these 
results? 
Finally, the studies aimed to understand the underlying reasons for the importance of 
these structural design elements and process dynamics to really grasp how healthcare 
franchises work. Such an understanding can support individual practitioners in making 
the most effective choices regarding the design and operation of their franchise. 
4) Why are these structural design elements and process dynamics related to results? 
The next section describes how each of the chapters in the thesis contributes to 
answering the preceding questions. 
Research design and outline of the thesis
An exploratory sequential mixed methods design (Creswell et al., 2011) was used to 
answer the research questions. By sequentially combining systematic literature research, 
qualitative research and quantitative research, the thesis could result in a comprehensive 
in-depth and broad picture of an unexplored phenomenon in healthcare, and findings 
could be triangulated (Doyle et al., 2009). 
 The thesis starts with two systematic literature reviews that were used as a 
foundation for the empirical research. Chapter 2 identifies the available empirical 
evidence regarding the results of franchising in healthcare for clients, professionals 
and organizations (franchisors and unit actors), and thus contributes to answering 
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research question 2. This chapter confirmed that franchising in healthcare could be 
valuable, but that results vary within and across franchise systems. It also revealed that 
insights into what factors produce those results are lacking in the healthcare sector. 
Therefore, chapter 3 comprises a systematic literature review of the empirical evidence 
concerning the structural design elements and process dynamics that make franchising 
work in all industries. This literature review resulted in a framework of success factors of 
franchising from the perspective of franchisors and franchisees – the perspective of unit 
managers rarely received attention in other industries. The results from chapter 2 and 
the framework from chapter 3 were used as a theoretical framework for the subsequent 
empirical research in Dutch healthcare franchises to answer all the research questions. 
 The qualitative research comprised an exploratory comparative embedded case 
study design. Three Dutch healthcare franchise systems providing mental healthcare, 
hospital eye-care and care for the intellectually disabled were investigated. Data were 
sampled from both the franchisor and the unit actors. This qualitative research aimed to 
provide insight in how healthcare franchises are structurally designed and operated in 
practice (research question 1), which structural design elements and process dynamics 
are perceived to promote positive results in healthcare (question 3), and in the reasons 
underlying these perceived relationships (question 4). Chapter 4, 5 and 6 present the 
results of this qualitative research. Chapter 4 explores the role of the business format 
and contractual payments, chapter 5 explores the role of the ownership structure, and 
chapter 6 seeks to understand the role of the relationship between the franchisor and 
the unit actors. The latter chapter integrates the qualitative results in a mixed methods 
design. The qualitative findings were translated into a quantitative nation-wide cross-
sectional survey instrument that was disseminated among nineteen Dutch healthcare 
franchise systems in five different healthcare sectors (mental healthcare, hospital care, 
care for the intellectually disabled and youth care, paramedical care, home and elderly 
care). Through integrating the qualitative and quantitative findings on the item-level, 
the study offers a deeper, richer and more objective understanding regarding the 
role of the relationship than the subjective ‘common sense’ relationships about this 
subject that were retrieved from only the qualitative study. All together, these three 
chapters indicate which structural, strategic and behavioral decisions are perceived to 
be important in franchise systems in healthcare to ensure that the desired results are 
achieved. The integration and aggregation of these findings resulted in an adapted, 
aggregated framework depicting the success factors of healthcare franchising. 
 The operationalizations underlying the qualitatively adapted framework were 
translated into a quantitative survey instrument to explore the breadth of the findings 
and quantify the qualitatively perceived relations. The relationship characteristics items 
from chapter 6 were a subset of this cross-sectional survey instrument. In chapter 7 
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the entire healthcare framework is quantitatively explored, thereby contributing to 
answering research questions 2 and 3. 
 The outline of the thesis, including the connection between the chapters, is 
depicted in figure 1. A detailed description of the methods used is included in each 
of the chapters. The thesis ends with an overview and discussion of the main findings, 
methodological issues, and practical and research implications in chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifying the available 
evidence  
 
Phase 1: systematic literature 
review 
Exploring  which structural design elements 
and process dynamics are perceived as 
related to results of healthcare franchises, 
and why, in 3 case  study systems in 3 
healthcare sectors 
 
Phase 2: qualitative multiple embedded case 
study 
Testing which structural design elements 
and process dynamics are quantitatively 
related to results of healthcare franchises, 
through a cross-sectional survey of 
franchisors and units in 19 healthcare 
franchise systems in 5 healthcare sectors 
Chapter 4: Role of the business format 
Phase 3: quantitative exploratory 
cross-sectional survey 
Chapter 5: Role of the ownership structure 
Chapter 6: Role of relationship characteristics 
Chapter 7: Framework of factors related 
to success of healthcare franchises 
Chapter 2: Results of 
franchising in healthcare  
Chapter 3: Building  a 
framework of structural 
design elements and 
process dynamics related 
to success 
Figure 1: Overview of the dissertation content and connection between chapters
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Is Franchising in Healthcare 
Valuable? A Systematic Review
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Abstract
Background. Franchising is an organizational form that originates from the business 
sector. It is increasingly used in the healthcare sector with the aim of enhancing 
quality and accessibility for patients, improving the efficiency and competitiveness of 
organizations and/or providing professionals with a supportive working environment. 
However, a structured overview of the scientific evidence for these claims is absent, 
whereas such an overview can be supportive to scholars, policy makers and franchise 
practitioners. 
Methods. This study provides a systematic review of literature on the outcomes of 
franchising in healthcare. Seven major databases were systematically searched. Peer-
reviewed empirical journal articles focusing on the relationship between franchising 
and outcomes were included. Eventually, 15 articles were included and their findings 
were narratively synthesized. The level of evidence was rated by using the Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation scale.  
Results. The review shows that outcomes of franchising in healthcare have primarily 
been evaluated in low- and middle-income countries in the reproductive health/family 
planning sector. Articles about high-income countries are largely absent, apart from 
three articles evaluating pharmacy franchises. Most studies focus on outcomes for 
customers/clients and less on organizations and professionals. The evidence is primarily 
of low quality. Based on this evidence, franchising is predominantly positively associated 
with client volumes, physical accessibility and some types of quality. Findings regarding 
utilization, customer loyalty, efficiency and results for providers are mixed. 
Conclusions. We conclude that franchising has the potential to improve outcomes 
in healthcare practices, but the evidence base is yet too weak for firm conclusions. 
Extensive research is needed to further determine the value of healthcare franchising 
in various contexts. We advocate more research in other healthcare sectors in both low- 
and middle-income countries and high-income countries, on more types of outcomes 
with attention to trade-offs, and on what factors produce those outcomes. 
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Introduction
Franchising is increasingly applied in the healthcare sector in both low- and middle-
income countries1 and high-income countries. Franchising comprises a contractual 
arrangement between one firm (the franchisor) and a second firm (the franchisee), 
whereby the franchisee has the right to market goods or services under the franchisor’s 
brand name (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Combs et al., 2004). In business format franchising, 
the most common form of franchise, franchisees also obtain the right to use a business 
format. This consists of the brand name, support systems, and a specification of products 
and services that need to be delivered (Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Komoto, 2005). Currently, 
42 franchises in various Asian and African countries were documented at the end of 
2009 (Montagu et al., 2009). Websites and trade magazines document the existence 
of approximately 50 franchise systems in the USA in various types of care (elderly and 
home care, eye and hearing care, dental care, paramedical care, and pharmaceutical 
care)2. In the Netherlands, approximately 30 care franchises exist in, among others, 
home care, hospital care, mental healthcare, and care for the disabled. Websites report 
the existence of at least 15 franchises in the UK3 and 19 in Canada4. 
 Franchising is increasingly explored in low- and middle-income countries as well 
as high-income countries as an organizational model to overcome several challenges 
in the healthcare sector. Many countries are confronted with inequalities in access 
and health outcomes (Dzau et al., 2010; Montagu, 2002; Institute of Medicine, 2001), 
unreliable quality (Dzau et al., 2010; Hussey et al., 2008; IOM, 2001; Knott et al., 2008), an 
increasing scarcity of healthcare professionals and continuously rising healthcare costs 
(Dzau et al., 2010; IOM, 2001; Shortell et al., 2000). Increasing market competition and 
privatization of healthcare in various developed countries (Cutler, 2002; Schut & Van de 
Ven, 2005) also force care providers to search for organizational models that can help 
create competitive advantages and increase their survival chances. 
 However, does franchising help to overcome these challenges? Various authors 
argue that in low- and middle-income countries, the clearly defined products and 
services, delivery standards, training, quality monitoring, and the donor-funded or 
subsidized system in many of the franchises in these countries should, in theory, lead to 
a rapid expansion of accessible, high-quality care for all citizens, subsequently resulting 
in health improvements at local and societal levels (Montagu, 2002; Lönnroth et al., 
2007). Those same elements—except for the donor-funded or subsidized system—can 
1  In low and middle-income countries some healthcare franchises are termed ‘social franchise’, as these franchises are 
designed to fulfill social instead of primarily financial goals. 
2 http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/healthcare/indexhlth.html, http://www.bison.com/Healthcare_Franchises, 
retrieved 14 October 2011
3  http://www.franchisesales.co.uk/search/care-services-franchise-health-care-franchises, retrieved 14 October 2011
4  http://canada.franchisesales.com/search/home-health-care-senior-care-franchise, retrieved 14 October 2011
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also allow for the geographical dispersion of high-quality and efficient care in high-
income countries (Hogan et al., 2006; Knott et al., 2008). Franchising could provide a 
better working environment by offering training to improve the quality of care (Agha et 
al., 2007b; Bishai et al., 2008), stimulating interaction and knowledge-exchange among 
care professionals in the same field (Agha et al., 2007b), increasing efficiency through 
economies of scale (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Montagu, 2002), providing access to 
innovations originating from franchisor headquarters and other franchisees (Knott et 
al., 2008), and offering other types of management and operational franchisor support 
(Christensen & Curtiss, 1977). Furthermore, some authors hypothesize that the use of 
a brand name and other marketing strategies can pull more patients to the franchise 
practices by signaling the presence of high quality providers, which will subsequently 
result in higher revenues (Bishai et al., 2008; Agha et al., 2007b). 
 Authors also theorize about the possible disadvantages of franchising. Knott et al. 
(2008) and Montagu (2002) predict difficulties in controlling the quality of services 
provided by franchisees—especially in the case of highly educated professionals who 
provide complex medical services—while the quality of the brand name depends on 
the quality of services provided by those franchisees. Furthermore, Montagu (2002) 
expects trade-offs between quality and social goals on the one hand and competitive 
prices and patients’ demands on the other hand. There is also a risk of a contradiction in 
interests between the franchisor and the franchisee, especially in developed countries 
where some franchisors are more profit-oriented than quality-oriented (Pozniak, 2006). 
Finally, mandatory fees (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977) and a reduction in professional 
autonomy (Dobson & Perepelkin, 2011; Montagu, 2002) are potential drawbacks for 
care providers who become franchisees. 
 These potential advantages and disadvantages raise the question of what the 
actual value of franchising in health care is. Because of the increasing use of healthcare 
franchising, the public function of healthcare and the multiple challenges with which 
the healthcare sector is confronted, answering this question is crucial. However, a 
systematic overview of the actual outcomes of franchising in healthcare does not 
exist. Only Koehlmoos et al. (2009) conducted a review of the influence of franchising 
on access to and quality of health services in middle- and low-income countries. They 
restricted themselves to a search for high-level evidence and concluded that there was 
none; however, lower-level evidence can also provide indications of what franchising 
can effect, particularly when multiple lower-level studies find the same results. 
Furthermore, that review did not comprise evidence gathered in high-income countries 
and did not focus on all types of outcomes. Therefore, we have conducted a systematic 
literature review, considering two related questions: 1) What is the state of empirical 
scientific knowledge about outcomes of franchising in healthcare for patients, healthcare 
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professionals and organizations? 2) Which outcomes of healthcare franchising have been 
identified in these studies? 
Methods
Before starting a review of the evidence about outcomes of healthcare franchising, we 
determined our inclusion criteria, definitions, search strategy, selection procedure, and a 
standardized data extraction form to retrieve data from the eventually included studies. 
We referred to various guidelines for reviews (Cochrane; Campbell Collaboration; Popay 
et al., 2006; Petticrew & Roberts, 2006), other systematic reviews (e.g., Buljac-Samardzic et 
al., 2010; Johns & Torres, 2005; Lemmens et al., 2009), and more experienced colleagues 
in reviews to do this adequately. 
Inclusion criteria and definitions
We included empirical studies on the outcomes of healthcare franchising for customers 
(patients), franchisees (care professionals and organizations) and franchisors. The term 
‘healthcare’ includes all preventive, diagnostic and treatment activities (related to both 
curing and caring) for those who are injured, ill, mentally or physically impaired, or 
at risk to be so in the future. ‘Outcomes’ are defined as the results of an activity, plan, 
or process; we included all types of outcomes. Consistent with the basic definition of 
business format franchising, franchises considered in studies needed to include a brand 
name accompanied by a contract between a franchisor and a franchisee that regulates 
the provision of goods or services by the franchisee under that brand name, with 
standard supplies, delivery standards, training and/or management (Blair & Lafontaine, 
2005; Combs et al., 2004). 
 To be included in our review, studies had to compare franchise and non-franchise, 
pre-post franchise or different franchise systems. Qualitative and quantitative empirical 
academic peer-reviewed journal articles were included. Reviews were excluded because 
they are not empirical, but their references were checked to identify additional primary 
studies eligible for inclusion5. Other materials such as policy documents, opinion papers, 
books and case reports without detailed illumination of the research design were 
excluded for quality reasons because the rigor of their methods cannot be verified, they 
are not empirical scientific, and/or they are not certainly peer-reviewed. To ascertain 
that this criterion resulted in a representative overview of evidence not distorted by 
publication bias, a quick scan was conducted of the results presented in other materials 
(see search strategy and article selection). Studies about franchises in all healthcare 
5 Reviews of Koehlmoos et al. 2009, 2011 were identified and checked to identify possible primary empirical studies eligible 
for inclusion. 
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sectors and in all countries were eligible for inclusion. Studies were excluded when they 
only used franchising as a case to examine a research question not related to franchising 
itself or when they used franchising only as one of many examined variables without 
detailed consideration of franchising. We did not use the research design itself as an 
exclusion criterion for this review. Multiple weaker studies that yield similar results also 
provide an indication of what franchising can effect and high quality studies are more 
difficult to conduct in this field. Reviewing high quality studies only would therefore 
impede our aim of providing a comprehensive overview of the state of evidence on 
outcomes of franchising so far.   
Search strategy 
To be sure that all relevant articles were identified, we searched 7 different major 
databases. PubMed/MEDLINE, the Cochrane Library, ABI/INFORM, Scopus, PsycINFO, 
Science Direct and Web of Science (Social Sciences Citation Index) were searched till July 
2011. The searches did not include any limitations in dates of publication, geographical 
region, or language, but search terms were only in English. We developed our search 
strategy in PubMed/MEDLINE by combining MeSH terms (e.g., delivery of health care, 
health, aged, physicians) and free text (e.g., care, patient*, hospital*, treatment, mental, 
pharmac*, illness, nursing home*, cure, specialist*) related to healthcare AND the 
truncated free text term franchise* (relevant MeSH terms not available). This strategy was 
adapted for use in other databases. Our search procedure was checked by a university 
librarian. In addition to this database search, the references of included articles and of 
other reviews on similar and related subjects were hand searched to identify additional 
relevant empirical studies.  We also searched for grey literature to ascertain that our 
inclusion of peer-reviewed empirical journal articles only would not result in skewed 
conclusions because of publication bias. We searched for non-published or non-
peer-reviewed materials by checking references, searching Google, Google Scholar 
and Scopus, reviewing some of the personal websites of authors of included articles, 
contacting some of the authors, and searching the websites of Global Health Sciences 
and PSI for reports about social franchises in low- and middle-income countries. 
Study selection and data extraction
To achieve a high-quality and unbiased review two researchers were involved in the study 
selection and data extraction process. The selection process started with a preliminary 
search in PubMed/Medline and a first rough selection of potentially relevant titles and 
abstracts by one reviewer. All articles that were obviously not relevant as they had another 
subject were excluded, whereas abstracts with any potential relevance were included. 
The resulting 68 abstracts were independently assessed by two reviewers by using the 
A Systematic Review of Outcomes of Franchising in Healthcare     |    25
Ch
ap
te
r 2
predetermined selection criteria, and the resulting inclusion (n=29) and exclusion of 
abstracts was discussed. After this testing round, all of the databases were searched 
by one reviewer (n=1,482 hits), duplicates were removed (n= 438), and all obviously 
irrelevant titles and abstracts were excluded. Abstracts with any potential relevance 
were independently assessed by a second reviewer (n= 79) and doubts regarding 
inclusion were discussed. The resulting 35 abstracts were included for full-text review. 
Three articles that could not be found in full-text format were excluded6. The other 32 
full-text articles were reviewed and summarized using a semi-structured data extraction 
form predetermined by two reviewers. The form included information about the aim, 
subject, focus and background of the article, the methodology (outcomes, intervention, 
definitions, research design) and the results of the study. In cases of exclusion or doubt 
regarding inclusion, a second reviewer was involved. The references of the included 
articles were checked for additional relevant studies, resulting in one additional study 
that was summarized by the data extraction form. In the end, 15 articles were included 
in the final analysis (see figure 1). 
 The search on grey literature did not result in a significant number of studies 
eligible for inclusion. Most of the identified materials were case reports of single 
franchise networks without detailed illumination of research strategy, did not focus 
on a comparative evaluation of outcomes of franchising, or were not empirical. Two 
unpublished studies did fit in our inclusion criteria (Plautz et al., 2003; Tsui et al., 2006). 
However, they did not show diverging results from our other studies, both were 
conducted in the same sector as the majority of the other included articles (reproductive 
health), and both found positive effects of franchising on utilization, hence providing no 
indication for publication bias. We therefore choose to keep only the empirical peer-
reviewed academic journal articles in our results section.   
 We also determined the levels of evidence for identified outcomes of healthcare 
franchising. The quality of investigation of each single outcome in each study was 
independently appraised by two reviewers using the Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) scale. This scale distinguishes four 
levels of quality of evidence: high (A), moderate (B), low (C), and very low (D) (see Box 1). 
In cases of doubt or disagreement, a third reviewer was consulted to reach consensus. 
6 Chiguzo et al. 2008 (delivering new malaria drugs through grassroots private sector), Parkin et al. 2008 (quality of care in a 
franchised GP group) and Yavner et al. (1998) (the failure of the dental franchise industry) could not be found in full-text.
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1044 references reviewed on title and abstract 
14 articles included after reading full text 
438 duplicates removed 
1 additional full-text article included by reference check 
15 articles finally included in the review 
44 abstracts excluded: 
-no scientific empirical study: n = 35 
-no influence of franchise on outcomes: n=3 
-franchise not pivotal/no detailed consideration: n=4 
-systematic review on related subject: n=2  
79 abstracts independently assessed by two reviewers 
965 irrelevant abstracts excluded 
1,482 references identified through database searching 
18 articles excluded after reading full-text 
-no peer-reviewed scientific empirical study: n = 10 
-no franchise – non franchise or different franchises 
comparison: n = 1 
-no influence of franchise on outcomes: n=4 
-franchise not pivotal/no detailed consideration: n=3  
35 abstracts included for full-text review 
32 articles to be read in full-text 
3 abstracts could not be found in full-text, and are excluded 
Figure 1: Selection process for systematic review 
438 duplicates removed
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Box 1: Levels of quality of evidence using the GRADE rating scale 
Level A: high
Level A consists of several high-quality studies with consistent results. Further research is highly unlikely 
to change the confidence in the estimated effect. This category comprises high-quality pre- and post-
surveys, multi-center randomized controlled trials (RCT) and, in special cases, one large, high-quality 
multi-center trial.
Level B: moderate
Level B consists of several studies with some limitations and consistent findings or one high-quality study. 
Further research is likely to have an impact on the confidence of the estimated effect and may change 
the estimated effect. This category comprises one-center RCTs, RCTs with severe limitations, and pre-and 
post-surveys. 
Level C: low
Level C consists of one study with acceptable quality or inconsistent results of several studies focusing on 
the same outcome. Further research is very likely to change the estimated effect and have an important 
impact on the confidence of the estimation. This category comprises high-quality qualitative studies, 
quasi-experimental designs, and pre- and post-surveys with limitations. 
Level D: very low
Level D evidence implies that the estimated effect is very uncertain. This category comprises low-quality 
qualitative studies and pre-and post-surveys with severe limitations. 
Limitations and strengths for determining evidence level (upgrade or downgrade)
Quality of evidence is lower for studies with limitations in study design and execution (risk of bias), 
unexplained inconsistency/heterogeneity in outcomes, indirectness, or imprecision of estimates. The 
quality of evidence is higher when effects are large and all plausible confounders would reduce the effect. 
(adapted from Buljac-Samardzic et al. 2010 and GRADE Working Group 2004)
Data analysis
Statistical data could not be pooled for meta-analysis purposes due to the heterogeneity 
of franchise design, outcome conceptualizations, and the presence of both qualitative 
and quantitative research designs. We therefore conducted a narrative synthesis of the 
data (Popay et al., 2006). Following the recommendations of Popay et al. (2006) for such 
a synthesis, our analysis comprised the following steps. 
 As a first step, we examined each included study with regard to the following factors 
as described on our data extraction form: country, sector, methods, franchise design, 
type(s) of outcome(s), operationalization of each outcome, pivotal actor/stakeholder 
for each outcome, whether significances of outcomes were tested, and GRADE rating. 
At the second step in our analysis, we clustered outcomes that were directed towards 
the same type of result. This clustering led to 7 outcome categories: quality of services, 
accessibility of services, utilization of services, results for providers, client loyalty, client 
volumes, and efficiency. As a third step in our analysis, we described similarities and 
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differences in outcomes found within each of the outcome categories. In the final step, 
we used the variables from step 1 to search for explanations for the differences we 
found. In this step we also made a judgment of the overall quality of evidence (see box 
1 GRADE) and overall results for each type of outcome. 
Results 
State of empirical research 
Around half of the fifteen studies have focused on quality and utilization. A few studies 
have considered results for providers, client loyalty, client volumes and efficiency (see 
table 1). Most studies have investigated outcomes for customers/clients. Outcomes for 
professionals and organizations have received less attention. 
Table 1: Outcomes investigated in included studies
Outcome Times investigated (n)
Quality of services 9
Utilization of services 7
Accessibility of services 4
Results for professionals 3
Client loyalty 3
Client volumes 2
Efficiency 2
 
With regard to the methodologies used, studies have rarely employed qualitative (n=1) 
or mixed methods designs (n=1); rather, quantitative research dominates (n=13) (see 
table 2). Many of the outcomes are subjective (opinions) or self-reported measures, not 
objective numbers. The majority of studies have presented low levels of evidence (C or 
D on the GRADE scale). 
 Twelve of the fifteen studies have been conducted in low- and middle-income 
countries in Asia and Africa. Because many franchises in low- and middle-income 
countries have primarily social goals (health improvement) instead of financial goals, 
they are called social franchises (Qureshi 2010). Three studies have investigated 
outcomes in high-income countries, all in a pharmacy context.
 The research covers a few healthcare sectors. There is an overrepresentation of 
research conducted in reproductive health/family planning services (n=11). The other 
investigated sectors are pharmacy (n=3) and tuberculosis care (n=1). 
 Regarding the design of the investigated franchise systems, the research is skewed 
towards fractional franchises (n=10). Fractional franchise means that “a targeted 
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package of goods and services is added to the services of the provider who maintains 
additional unfranchised product lines and services” (Bishai et al. 2008, p. 193). The rest are 
stand-alone franchises (n=5). A stand-alone franchisee exclusively provides franchised 
products/services (Stephenson et al., 2004). The precise franchise design is not always 
described in the articles. 
 Some studies have investigated the same franchise network. Both studies by Agha 
et al. (2007) investigated the same franchise network in Nepal; both studies by Ngo et 
al. (2009, 2010) investigated the same franchise network in Vietnam; Bishai et al. (2008), 
Qureshi (2010), Shah et al. (2011) and Stephenson et al. (2004) investigated the same 
franchise network in Pakistan; and Shah et al. (2011) and Stephenson et al. (2004) 
investigated the same franchise network in Ethiopia. However, at least 20 different 
franchise networks were analyzed in the fifteen studies.
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Outcomes of franchising in healthcare
Quality of services
Eight out of the nine studies on quality of services were conducted in low- and middle-
income countries. The studies focus on a wide range of quality types: medical quality, 
quality of facilities and supplies, quality of the provider, client satisfaction, and overall 
quality. Most of these studies measured perceived or ‘subjective’ quality rather than 
‘objective’ quality, and most used process indicators of quality rather than actual medical 
outcomes. Except for results on the quality of the provider, the level of existing evidence 
is low (see table 3). The evidence to date shows that franchising predominantly has 
either a positive effect or no effect on quality.
 The two studies on quality of facilities and supplies show positive results of 
franchising (Agha et al., 2007b; Ngo et al., 2009). 
 Franchising has at least the same results for the quality of the provider and medical 
quality. In regard to the quality of the provider, the study with a moderate evidence 
level found that clients were handled just as well in non-franchised systems (Agha et al., 
2007b), whereas two studies with slightly lower evidence levels found positive results 
(Agha et al., 2007a; Ngo et al., 2009). Also in regard to medical quality, only the studies 
with lower levels of evidence found a positive effect. Lönnroth et al. (2007) found 
franchising to have a positive effect on reducing treatment delays. Evans et al. (2007) 
found that franchises had higher adherence rates than corporate pharmacies; however, 
when compared with independent pharmacies, adherence rates were similar. Also in 
regard to other medical quality indicators, no differences were found between franchise 
and non-franchise (Agha et al., 2007b; Lönnroth et al., 2007; Kozhimannil et al., 2009).
 Studies on client satisfaction and overall quality have more mixed and sometimes 
even negative results. Regarding client satisfaction, Ngo et al. (2009) and Agha et al. 
(2007b) found positive results. However, Stephenson et al. (2004) found better results 
for franchises compared to non-franchises in Pakistan, similar results in India and 
negative results in Ethiopia. In regard to overall quality, only a low quality study (D) 
found an overall positive effect (Bishai et al., 2008). Studies with a slightly higher level of 
evidence (C) found either no effect (Stephenson et al., 2004) or mixed results depending 
on the organization of comparison and the country of study (Shah et al., 2011). In both 
Pakistan and Ethiopia, franchise providers yielded more positive results than private 
non-franchise providers and less positive results than governmental organizations. 
The effect differed in a comparison with non-governmental organizations: in Pakistan, 
franchises performed better on overall quality; in Ethiopia, no difference was found 
between them.
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Table 3: Quality of services
Type of quality Indicator Score* Significance tested GRADE Author
Medical quality Satisfaction quality service: 
medicine
0 Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Adherence to therapy +/0 Yes D Evans et al., 2009
Achievement of care 
standards
0 Yes C Kozhimannil et al., 2009
Reducing treatment delays + No D Lönnroth et al., 2007
Treatment success 0 No C Lönnroth et al., 2007
Quality of 
facility and 
supplies
Satisfaction quality service: 
physical look
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Satisfaction quality service: 
privacy
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Satisfaction quality service: 
range of services
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Satisfaction quality service: 
cleanliness
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Satisfaction quality service: 
equipment
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Appearance and facilities + No D Ngo et al., 2009
Quality of 
provider
Providers caring manner + Yes C Agha et al., 2007a
Providers expertise/reliability + Yes C Agha et al., 2007a
Satisfaction quality service: 
good handling clients
0 Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Providers expertise/reliability + No D Ngo et al., 2009
Providers caring manner + No D Ngo et al., 2009
Satisfaction of 
client
Satisfaction clients + No D Ngo et al., 2009
Fewer complaints + No D Ngo et al., 2009
Intention to return +/0/- Yes C Stephenson et al., 2004
Are you overall satisfied with 
quality?
+ Yes B Agha et al., 2007b
Overall quality Average score quality of 
provider, facilities and 
supplies, client satisfaction
+/0/- Yes C Shah et al., 2011
Is quality better than 
elsewhere?
0 Yes C Stephenson et al., 2004
Average score quality of 
provider, facilities and supplies
+ No D Bishai et al., 2008
* + = positive, 0=no difference, - = negative
Accessibility 
Studies on the accessibility of care services have only been conducted in developing 
countries and have focused on two types of access (table 4): physical access, which 
implies that those who are in need of care can reach the facility, and socio-economic 
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access, which means that all socio-economic groups are able to access care. To date, the 
level of evidence on access is relatively low.
Table 4: Accessibility of care services
Type of access Indicator Score* Significance tested GRADE Author
Physical access Proximity of location + Yes C Agha et al., 2007a
Convenient location + Yes C Agha et al., 2007a
Socio-economic 
access
Access for the poor + No D Bishai et al., 2008
Ability to reach the poor + No D Lönnroth et al., 
2007
Access for the poor 0/- Yes C Shah et al., 2011
* + = positive, 0=no difference, - = negative
Franchising has a positive effect on physical access according to one C-level study 
(Agha et al., 2007a). The effects on socio-economic access are unclear. Only the two 
studies with the lowest evidence level showed a positive effect on socio-economic 
access (Bishai et al., 2008; Lönnroth et al., 2007). A study with a slightly higher evidence 
level (C) reported similar or even negative results for franchises compared to other 
organizational forms. In both Pakistan and Ethiopia, franchises yielded less socio-
economic access than governmental organizations and yielded similar access than non-
governmental organizations. The effect when compared with private non-franchise 
providers differed: in Ethiopia, franchises performed significantly worse on access; in 
Pakistan, no significant difference was found (Shah et al., 2011). 
Utilization of services 
All seven studies on utilization have been conducted in developing countries and have 
focused on the use of both early preventive care and healthcare (table 5). Preventive 
care is defined as services provided to prevent the occurrence of an undesirable medical 
condition, i.e., primary prevention, or to detect and diagnose those individuals with an 
existent disease who need care to prevent more significant morbidity, i.e., secondary 
prevention. Healthcare (or tertiary prevention) is defined as care for those who have a 
revealed (diagnosed) medical condition (e.g., Simeonsson, 1991). All but one of the 
studies presented a low level of evidence. 
 Based on two very low quality studies, franchising seems to have no relation with 
the utilization of healthcare (Agha et al., 2007b; Kozhimannil et al., 2009). The evidence 
so far shows that franchising has positive or no effects on the utilization of preventive 
care. The three studies with the lowest levels of evidence all showed positive effects 
on the utilization of primary (Decker & Montagu, 2007; Qureshi, 2010) and secondary 
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preventive care (Lönnroth et al., 2007). The two studies with a slightly higher level of 
evidence (C) found either positive effects on the utilization of primary preventive care 
or none at all. The franchise network studied by Agha et al. (2007b) showed a positive 
effect on utilization of preventive care. Depending on the franchisee site investigated 
in the franchise network studied by Hennink and Clements (2005), the unmet need for 
family planning successfully declined or remained the same. The use of family planning 
methods did not increase significantly after franchising occurred (Hennink & Clements, 
2005). The study with the highest evidence level among them (B) studied the total use of 
preventive care and healthcare and showed that results depended on the measurement 
method used: the citizens did not report a change in use, but the franchise clinics 
reported an increase in use (Ngo et al., 2010). 
Table 5: Utilization of care services
Type of utilization Indicator Score*
Significance  
tested
GRADE Author
Use of preventive 
care (primary 
and secondary 
prevention)
Use of family planning 
methods
+ Yes C Agha et al., 2007
Use of family planning 
methods
+ Yes D Decker & Montagu, 2007
Use of family planning 
methods 
0 Yes C Hennink & Clements, 2005
Unmet need +/0 Yes C Hennink & Clements, 2005
Use of family planning 
methods
+ Yes D Qureshi, 2010
Notification 
(detection) of 
tuberculosis
+ Yes D Lönnroth et al., 2007
Use of healthcare 
(tertiary)
Use of birth facility 0 Yes D Kozhimannil et al., 2009
Use of antenatal care 0 Yes D Agha et al., 2007
Preventive care and 
healthcare
Use of reproductive 
health and family 
planning care
+/0 Yes B Ngo et al., 2010
* + = positive, 0=no difference, - = negative
Results for providers 
The results for providers have been investigated in three studies: two in developed 
countries and one in a developing country. They focus on very different indicators, and 
the results among these studies differ. The level of evidence generated by these studies 
is very low (D) (table 6). 
 Healthcare professionals in Vietnam felt more effective in managing their 
relationships with clients because of training offered by the franchisor (Ngo et al., 2009). 
Franchisee pharmacists in Canada perceived themselves as having less authority and 
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autonomy compared with independent pharmacists but more authority and autonomy 
than corporate pharmacists (Dobson & Perepelkin, 2011). Pharmacists in the USA varied 
in their levels of satisfaction with their franchise system and the support services offered 
by their franchisors. Their overall satisfaction with the franchise system varied among 
systems, but it was predominantly medium to low. The same rule applies to reported 
satisfaction with different types of support services (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977). 
Table 6: Results for providers, client loyalty, client volumes and efficiency
Outcome Indicator Score* Significance  tested GRADE Author
Results for 
providers
Franchisee satisfaction 
with franchise and services 
offered
+/- No D Christensen & Curtiss, 1977
Perceived authority 
(control (stress, 
satisfaction, workload), 
decision-making ability) 
and autonomy
+/- Yes D Dobson & Perepelkin, 2011
Effectiveness in dealing 
with complaints, concerns, 
objections of customers 
+ No D Ngo et al., 2009
Client loyalty First visit or return visit? 0 Yes C Agha, Gage & Balal, 2007
First visit or return visit? + Yes C Agha et al., 2007
> 75% medicines 
dispensed from same 
pharmacy
- /0 Yes D Evans et al., 2009
Client volumes Clinic-reported client 
volumes
+ Yes B Ngo et al., 2010
Monthly client volume + Yes C Stephenson et al., 2004
Efficiency Costs of care per client +/0/- No D Bishai et al., 2008
Costs of care per client 0/- Yes D Shah et al., 2011
* + = positive, 0=no difference, - = negative
Client loyalty 
The impact of franchising on client loyalty has been analyzed in Nepal and Canada in 
studies of low quality (C and D). The results differed between the countries, between 
different organizations of comparison and between studies with different quality levels 
(see table 6). Only the study with a very low quality level showed a negative effect: 
in this Canadian study, customers were less loyal to franchised pharmacies than to 
independent pharmacies, but equally loyal to corporate pharmacies (Evans et al., 2009). 
The studies with a slightly higher quality of evidence (C) in Nepal found either a positive 
or similar effect: Agha et al. (2007b) found customers to be significantly more loyal to 
new franchise clinics than to non-franchised clinics, whereas Agha et al. (2007a) found 
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customers to be just as loyal after franchise implementation as they were before. This 
last study, however, showed that the increased quality after implementation of the 
franchise network significantly predicted an increase in loyalty (Agha et al., 2007). 
Client volumes 
Studies on client volumes have only been conducted in developing countries, but in 
four different ones. All of the studies presented evidence of moderate to low quality. In 
all of the four countries, a positive association between franchising and client volumes 
was found (Ngo et al., 2010; Stephenson et al., 2004) (table 6).
Efficiency 
The impact of franchising on efficiency—defined as costs of care per client—has only 
been studied in Pakistan and Ethiopia, and only with methodologies of low quality. In 
Ethiopia, franchising was less efficient than other studied organizational forms (Bishai 
et al., 2008; Shah et al., 2011). In Pakistan, franchises were just as efficient as non-
governmental organizations; however, compared with governmental organizations, 
Shah et al. (2011) found franchises to be just as efficient, whereas Bishai et al. (2008) 
found franchises to be more efficient. 
Discussion 
In this study we have provided a systematic overview of outcomes of franchising in 
healthcare to determine the state of empirical scientific knowledge on the subject and 
the outcomes that have been found. 
 The review shows that the body of empirical knowledge is quite undeveloped. 
Only 15 peer-reviewed empirical studies were identified, the variety in healthcare 
sectors and types of outcomes studied is limited, research in developed countries is 
underrepresented, and the focus has been mainly on the customer and far less frequently 
on healthcare professionals or organizations. Given this existing body of knowledge, 
we cannot make strong conclusions or generalizations about what the actual value of 
franchising is. Some interesting patterns do, however, emerge. The evidence to date 
suggests that franchising can be valuable to healthcare practices, particularly in low and 
middle-income countries. The results of studies so far show that healthcare franchises 
predominantly perform better or at least as well as non-franchised healthcare entities 
on physical accessibility, utilization, client volumes and quality of services as it relates 
to facilities and supplies, the provider and client satisfaction. Franchising seems less 
positive for the efficiency of care delivery and results for providers (less autonomy, less 
authority, dissatisfaction with support services offered).  With regard to the healthcare 
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sector, negative outcomes were only found in the reproductive health/family planning 
and pharmacy sectors. With regard to countries, negative results were only found in 
Canada, the USA, Pakistan, and, especially, Ethiopia; in all other low- and middle-income 
countries, franchises had similar or better results compared with non-franchises. 
The achieved outcomes did not seem to be different for fractional and stand-alone 
franchises.  
 We do not really know why some studies yielded positive results whereas others 
did not. This is partly due to the absence of detailed franchise design descriptions in 
some studies and to the small number of articles. In addition, the empirical knowledge 
gathered so far gives little insight into the reasons behind the comparative outcomes 
of healthcare franchising. Only Ngo et al. (2009) and Qureshi (2010) identified a 
contributive role of training. Training helped improve the quality of services and results 
for providers (Ngo et al., 2009) and also contributed to increased utilization of services 
(Qureshi, 2010). 
 The question is whether the results of franchising shown in this review will also 
apply to other healthcare sectors and to high-income countries. It is possible that the 
effects of franchising on quality, accessibility, utilization and client volumes in low- and 
middle-income countries are not primarily due to the organizational form of franchising 
per se, but rather to the extension of good quality healthcare supply as a consequence 
of the structural involvement and control of private-sector providers in the fulfillment 
of public goals (Montagu, 2002; Lönnroth et al., 2007). In an environment in which there 
are many unmet needs and in which the access to and quality of services is relatively low 
(Hennink & Clements, 2005), other organizational forms that consist of partially similar 
interventions, such as voucher systems (e.g., Prata et al., 2005), may also provide positive 
outcomes. Similarly, it may not be a coincidence that negative results for providers have 
only been found so far in developed countries, where professionals regularly have more 
access to equipment, resources and learning opportunities. 
 The scientific evidence to date seems to provide only a partial overview of the 
outcomes of healthcare franchising. The current empirical evidence pinpoints only 
now and then to some possible drawbacks of and difficulties with franchising, whereas 
both theory (see introduction) and practice reports mention them. Practice reports of 
single franchise networks in low- and middle-income countries tell that the franchisor 
only has limited ability to force compliance with service standards of the franchise and 
to control quality, whereas the quality of care is highly variable across clinics. It is also 
reported that provider skills range from excellent to poor, with some of them falling 
below minimum standards of the franchise, and that some franchisees ask higher than 
recommended prices for their services (e.g., Mc Bride & Ahmed, 2001; Montagu & Kinlaw, 
2009). There is no systematic insight in the actual scope of these problems and their 
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effect on the comparative outcomes that franchises yield. Case reports and theory also 
highlight positive results for healthcare professionals that have not yet been confirmed 
in peer-reviewed academic studies. Moreover, the number of franchises in high-income 
countries (see introduction) as well as low- and middle-income countries is far larger 
than the ones that have been studied scientifically (see e.g., Schlein & Montagu, 2012). 
This all suggests that the current evidence base needs to be extended in order to get 
a comprehensive and representative scientific overview of the value of franchising in 
healthcare. 
 Our data analysis in this report also has a limitation due to the state of materials 
included. We selected outcomes as the starting point for our analysis, but we do not 
know whether and to what extent the case mixes, countries, health systems, and 
franchise systems investigated in different studies are comparable. However, this 
limitation is inherent to the limited information that has been provided on these aspects 
in the individual studies. 
Research agenda
This review has shown that franchising in healthcare has largely been disregarded by 
scholars. More exploration and detailed investigation are therefore needed. 
 First, research should be conducted in other healthcare sectors beyond reproductive 
health/family planning and pharmacy. Outcomes may differ not only because of 
institutional and cultural differences between sectors, but also because it is more 
difficult to standardize and monitor in healthcare sectors that require a high degree of 
(medical) professional knowledge (Montagu, 2002).
 Second, research is needed on more types of outcomes for all stakeholders because 
we do not know yet whether franchising can meet health demands in an efficient way 
to contain costs and enhance the health status of the society, provide a better working 
environment for the increasingly scarce healthcare professional, or improve the 
competitiveness of care providers. Researchers are advised to include the outcomes for 
all stakeholders in their studies to make trade-offs visible because there can be conflicts 
of interest between stakeholders, e.g., financially-driven franchisors and quality-driven 
healthcare professionals (e.g., Dobson & Perepelkin, 2011).
 Third, scholars should proceed with comparing franchise with non-franchise 
forms that may partially meet similar challenges (e.g., voucher systems) to investigate 
whether, how and when franchising is the most suitable organizational form to beat the 
challenges in the health sector all over the world.  
 Fourth, future research should also focus on franchising in higher income countries. 
It is rather surprising that franchising—originating from an Anglo-Saxon context—
has been investigated so little in the healthcare sector in high-income countries. 
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The outcomes in these countries might differ from those in low- and middle-income 
countries, not only because of differences in cultural, institutional and economic 
environments, but also because of differences in franchise design. In the social franchises 
established in low- and middle-income countries, the donors or franchisors frequently 
assume the largest risk in opening new units or establishing healthcare services, instead 
of the franchisees that normally assume risks in franchise organizations (Bishai et al., 
2008; Lönnroth et al., 2007; Stephenson et al., 2004). This incentive difference may have 
an impact on outcomes. 
 Finally, future research should investigate the causes of outcomes of healthcare 
franchising. Attention should be paid to the combined roles of franchise design (e.g., 
stand-alone vs. fractional, type of support being offered to franchisees), the conduct of 
actors in the franchise system (e.g., the adherence to service protocols, provider skills) 
and the external context in which franchising is implemented. 
 In assuming this research agenda, scholars can build on the extensive knowledge 
that exists about franchising in sectors outside healthcare. Scholars should also guard 
for sound measures and designs in their research because, as this review showed, 
different studies on the same outcome in the same franchise network may yield 
different conclusions if they have different measures (Ngo et al. 2010), different research 
designs (Agha et al., 2007a and Agha et al., 2007b), or the presence/absence of testing 
of significances (Shah et al., 2011 vs. Bishai et al., 2008). 
Conclusion
Franchising has the potential to be a valuable organizational strategy to clients, society 
and organizations, but the evidence base is yet too weak for firm conclusions. So far 
franchises have been shown to predominantly perform better or at least as well as 
non-franchised healthcare entities on physical accessibility, utilization, client volumes 
and some types of quality of care. However, there are also signals of some less positive 
effects that need further investigation before expansion of franchising is justified. 
Practitioners could further explore the merits of franchising by developing franchises 
for various types of healthcare. These developments should be accompanied with 
process and outcome evaluations to further assess the actual outcomes of franchising 
in healthcare in various contexts so as to justify continued investment in franchising as 
organizational form. 
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Abstract
There is a large and fragmented literature which examines the nature of franchising. 
This study aims to collect all the empirical evidence on the factors that make franchising 
work and to integrate this evidence in a framework. A narrative synthesis was performed 
of 126 peer-reviewed empirical journal articles. This review shows how the outcomes of 
franchising are determined by five major clusters of factors: ownership structure, business 
format design, contract design, behavior of the franchisor and the franchisee and their 
interaction, and the age and size of the system and its units. It identifies what franchisors 
and franchisees need to do to be successful and which evidence gaps and conflicting 
results remain. To yield better outcomes for both the franchisor and the franchisee, 
they should work on a recognizable brand name and a good working relationship; in 
addition, they should have suitable skills and attitudes as well as contractual exclusive 
territories. For further improvement of franchisee outcomes, high-quality franchisor 
support, decentralized decision-making, selection tools and fair contracts are essential. 
The effects of a high franchise proportion, active ownership, knowledge exchange and 
standardized operating instructions are contingent on other structural and contextual 
factors in the system. Conflicts and tying should be prevented. Hardly any research 
has been undertaken into which franchise designs are valued by customers. We have 
launched a research agenda for further research, from various theoretical perspectives, 
into the interactions between system elements, actors and contexts.
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Introduction
In recent decades, the number of franchises in the world has increased considerably 
(Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Fulop & Forward, 1997). It is expected that franchising delivers 
a better financial performance, a more supportive working environment and/or higher 
survival chances than alternative organizational forms (Combs et al., 2004; Tuunanen 
& Hyrsky, 2001). Franchising comprises a contractual arrangement between two firms: 
the franchisor and the franchisee. In this arrangement, the franchisee buys the right to 
market goods or services under the franchisor’s brand name (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; 
Combs et al., 2004a). Business format franchising is the most commonly studied form 
of franchise. In this format, franchisees also receive various types of support, such as 
an operations manual, training and on-site guidance. Franchisees have to pay for this 
support and they are obliged to operate their businesses as prescribed by the franchisor 
(Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Komoto, 2005).
 Despite the positive expectations, failure rates of new franchise initiatives are 
high. In the USA, it is estimated that 50-85% of these initiatives fail (Bates, 1998; Shane 
& Foo, 1999; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998). Moreover, there is significant variation in the 
strategic and operational success of franchises. Some studies comparing franchising 
with alternative organizational forms show superior performance (e.g., Aliouche & 
Schlentrich, 2009; Frew & Jud, 1986; Yoo et al., 1998; Shane, 1996; Lewis & Anderson, 
1999; Knight, 1986), whereas others show inferior or equal performance regarding 
financial performance, efficiency, survival and franchisee satisfaction (e.g., Stanworth et 
al., 2001; Benjamin et al., 2006; Bates, 1995a, 1998; Anderson et al., 1998; Grünhagen & 
Dorsch, 2003). 
 Research suggests that at least a part of these variations result from factors within 
franchise systems. With the use of the structure–process/conduct–outcome framework 
(e.g., Devaraj et al., 2006; Donabedian, 1966; Zinn & Mor, 1998), a distinction can be 
made between structural and process-related factors that shape results. Franchise 
practitioners need information about the structures and processes that can help 
them to be successful. Unfortunately, the evidence base is fragmented, complex and 
heterogeneous in terms of theoretical perspectives, methods and conceptualizations, 
providing only partial or even confusing advice for practitioners. Although reviews of 
the franchise literature have been conducted by Elango and Fried (1997), Fulop and 
Forward (1997) and Combs et al. (2004a), none of these authors have systematically 
built an overview that integrates all the evidence to support both practitioners and 
researchers. As a result, this paper has a double aim: first, to collect all the empirical 
evidence on the structural and process-related factors that influence the outcomes 
achieved within franchise systems for franchisors, franchisees and customers, and 
second, to bring this evidence together in an integrative framework. To this end, we 
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have conducted a systematic review, which gives practitioners an integrative insight 
into why some franchises succeed while others are less successful. Moreover, it identifies 
evidence gaps and conflicting results and provides a collective starting point for future 
research from various theoretical perspectives. 
Research methods
We used a systematic approach in our review: we determined the inclusion criteria in 
advance, systematically searched for articles according to these criteria, and employed 
a systematic selection and extraction procedure. The research methods are described 
in detail below. 
Data collection
The studies included investigated the relationship between the outcomes of franchising 
and franchise design or processes. Outcomes are defined as the results of an activity, 
plan or process within franchise systems. All types of outcomes were included, for 
example financial performance, survival, growth, and satisfaction. Design comprises all 
the structural and procedural aspects of the franchise arrangement. Processes refer to 
actors’ behavior and interaction with each other. Studies on the external context were 
included if their authors considered context in relation to design or processes. Studies 
were only included if they were empirical studies published in peer-reviewed journals. 
Studies were excluded if they only used franchising as a case in investigating a research 
question unrelated to franchising itself. During the selection process, no distinction 
was made between business format and product/trade-name franchise because the 
boundaries between these two types are often blurred (e.g., Dnes, 1992) and because 
authors frequently do not specify which type of franchise is being studied. International 
expansion through franchising was excluded as this process involves quite different 
dynamics and managerial questions (e.g., Preble & Hoffman, 2006) and requires a 
specific set of capabilities (Fladmoe-Linquist, 1996). Including this aspect would have 
made the focus of this review too broad.
 We searched Abi/Inform, Cochrane Library, EconLit (EBSCO), Emerald, PsycINFO, 
PubMed/Medline, Scopus and Web of Science for articles published before January 
2011 without any other limitations with regard to publication date. The search was 
limited to articles in English. Every database except Emerald was searched using the 
term franchis* AND the following combination of terms: effect*, efficiency, impact, 
innovation*, outcome*, perform*, quality, satisfaction, survival, value. As Emerald did 
not allow a search using these truncated terms, we checked the journals included in all 
of the databases and identified those that were unique to Emerald. We then searched the 
A Framework Based on a Systematic Review across Industries     |    49
Ch
ap
te
r 3
62 unique journals within Emerald using the term franchis*. In addition to conducting 
this database search, we checked the references of all of the included articles to identify 
additional relevant articles.
3,582 references identified through database searching  
-Abi/Inform: n=1,033  
-Cochrane: n=1  
-Scopus: n=993 
-PsycINFO: n=153  
-EconLit (EBSCOhost): n=504  
-PubMed/Medline: n=217  
-Emerald: n=84  
-Web of Science: n=597  
189 abstracts included for full-text review 
1,890 references excluded after examination of abstracts 
-  obviously not meeting inclusion criteria 
82 articles excluded after reading full-text 
-  full text not in English: n=2 
-  duplicate with other article: n=2 
-  no empirical investigation of influencing factor-outcome link: n=54 
-  expansion with international franchising: n=3 
-  not a peer-reviewed journal article / opinion: n=8 
-  not a business format or product trade-name franchise: n=3 
-  question unrelated to franchise itself: n= 10  
107 articles included after reading full text
19 additional articles included by reference check
126 articles finally included in the review
1,503 duplicates removed  
2,079 references reviewed on title and abstract 
Figure 1: Selection process systematic review
 To ensure a high-quality and unbiased review, three researchers were involved in the 
article selection and data extraction process. We started with an independent assessment 
and discussion of 40 abstracts by two reviewers to maximize validity. Subsequently, all 
databases were searched by one reviewer (n=3,582 hits), duplicates were removed, and 
the remaining abstracts (n=2,079) were reviewed. Abstracts with potential relevance 
were independently assessed by a second reviewer and doubts regarding inclusion 
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were discussed. Many abstracts (n=1,890) were excluded because they obviously did 
not meet the inclusion criteria1. The resulting 189 studies were reviewed in full-text 
and summarized by using a semi-structured data-extraction form. If there was doubt 
regarding inclusion, a second reviewer was involved; in case of persistent doubt a third 
reviewer was involved. This full-text reading reduced the selection to 107 articles (see 
Figure 1 for reasons for exclusion). By performing reference checks of the included 
articles, we found 19 additional relevant studies. Ultimately, 126 articles were included 
in our analysis (Figure 1). 
Data analysis
A narrative synthesis was conducted of the review material. Due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the literature, meta-analysis was not possible. In a narrative synthesis, 
the relationships between studies with different foci, theories and methodologies 
are thematically explored (Mays et al., 2005; Popay et al., 2006). Following the 
recommendations of Popay et al. (2006), we conducted the following steps. 
 Firstly, we analyzed each study on the investigated design or process factors, 
operationalization of each factor, types of outcomes, operationalization of each 
outcome, theoretical perspective, country, industry, methodology, and actor perspective 
(franchisor, franchisee and customer). As a second step, we clustered the factors that 
referred to similar design or process elements. To accomplish this clustering, we relied 
on the definition of franchising as described in the introduction. This approach resulted 
in two major factor clusters: ‘contract’ and ‘business format’. We also determined clusters 
by searching in studies for aspects that are central in major franchise disciplines. From 
an economic/organizational perspective, the major factor ‘ownership structure’ was 
established. From a social perspective, the focus of studies is on the individual behavior 
of the franchisor and franchisee and on their interaction (relationship). This perspective 
led us to establish the fourth major cluster, ‘behavior and interaction’. The last cluster of 
factors, ‘age and size’, was determined by thematically analyzing the common themes 
of all factors that could not be grouped within one of the other four clusters2. Within 
the five major factor clusters, sub-clusters were identified by thematically analyzing 
the common themes of the factors studied (see the results section). Thirdly, outcomes 
related to the same type of result were clustered by sub-factor. The size and direction 
1 Many abstracts were excluded because the term franchising was used with another meaning than the business format 
franchises we were interested in. For example, the term franchise is also used in the banking/ financing sector, it is used in 
the context of railways and other transportation, and it is used in sport leagues. 
2 Many studies have included size and age variables as control variables in their studies. As such, size and age were not used 
as a criterion for initial selection, as doing so would have included many studies that were otherwise not relevant. This 
article therefore only reports on studies in which age and size were used as control variables if these studies were also 
included for one of the other four factor clusters.
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of each outcome were determined for every study and were summarized using the 
following symbols: – (negative), 0 (no difference) or + (positive). If studies did not report 
on the statistical significance of their findings, symbols were still used in accordance 
with the outcomes reported by the authors. Finally, we described the similarities and 
differences between the outcomes for each sub-factor and searched for the reasons for 
the differences by using the variables from Step 1. 
 The designs of most of the studies did not allow us to determine causality in the 
analysis. Although terms such as ‘influencing factors’ may suggest causality, only the 
existence of some type of relationship can be ascertained.
Results: The state of empirical research
A total of 126 empirical studies have related design and process factors within franchising 
to outcomes. Aspects related to behavior and the interaction between the franchisor 
and the franchisee received the most attention (n=58). A small majority of the studies 
investigated outcomes at the franchisee level (n=74). Outcomes at the customer level 
were rarely investigated (n=2). Outcomes at the franchisee level were the dominant 
focus in studies on the business format (35 of 49 studies) and behavioral and interaction 
aspects (47 of 58 studies), whereas outcomes at the franchisor level received the most 
attention in studies of ownership structure (28 of 34 studies). Financial performance 
(n=21), survival (n=20), and growth (n=12) were the most frequently investigated 
outcome types at the franchisor level. Satisfaction (n=43) and financial performance 
(n=27) were most frequently considered in studies that investigated outcomes for 
franchisees (see Table S1 in the Appendix of this chapter for a more extensive overview). 
 One-third of the studies used the restaurant/food industry as empirical setting, 
either alone or in combination with one or two other industries. Another substantial 
number of studies (n=57) conducted their research in multiple industries. Studies were 
conducted in 17 countries, predominantly in North America and the UK (67%) and 
countries in continental Europe (17%). Only 9 studies were conducted in Asian or South 
American countries. Research on franchising in the US was ample (>60%). 
More than one-third of the articles employed an economic perspective (35%). A 
quarter of all studies used agency theory as their theoretical perspective. A substantial 
number of studies (n=38) did not mention a theoretical perspective; instead, these 
studies constructed the theoretical foundation for the research based on prior research 
findings or undefined theories (Table 1)3.
3 See Table S1 in the end of the chapter for a more detailed overview of the state of empirical research with regard to 
theoretical perspectives, countries, industries, outcome types, and methodology for the total base of articles and for each 
factor cluster. 
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Table 1: Summary of empirical research on outcomes of factors within franchising 
Region Sector Research design Type of theory
North America:       62% Restaurant/food: 32% Quantitative: 80% Economic:                   35%
Europe (incl. UK): 22% Hotel:                6% Qualitative:      13% Organizational:            15%
Oceania:                 9% Other:         19% Mixed methods: 7% Social-psychological: 19%
Asia:               5.5% Various: 43% Learning:                       4%
South America:  1.5% Not specified:           26%
The majority of the studies employed quantitative designs (n=101). The studies 
vary widely in sample size. Of the 101 studies, 28 studies investigated outcomes 
longitudinally. The qualitative (n=16) and mixed-method (n=9) studies also differed 
greatly in terms of the number of interviews used. Our subsequent analysis considers 
these methodological differences as possible explanations for the mixed outcomes that 
resulted from these studies. 
Results: A framework of factors related to outcomes of 
franchising
As described in the data-analysis section, the analyses show that five major factors with 
multiple sub-factors are related to outcomes of franchising: the ownership structure 
that is chosen for the system and the units, the design of the business format, the design 
of the contract, the behavior of the franchisor and the franchisee and their interaction, 
and the age and size of the system and the units. We have mapped all these factors into 
a comprehensive framework with the five major factors as major building blocks and 
the sub-factors as the content of these blocks (see Figure 2). The results section of this 
paper is further structured along these five blocks of the framework. 
A: The influence of ownership structure 
Our analysis shows that outcomes are related to four choices regarding ownership 
structure (see Block A, Figure 2): whether both the franchisor and franchisees or only the 
franchisees own units (plural form versus pure franchise); the proportion of units owned 
by franchisees; whether each franchisee owns one or more units (single-unit versus 
multi-unit ownership); and whether the responsibility for the daily operations of the 
unit is delegated to a unit manager or not (passive versus active ownership). Structured 
information about each individual paper can be found in Table S2 in the appendix of 
this chapter. 
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x = on franchisor level only 
* = on franchisee level only 
External context: market, industry, regulations 
Outcomes franchisor and franchisee 
 
 
managerial effectiveness X 
survival 
financial performance 
growthX 
success, competitive advantage* 
satisfaction, intention to remain 
A: Ownership structure
- plural form or pure franchise X 
- proportion units owned by 
franchisees X 
- single or multi-unit ownership 
- passive or active  ownership 
B: Business format 
- brand name 
- support:  
o provision* and extent  
o type 
o quality* and importance* 
- control: 
o initial control*  
o extent of standardized 
operating instructions 
o decentralized decision-
making* 
C: Contract design 
- level of initial payments 
- level of ongoing payments 
- exclusive territories 
- not tying* 
- fair, clear and protective 
contract* 
E: Size and age 
- size 
o size of system X  
o size of franchisee firm* 
- age  
o (initialX) age of system 
o age of franchisee firm* 
D: Behavior & interaction
- relationship: 
o closeness  
o commitment  
o trust 
o communication & 
knowledge exchange 
o little conflict and 
opportunistic 
behavior* 
 
- attitude & skills: 
o motivated, hard 
working, active 
franchisees, 
o managerial & 
marketing skills* 
franchisees 
o prior experience 
franchisees X 
o franchisor skills and 
attitude to manage, 
support, recruit 
franchisees
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of factors related to outcomes based on review  
Plural form versus pure franchise 
Ten studies have compared the outcomes of plural forms with those of pure franchises. 
These studies were conducted in the US (n=5), France (n=4) and Spain (n=1). Seven 
studies used the restaurant/food industry as the empirical setting. All studies focused 
on the outcomes for the franchisor. 
 Four studies found that plural forms are more managerially effective because 
innovation, uniformity and economic efficiency are more attainable. The franchisees 
contribute to innovation because they have a greater incentive to perform well as 
independent entrepreneurs. The company-owned units facilitate the dissemination of 
innovation and help to increase uniformity, because they can be used as pilot sites that 
persuade franchisees to adopt new practices and as training sites for new franchisees. 
The use of the same control system further enhances uniformity (Bradach, 1997; Cliquet, 
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2000; Cliquet & Croizean, 2002; Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). Cliquet (2000) and Cliquet and 
Croizean (2002) found that the combined use of franchisees and company-owned units 
also leads to greater economic efficiency. 
 Besides managerial effectiveness, one study also found that the plural form 
outperforms pure franchise with regard to franchisor survival (Bordonaba-Juste et 
al., 2009). With regard to efficiency and financial performance, the results are mixed. 
Perrigot et al. (2009) found that plural forms are more efficient than predominantly pure 
systems, whereas Botti et al. (2009) found no significant difference. These contradictory 
results may be caused by differences in methodology, as Perrigot et al. (2009) used more 
variables to measure efficiency and employed a different cut-off point for the plural 
form measure. Regarding financial performance, both Hsu and Jang (2009) and Koh et 
al. (2009) found that franchisors gain more financially in plural forms. Srinivasan (2006) 
found this only to be true for some franchisors. For certain chains, intangible value is 
unaffected and small chains may even experience weaker financial performance if they 
also have high financial liquidity and a lasting advertising strategy (Srinivasan, 2006). All 
three studies considered the same outcome, industry and country; however, the study 
by Srinivasan was conducted earlier and used a larger sample and study period than 
the study by Koh et al. (2009). Moreover, Srinivasan considered contingent variables 
other than those used in the other two studies. Despite the overall greater effectiveness, 
franchisors with a plural form also meet with difficulties (Cliquet, 2000). The franchisors’ 
interests associated with managing franchisees and company-owned managers are 
not always aligned, the risk of conflicts and management problems are higher, and 
demotivation and anxiety among franchisees is more common. 
Proportion of units in chain owned by franchisees 
Fourteen studies evaluated the optimal proportion of units owned by franchisees in 
plural form chains. These studies were conducted in the US (n=11), France (n=1) and 
Spain (n=2). Half of the studies were conducted in the restaurant/food industry. Eleven 
studies employed an agency perspective, either exclusively (n=1) or in combination 
with another perspective (n=10). 
 Two studies give estimates of the optimal proportion. As the targeted outcome and 
studied countries differ, so does the estimated proportion. The ideal proportion for 
survival in the Spanish restaurant industry was around 69 percent (Bordonaba-Juste et 
al., 2009), whereas the ideal proportion for financial performance in the US restaurant 
industry was between 37 and 46 percent (Hsu & Jang, 2009). Other studies made more 
general claims and found that a higher franchise proportion yields lower customer 
satisfaction and financial performance (O’Neill & Matilla, 2004; O’Neill et al., 2006). 
The effects on growth are unclear; whereas Shane et al. (2006) and Sen (1998) found 
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a positive relationship between proportion and growth, Kosová and Lafontaine (2010) 
found a negative relationship. 
 Various studies found that the optimal proportion is contingent on the 
environment, strategy, business format characteristics and system age. With regard to 
the environment, franchisors have higher financial outcomes and survival rates if they 
increase their franchise proportion (1) if their units are widely dispersed in different 
geographical markets (Hsu & Jang, 2009; Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001; Vazquez, 2007), (2) 
if they have started their operations in a strict legal environment (Shane & Foo, 1999), or 
(3) if they were one of the first entering franchise firms on their market and are currently 
relatively mature (Bordonaba-Juste et al., 2009). With regard to strategy, franchisors 
perform better financially if they align their franchise proportion with their financial 
and marketing strategies (Srinivasan, 2006) and do not use franchising as a strategy to 
gather resources, as such an approach prevents a proper fit between on the one hand 
proportion and on the other hand business format characteristics and geographical 
dispersion of units (Combs, Ketchen & Hoover, 2004b; Ketchen et al., 2006). With regard 
to the business format, if franchisors have highly valuable resources (Barthelemy, 2008; 
Vazquez, 2007) or tacit business practices that cannot be specified in the operations 
manual (Barthelemy, 2008), they obtain better financial and survival outcomes if they 
reduce their franchise proportion. Franchisors should increase the proportion if local 
knowledge is important in applying the business format on unit level (Vazquez, 2007). 
With respect to age, Kosová and Lafontaine (2010) found that, in order to enhance their 
survival chances, it is better for young systems to use a lower franchise proportion than 
mature firms.
  Two US studies investigated whether company-owned units or franchised units 
are more suitable at the unit level, given a particular environment and strategy. Vroom 
and Gimeno (2007) found that chains have a greater advantage with company-owned 
units than with franchised units in concentrated markets, as company-owned units can 
generate higher revenues in such a situation. Yin and Zajac (2004) found that franchised 
units require complex rather than simple strategies for optimal financial performance, 
and that the opposite is true for company-owned units. 
Single-unit versus multi-unit ownership 
Nine studies investigated the outcomes of single-unit versus multi-unit ownership. All 
these studies were conducted in the US, and most took a franchisor perspective (n=7) 
and employed agency theory (n=6). 
 For franchisees, owning multiple units is more advantageous than owning only one. 
This results in better survival rates (Bates, 1998) and lower production costs because 
production experience is more easily transferred between units belonging to the 
56    |     Making Franchising in Healthcare Work
same owner (Darr et al., 1995). For franchisors, the results of multi-unit franchising are 
more equivocal. It lowers the chances of survival for new franchisors (Shane, 1998) but 
increases them for larger franchisors (Shane, 2001). Multi-unit and single-unit systems 
are similarly productive (Thompson, 1994). Three of the four studies on system growth 
found positive effects (Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Bradach, 1995). 
However, the study with the largest sample (1,201 as opposed to 169, 152, and 5 systems 
in the other three studies) did not find a significant effect in this regard (Clarkin & Rosa, 
2005). According to Bradach (1995), multi-unit franchises can grow more easily because 
the re-use of existing franchisees implies that the franchisor receives the same fees while 
fewer resources have to be allocated to finding franchisees for new units. Moreover, 
he found that multi-unit franchisees make the system more effective by facilitating 
system-wide adaptation because franchisors have to persuade fewer franchisees to 
implement changes. However, these franchisees are slightly less effective in terms of 
local responsiveness (Bradach, 1995). 
Passive versus active ownership 
Passive ownership and multi-unit ownership are closely related; after all, when 
franchisees own multiple units, passive ownership must be allowed. However, four 
studies also considered specifically whether passive ownership is related to outcomes. 
Three of these studies employed an agency perspective and were conducted in the 
US. For franchisees in older and larger US restaurant chains, passive ownership is 
disadvantageous for their survival chances (Michael & Combs, 2008). For franchisors, 
the findings on survival are less straightforward. Although Shane (1998) found lower 
survival in systems that adopt passive ownership, Vazquez (2009) showed that such 
ownership is only negative in systems in which the operations manual is not specific 
and local knowledge is highly important. With regard to system growth, Clarkin and 
Rosa (2005) showed a positive effect. 
B: The influence of the business format
Besides ownership structure, the business format appears the second influencing factor. 
Studies show that the outcomes of franchises are determined by the brand name, the 
format facilitators directed at support, and the format facilitators directed at control. 
Format facilitators are the operating and management structures that should ensure 
that franchisees deliver the products and services required by the franchisor (Kaufmann 
& Eroglu, 1998) (see Block B, Figure 2 and Table S3 in the appendix).
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Brand name 
All studies on the brand name (n=10) reported the positive effects of a strong 
recognizable brand name, regardless of the country or sector of investigation and the 
theoretical perspective that was used. For franchisors, the brand name is positively 
related to profits, sales, growth and survival (Gillis & Combs, 2009; Inma & Debowski, 
2006; Shane & Spell, 1998). For franchisees, it has a positive impact on satisfaction, 
success and survival (Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Hing, 1996; Knight, 1986; Michael & Combs, 
2008; Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001; Watson & Johnson, 2010; Pitt et al., 2003). 
Support 
The studies on the influence of the support provided to franchisees (n=49) considered 
the role of the provision and the extent of the support, the type of support, and the 
quality and importance of the support. Studies on the outcomes at the franchisee level 
(n=35) and of franchisee satisfaction (n=24) were the most common.
 Irrespective of the industry, the country, and the operationalization of the support 
provision, studies always show positive effects on franchisee satisfaction, financial 
performance and survival (Abdullah et al., 2008; Dubost et al., 2008; Hing, 1995, 1999; 
Roh & Yoon, 2009; Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001; Rajagopal, 2007; Frazer & Winzar, 2005). 
However, franchisees’ valuation of the support provision generally decreases over 
time (Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001; Grünhagen & Dorsch, 2003). The extent of the support 
provided also contributes to positive outcomes for franchisees. Franchisees are more 
satisfied and perform better financially if they are offered a large amount of support 
(Knight, 1984, 1986; Minguela-Rata et al., 2009, 2010). In contrast, offering extensive 
support is not directly beneficial for the franchisor. In Australia, it was found to have no 
impact on disruption rates (Frazer, 2001a; Frazer & Winzar, 2005), and in the US, it even 
had negative effects on survival rates (Shane, 1998, 2001; Shane & Spell, 1998).
 The type of support provided to franchisees matters more for franchisors than 
for franchisees. Studies on the franchisee level all show positive or neutral effects of 
different support types; no type of support has negative effects. All studies on franchisee 
satisfaction found positive effects, irrespective of the type of support studied. Training 
(Hunt, 1973; Lusch, 1977; Merrilees & Frazer, 2006), franchisor representatives (Lusch, 
1977), assistance in seeking suitable locations, product development and a ready-
made concept (Hing, 1996) are all positively related to satisfaction. Marketing and 
brand support were also found to have a positive effect on satisfaction in various 
industries (Hing, 1996; Merrilees & Frazer, 2006; Lusch, 1977), although high-performing 
franchisees value these support types more than lower performers (Merrilees & Frazer, 
2006). Nevertheless, not all support types have unequivocal positive effects on the 
financial performance and survival rates of franchisees. Financial assistance was found 
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to have no impact on financial performance (Churchill & Hunt, 1973), whereas training 
was found to have a positive effect on both financial performance (Michael & Combs, 
2008; Minguela-Rata et al., 2010) and survival (Michael & Combs, 2008). Kalnins and 
Mayer (2004) found that the survival of restaurant franchisees can be improved by 
transferring local knowledge to franchisees, but not by transferring experience gained 
non-locally. 
 Studies on the franchisor level show more mixed results for the different support types. 
With regard to survival, Shane (2001) found positive effects of training, communication 
services and assistance to franchisees in seeking suitable locations. However, 
Grünhagen et al. (2008), who studied the relationship between multiple support types 
and the closing or conversion of outlets, found no effect of any support type in the 
US. In Germany, only insurance had a positive survival effect, whereas newsletters, 
internet services and field visits even resulted in more disruption (Grünhagen et al., 
2008). Regarding system growth, the effect of support types is also mixed. Shane et al. 
(2006) found a positive effect of providing financial assistance to franchisees, although 
Clarkin and Rosa (2005) found no effect. Similarly, Leblibici and Shalley (1996) showed 
a positive effect of mechanisms to support the franchisor and franchisees in managing 
their working relationship, whereas Dandridge and Falbe (1994) found that this support 
type had no effect on growth. The only study on success, by Yang et al. (2005), found 
some indication that separate headquarters for innovation and administration with an 
ample support staff dedicated to innovation positively correlates with success. 
 Moreover, the quality of the support offered favourably affects franchisee outcomes. 
Six studies found positive relationships with satisfaction (Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Huang & 
Phau, 2009; Lewis & Lambert, 1991; Morrison, 1996; Spinelli & Birley, 1998) and success 
(Falbe & Welsh, 1998), irrespective of the country, sector, and operationalization used. 
Falbe and Welsh (1998) even reported that franchisors found system quality to be the 
most important factor in franchisee success. Franchisee satisfaction also increases when 
franchisees perceive the support to be instrumental (Lusch, 1977; Yavas & Habib, 1987) 
or helpful (Michie & Sibley, 1985). The influence of instrumental support on satisfaction 
is stronger if the quality of that support is high (Yavas & Habib, 1987). Interestingly, 
different franchisees within the same system can attach different quality and importance 
levels to the same support, resulting in different satisfaction levels (Huang & Phau, 2009).
Control 
Fifteen studies considered the influence of format facilitators directed at control. 
These studies considered the role of initial control, standardized operating instructions 
and (de)centralized decision-making. Studies at the franchisee level (n=10) and with 
franchisee satisfaction as an outcome (n=7) were the most common. 
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 Six studies indicated that the use of disclosure information and assessment methods 
to initially select franchisees with the right attitudes and expectations ultimately leads 
to greater franchisee satisfaction (Hing, 1995, 1999; Roh & Yoon, 2009; Tuunanen, 2002) 
and success (Morrison & Lashley, 2003), but not to more system growth (Clarkin & Rosa, 
2005). 
 Five studies showed that greater use of standardized operating instructions for 
franchisees has no negative effects on franchisee outcomes but has mixed effects 
on franchisor outcomes4. At the franchisee level, both Kidwell et al. (2007) and Knott 
(2003) found that franchisor requirements regarding the use of specific practices and 
procedures positively contribute to financial performance. Kidwell et al. (2007) found 
that this positive effect occurred because the use of instructions curbed free-riding 
behavior among franchisees. Free-riding means “cutting costs by lowering product or 
service quality” while profiting from the brand reputation of the franchisor (Kidwell et al., 
2007, p. 523), especially in cases of non-repeated trade. However, Komoto (2005), who 
only considered the effect of strictly following the operations manual, found that this 
strategy has no universal positive effect. In fact, it enhanced the financial performance 
of franchisees during their first five contract years but not in later years when local 
adaptation became performance-enhancing. At the franchisor level, the effects on 
financial performance depend on the ownership type. Significant investment in 
developing standardized operating routines enhanced performance in pure franchises 
but reduced performance in plural form chains (Gillis & Combs, 2009). One small-scale 
study found that a high level of standardization had no effect on growth (Leblebici & 
Shalley, 1996). 
 Five studies considered the impact of the extent of decentralized decision-making. 
At the franchisor level, centralized services decreased the exit chances of large systems: 
the larger the system, the larger the effect (Shane, 2001). However, at the franchisee 
level, decentralization of decision-making yields better outcomes. Irrespective of 
operationalization, industry and country, it is related to more perceived competitive 
advantage (Baucus et al., 1996), satisfaction (Baucus et al., 1996; Schul et al., 1985; 
Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001), and a better financial performance as a result of less free-
riding behaviour (Kidwell et al., 2007). 
C: The influence of contract design 
The design of the contract is the third factor that influences outcomes. Besides provisions 
about format facilitators, six other contract elements were investigated: initial payments, 
ongoing payments, contract length, exclusive territories, tying and fairness (see Block C 
4 Although various authors have also included the operations manual as a support service (previous section), it also has an 
important control function. It is both a support and a control tool. 
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Figure 2 and table S4 in the appendix). Of the thirty-seven studies, 75% were conducted 
in the US. Various industries were used as empirical setting. 
Level of initial payments 
Seventeen studies considered the effects of the level of initial payments at the franchisee 
(n=7) and franchisor (n=10) level. Initial payments are payments made by franchisees 
before they can open a new unit. All but one of the studies were conducted in various 
industries in the US. 
 At the franchisee level, three studies found the level of initial payments to be 
positively related to income (Churchill & Hunt, 1973) and survival (Bates, 1995b; Frazer 
& Winzar, 2005). Other studies reported negative and neutral relationships (Michael & 
Combs, 2008; Holmberg & Morgan, 2003; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999). At the franchisor 
level, initial payments also have mixed effects. The effect on survival tends to be 
different for different types of payments. Higher levels of cash investment are positively 
related to the survival of new and large franchisors (Shane, 1998, 2001), whereas most 
studies found that the level of total investment/start-up costs had no effect (Shane, 
1996, 1998; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998; Kosová & Lafontaine, 2010; Castrogiovanni et al., 
1993). Kosová and Lafontaine (2010) even found a negative relationship, especially for 
mature firms. Only Shane and Foo (1999) found a positive survival effect of start-up 
costs in states in which new systems are obliged to register. Initial payments also seem 
to have mixed effects on growth, as negative, neutral and positive relationships were 
identified in various studies (Shane et al., 2006; Kosová & Lafontaine, 2010; Shane, 1996; 
Castrogiovanni & Justis, 2002). Only one study considered financial performance and 
concluded that start-up costs should be relatively low (Gillis & Combs, 2009). 
Level of ongoing payments 
Nineteen studies investigated the influence of the level of ongoing payments. Although 
it is frequently argued that payments serve as an incentive for franchisees, in practice, 
higher levels of ongoing payments rarely have a positive effect at the franchisee level. 
On the contrary, predominantly negative relationships have been found with survival 
(Michael & Combs, 2008), financial performance (Frew & Jud, 1986), and satisfaction if the 
franchisees perceive the payments as too high (Abdullah et al., 2008; Frazer et al., 2007a; 
Hing, 1996; Knight, 1986; Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001). Only Benjamin et al. (2007) found 
that the effect on financial performance depends on the region. In certain regions, the 
payments are in balance with the gains of being part of the franchise system, whereas 
in other regions, franchisees profit more than they have to pay (Benjamin et al., 2007).
 At the franchisor level, the majority of studies showed that the magnitude of ongoing 
payments has no effect on survival chances (Shane, 1996, 1998; Shane & Foo, 1999; 
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Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998), shareholder returns (Spinelli et al., 2003), or growth (Kosová 
& Lafontaine, 2010; Sen, 1993; Shane, 1996). One study even found that higher ongoing 
fixed fees negatively affect survival, at least for mature chains (Kosová & Lafontaine, 
2010). Only a subset of the studies found positive effects on financial turnover (Chaudey 
& Fadairo, 2008, 2010) and the survival of large systems (Shane, 2001). Moreover, Kosová 
and Lafontaine (2010) found a positive relationship between advertising fees and 
survival, and a positive effect on growth from royalties and advertising fees in mature 
firms. Interestingly, Kaufmann and Dant (1996) found an overall positive effect of fees 
on growth, while Shane et al. (2006) reported larger increases in the size of systems that 
gradually lower royalty rates and that start with low fees and raise them over time. 
Length, tying, exclusive territories, and fairness of contract 
The roles of contract length, tying, exclusive territories and contractual fairness have 
also been investigated. Contract length appears to be unimportant to achieve positive 
outcomes. Of six studies, only Chaudey and Fadairo (2008, 2010) found a positive 
correlation between constraint contracts and results, and length was only one of 
the six variables in the constraint contracts measure. Moreover, tying agreements in 
the contract, i.e., obligatory central purchasing, are not important to the success of 
franchising. Three out of four studies showed that such agreements benefit neither the 
franchisor nor the franchisee (Hunt & Nevin, 1975; Hing, 1996; Michael, 2000). Only one 
small-scale Korean study found a positive relationship with satisfaction, but this was 
more related to the punctuality of deliveries by the prescribed supplier than to price 
levels (Roh & Yoon, 2009). 
 In contrast to the marginal roles of length and tying, three US studies showed that 
adopting exclusive territories within contracts positively affects the survival of both 
the franchisor and the franchisee (Azoulay & Shane, 2001; Michael & Combs, 2008), 
and positively influences the franchisees’ financial performance because it prevents 
the establishment of new same-brand units that can capture revenues from existing 
neighboring franchisee units (Kalnins, 2004). Six studies highlighted the importance 
for franchisee satisfaction of contractual regulations (e.g., regarding termination and 
restrictions) that are clear, that do not exclusively benefit the franchisor’s interests, and 
that are perceived by franchisees as reasonable given the benefits that they obtain from 
the franchisor (Abdullah et al., 2008; Dubost et al., 2008; Hing, 1996; Morrison, 1996; 
Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001; Withane, 1991).
D: The influence of behavior and interaction
Fifty-eight studies showed that the previous three ‘hard’ design elements alone 
cannot ensure positive outcomes. Good relationships between the franchisor and 
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the franchisees and the skills and attitudes of both parties also play an important role 
(see Figure 2, Block D, and Table S5 in the appendix). Evidence is primarily available 
for outcomes at the franchisee level (n=47), with satisfaction as the outcome measure 
(n=33). 
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee 
Several studies showed the importance of a good working relationship by investigating 
the following relationship characteristics: closeness of the relationship, commitment, 
trust, communication/information exchange, dependence, conflict and opportunistic 
behavior. Moreover, various studies showed that these relationship characteristics are 
related.
 Studies focusing on various conceptualizations of closeness of the relationship 
consistently show that relationships between franchisors and franchisees always yield 
positive outcomes if they cooperate closely as partners with ample consideration 
for each other’s tasks, roles, and needs. Positive effects were found on the success of 
both parties, franchisee satisfaction, intention to remain, financial performance, and 
competitive advantage (Baucus et al., 1996; Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b; 
Brown & Dev, 1997; Huang et al., 2007; Huang & Phau, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Schul 
et al., 1985; Schul, 1987; Spinelli & Birley, 1998; Kidwell et al., 2007; Rajagopal, 2007; 
Morrison & Lashley, 2003; Clarkin & Rosa, 2005; Watson & Johnson, 2010). One study 
focused on the relationships between franchisees and showed that cooperation and 
interaction in a particular region improves financial performance, but supra-regional 
interaction does not (Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2010). 
 Franchisor-franchisee relationships with higher levels of trust predominantly yield 
superior performance. Five studies showed a positive relationship with franchisor and 
franchisee satisfaction and the intention to remain, irrespective of the country, industry 
and type of trust examined (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008a; Chiou et al., 
2004; Dubost et al., 2008; Dickey et al., 2007). Nevertheless, trust may be more important 
in some situations than in others. From the franchisee perspective, a high level of trust 
only has a significant positive effect at the beginning of the relationship, and not in the 
long term (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008a). At the franchisor level, trust only 
has a positive effect on financial performance in plural form chains, and not in pure 
franchises (Gillis & Combs, 2009). 
 Moreover, studies show almost unequivocally that high-quality, frequent 
communication and information exchange between franchisors and franchisees reduce 
the probability of negative franchisee exit (Frazer & Winzar, 2005). Moreover, it has a 
positive effect on franchisee satisfaction, intention to remain, success and perceived 
competitive position across countries and industries and regardless of the methodology 
used (Abdullah et al., 2008; Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b; Chiou et al., 2004; 
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Dubost et al., 2008; Hing, 1996; Lee et al., 2008; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Falbe & Welsh, 
1998; Gassenheimer et al., 1996). Only Gillis and Combs (2009) indicated possible 
negative effects of exchanging knowledge. This study found that franchisor investment 
in knowledge exchange reduced financial performance in pure franchise chains but 
increased it in plural form chains.
 Where the franchisor-franchisee relationship is characterized by higher levels of 
dependence, franchisees are found to enjoy higher levels of satisfaction and better 
performance (Lewis & Lambert, 1991; Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b). 
In addition, higher levels of commitment between the franchisor and franchisee 
yield higher satisfaction levels, higher levels of the intention to remain, and greater 
managerial effectiveness (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008ab). The only 
negative effect was on franchisee financial performance (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-
Redondo, 2004). Studies consistently showed the negative effects of relationships in 
which the franchisor and franchisee behave opportunistically and experience high 
levels of conflict rather than work with each other’s interests in mind (Gassenheimer et 
al., 1996; Kidwell et al., 2007; Lusch, 1976; Phan et al., 1996; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Schul, 
1987; Tuunanen, 2002; Frazer, 2001b; Frazer & Winzar, 2005). 
 Some of the preceding studies showed that these relationship characteristics are 
closely related, which suggests that the development of one characteristic can be 
stimulated by another. Franchisors and franchisees can enhance their level of cooperation 
by communicating better and more frequently, particularly when the franchisees are 
not heavily dependent on the franchisor (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Close cooperation, in 
turn, is associated with lower levels of conflict (Schul, 1987) and opportunistic behavior 
(Kidwell et al., 2007) and stimulates the development of trust (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-
Redondo, 2004) and commitment (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b). Partners 
can achieve more commitment by being more interdependent and by expressing more 
solidarity with each other (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b), by exchanging 
information (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008b; Watson & Johnson, 2010), 
and by building trust (Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008a). Commitment can 
also help to build trust (Dickey et al., 2007). Communication and information exchange 
moderates the negative impact of opportunistic behavior on franchisee satisfaction 
(Gassenheimer et al., 1996) and stimulates the development of commitment (Bordonaba-
Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008b; Watson & Johnson, 2010) and trust (Bordonaba-
Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008a; Chiou et al., 2004; Watson & Johnson, 2010). 
Attitudes and skills of franchisee and franchisor
Multiple studies revealed that the skills and attitudes of the franchisor and the franchisee 
are important for the success of franchising. Franchisees that are highly motivated and 
willing to work hard and make sacrifices are more likely to survive and succeed, as are 
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their franchisors (Bates, 1995ab; Clarkin, 2008; Frazer & Winzar, 2005; Frazer et al., 2007a; 
Merrilees & Frazer, 2006; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999; Parsa et al., 2005; Watson, 2008). 
Franchisees experience better financial performance, a greater likelihood of success 
and more satisfaction if they have good management and marketing capabilities and 
if they are able to align their own strategies and management efforts with those of the 
franchisor (Merrilees & Frazer, 2006; Clarkin, 2008; Frazer & Winzar, 2005; Knight, 1986; 
Parsa, 1999; Parsa et al., 2005; Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Withane, 1991). It is unclear whether 
entrepreneurial characteristics and risk taking are also important; some studies showed 
positive effects (Hing, 1995, 1999; Withane, 1991), whereas others showed negative 
(Fenwick & Strombom, 1998) or neutral effects (Fenwick & Strombom, 1998; Hing, 1995, 
1999; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999; Knott, 2003). Franchisees’ prior skills and experience 
appear to be less important than current capabilities. Experience, whether in self-
employment, management, business or industry, rarely has a positive effect (Bates, 
1995ab; Frazer et al., 2007a; Knight, 1986; Hunt, 1973; Fenwick & Strombom, 1998; 
Knott, 2003; Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Hing, 1995, 1999; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999). 
Two studies even found a negative effect on returns (Knott 2003) and on franchisee 
satisfaction (Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001). Only four studies found a positive effect on 
the success and survival of franchisees (Frazer & Winzar, 2005; Knight, 1986; Michael & 
Combs, 2008) and franchisors (Shane, 1998).
 Franchisors need the skills necessary to successfully manage relationships, provide 
the support that franchisees need, and recruit suitable franchisees. Otherwise, they may 
leave franchising or experience reduced success (Frazer, 2001b; Kirby & Watson, 1999; 
Knight, 1986; Stanworth et al., 2001; Watson, 2008). Franchisors should also be able to 
choose the right strategies to influence the behavior of their franchisees. Franchisors 
can rely on the contract and on threats (i.e., coercive strategies) or can primarily use 
support services and communication activities (i.e., non-coercive strategies). Studies 
unequivocally found better outcomes at the franchisee level when franchisors primarily 
relied on non-coercive strategies (Frazier & Summers, 1986; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch, 
1977; Michie & Sibley, 1985; Parsa, 1996, 1999; Yavas & Habib, 1987).
E: The influence of size and age
Fifty studies showed that the initial and current size of the system (n=21), size of the 
franchisee firm (n=12), initial (n=6) and current system age (n=22), and age of the 
franchisee firm (n=18) are related to outcomes (see Figure 2, Block E, and Table S6 in the 
appendix). 
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Size of system and franchisee firm 
The size of an existing chain when it starts franchising affects neither franchisor survival 
nor growth (Azoulay & Shane, 2001; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998; Shane, 1996). However, 
once the chain has started franchising, a larger system size has mixed effects. Of the six 
studies that considered the influence on financial performance, five found a beneficial 
effect (Gillis & Combs, 2009; O’Neill & Mattila, 2004; Inma & Debowski, 2006; Hsu & Jang, 
2009; Koh et al., 2009). Shareholder returns are the only exception to this trend (Spinelli 
et al., 2003). A methodologically strong study found a negative effect on growth (Kosová 
& Lafontaine, 2010). Two small-scale studies found neutral or positive effects (Leblebici 
& Shalley 1996; Inma & Debowski, 2006). In addition, the survival chances of franchises 
in Spain are affected positively or not at all by increases in size (Vazquez, 2007, 2009; 
Bordonaba-Juste et al., 2009). Positive effects were also found in four out of six studies in 
the US. Only Kosová and Lafontaine (2010) found a negative effect, but for young firms 
only. It is likely that the differences in findings in the US are due to the correction for 
unobserved chain heterogeneity in the study of Kosová and Lafontaine (2010), as this 
correction reversed their finding from positive to negative. This suggests that a negative 
effect of size for young firms is probable. Negative effects were also found in Australia, 
although these studies focused on disruption and not on real exit (Frazer, 2001a; Frazer 
& Winzar, 2005).
 The size of franchisee firms also appears to be relevant, at least to their survival and 
financial performance. Their survival chances are higher if they own a larger number 
of outlets (Parsa et al., 2005; Bates, 1995ab). Of the seven studies that investigated the 
relationship with financial performance, four found a positive effect (Brand & Croonen, 
2010; Frew & Jud, 1986; Benjamin et al., 2007; Churchill & Hunt, 1973), whereas the other 
three found no effect or a negative effect (Knott, 2003; Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2010; 
Yin & Zajac, 2004). These differences may be due to the different operationalization of 
size used in two of the latter studies and to differences between industries. Satisfaction 
and competitive position were found to be unaffected or even negatively affected by a 
larger franchisee size (Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Spinelli & Birley, 1998). 
Age of system and franchisee firm  
No harmful effect was found for franchisors if they waited longer before starting 
franchising in an existing chain. Franchisors that extensively pilot their concept are 
more likely to succeed (Stanworth et al., 2004). Three studies also found higher survival 
rates for chains that are older at franchise start (Bordonaba-Juste et al., 2009; Kosová 
& Lafontaine, 2010; Lafontaine & Shaw 1998), but two other studies did not share 
this finding (Shane, 1996; Azoulay & Shane, 2001). These differences may be due to 
differences in sample sizes; the positive studies used larger samples than the studies 
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that found no effect, which makes a positive effect more likely. The age of a chain at 
franchise start was found to have either a positive (Kosová & Lafontaine, 2010) or no 
effect on growth (Shane, 1996).
 As systems age, the outcomes for franchisors are affected, but it is not exactly clear 
how. None of the outcomes becomes unequivocally more positive. Four of the seven 
studies examining the relationship with financial performance found positive effects 
(Chaudey & Fadairo, 2008, 2010; Thompson, 1994; Spinelli et al., 2003), but the other 
three studies reported negative effects (Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001; Price, 1993; Inma 
& Debowski, 2006). This difference may be due to different ways of measuring and in 
particular to the way in which the last two studies measured age as part of a broader 
typology. Koh et al. (2009) showed that the financial effect of age disappears after some 
time. Studies on survival demonstrated mostly positive effects in the US and Spain 
(Shane & Foo, 1999; Shane, 1998, 2001; Kosová & Lafontaine, 2010; Vazquez, 2007; 2009), 
but negative and no effects in Australia (Frazer, 2001a; Frazer & Winzar, 2005). One US 
study also found a negative effect (Castrogiovanni et al., 1993). The variations in these 
findings may be due to the focus on disruption and to the measurement at unit level 
in the latter three studies, rather than on survival of the whole system. With respect 
to growth, studies showed that franchise system age has either a negative effect or 
no effect (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 2002, Inma & Debowski, 2006; Kosová & Lafontaine, 
2010; Leblebici & Shalley, 1996; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). 
 Ageing of franchisees and their outlets does not leave their outcomes unaffected, 
but the direction of the effect is not clear. Opposite effects were found on competitive 
advantage (Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Baucus et al., 1996) and financial performance 
(Baucus et al., 1996; Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2010; Knott, 2003; Komoto, 2005; Yin & Zajac, 
2004; Benjamin et al., 2007; Fenwick & Strombom, 1998; Darr et al., 1995), without any 
consistent patterns in sector, country and type of financial performance. Franchisee 
satisfaction remains the same (Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999) 
or even decreases over time (Grünhagen & Dorsch, 2003; Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001). 
Survival chances generally either stay similar or increase over time (Bates, 1995ab; Parsa 
et al., 2005; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004); they only decrease when an existing unit is bought 
from another owner (Bates, 1998). 
Discussion and conclusion
This systematic review aimed at collecting all the empirical evidence on the structural 
and process-related factors that influence the results achieved within franchise systems, 
and to bring this evidence together in an integrative framework. We can conclude that 
franchisors and franchisees must consider multiple factors, thus ensuring an adequate 
fit between franchise design elements, individuals and the external context to make 
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franchising work for themselves. Franchisors and franchisees should work on the 
development of a recognizable brand name and a high-quality working relationship, and 
they should make sure that they are both sufficiently skilled and motivated to generate 
better outcomes. Moreover, franchisors should provide site selection assistance and 
exclusive territories to franchisees, but they should not tie supplies. To further enhance 
franchisee outcomes, franchisors should offer high-quality instrumental support, use 
substantial tools to select potential franchisees, decentralize decision-making, provide 
fair and clear contracts, and use support services and communication rather than 
contractual threats to influence franchisee behavior. The provision of a large number of 
support services also benefits franchisees. However, this does not benefit franchisors. 
Whether franchisors should have a high franchise proportion, discourage passive 
ownership and/or invest in knowledge exchange and standardized operating routines 
to further enhance their own outcomes depends on their overall system design and the 
external context. The roles of multi-unit ownership, payments, size and age are as yet 
unclear. We have mapped all of these findings into a comprehensive framework that 
depicts the factors that jointly drive success in franchising (see Figure 2 in the results 
section)5. 
 Although the research findings presented in this review indicate that there are 
multiple factors that generally enhance success, the findings also show that outcomes 
in franchising are dependent on the compatibility and cohesion of different system 
design elements, the behavior of and relationship between actors in the system, and 
the context. More specific, neither ownership structure is universally appropriate or 
inappropriate, but the results are dependent on size, the market, business format design 
and age. Building trust and stimulating knowledge exchange may be more effective in 
plural form chains, whereas standardization may be better for results in pure franchises. 
Different support services seem to be valued to varying degrees among the different 
franchisees, systems, industries and countries, and the valuation may worsen over time. 
The impact of the magnitude of payments can be contingent on the system age and size, 
and also the inconclusive impact of age and size across studies may be a function of the 
lack of attention to the broader system. The cohesion of all these elements implies that 
it is important that researchers pay more attention to the interactions among different 
elements of the system, their combined effects and their relationship to the external 
context (contextualized systems approach; see e.g., Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998). 
 We do not yet know what factors determine the success of franchising for customers. 
This scarcity of empirical research from the customer perspective is surprising, given that 
the ultimate success of franchising is dependent on customer appreciation. Although 
data regarding financial performance and survival may indicate whether customers 
5 It should be noted that the framework only depicts the relationships that have been found to date. There may also be other 
relevant factors. Current evidence does not allow us to determine whether the dotted lines in the framework from factors 
to outcomes are causal. Thus, further extensive empirical research is needed. 
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value a particular franchise, we do not know what it is exactly that customers value 
about franchise systems. This lack of information constitutes a clear gap in knowledge 
(see also e.g., Dant, 2008). 
The contribution of theoretical perspectives to the evidence 
The diversity and complexity of the franchising literature makes it difficult to develop a 
single, overarching framework of the success factors involved. Researchers, even those 
from similar disciplines, have framed and operationalized similar factors differently. By 
compiling all of the empirical studies within one framework for the first time, our review 
may provide a valuable resource to scientists with different perspectives for future 
research and aims to make an important contribution to the current literature. 
 Various theories have primarily delivered complementary insights into what makes 
franchising work, despite their diverse means of framing the factors involved. Our 
review shows that the agency perspective (e.g., Vazquez, 2007; Combs et al., 2004b) 
has helped researchers to predict the influence of ownership structures, business 
format design and, to a lesser extent, contractual arrangements, age and size. Resource 
theories have often been used to complement agency theory (e.g., Combs et al., 2004; 
Hsu & Jang, 2009) in the study of ownership structures and have correctly indicated 
the impact of business format design and behavior in several studies. Relational/social-
psychological theories (e.g. social exchange, relational marketing) (e.g., Dubost et al., 
2008; Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2008b) have contributed significantly to our 
understanding of how the actions and interactions of the franchisor and the franchisee 
shape success. To a lesser extent, these theories have shown which characteristics of 
the business format are helpful. Learning and knowledge perspectives have only been 
employed in a small number of studies, but have been quite fruitful (e.g., Minguela-
Rata et al., 2009, 2010; Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001). Given the central position of 
knowledge transfer to franchising (e.g., Paswan & Wittman, 2009), it is surprising that 
these perspectives have not been used more often. Contingency principles have 
taught us that not all factors have similar effects in all situations (e.g., Yin & Zajac, 2004; 
Srinivasan, 2006). Multiple other perspectives have been used in a limited number of 
studies. For further research with a systems approach, we suggest researchers combine 
economic-based approaches (e.g., agency theory), organizational approaches (e.g., 
strategic), and social-psychological perspectives (e.g., relational exchange, expectancy, 
and entrepreneurship theory). 
Reflections on the literature and research agenda
In this review, we have identified various gaps that merit further research as well as 
multiple promising avenues for further investigation. We urge scholars to further 
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investigate the interaction between different system design elements, people and 
contexts to gain better insight into what makes franchising work. As indicated by this 
review, the relationships are complex between ownership structure, business format 
design, contract design, age, size, and behavior and interactions, and the outcomes 
of franchising. This implies not only that the effects of individual design and process 
elements are difficult to determine, but also that the effects of these elements may 
actually vary in different systems. These contingencies and the lack of attention to such 
interactions and linkages in some studies may explain the differences in the results 
obtained in this field. Therefore, we argue that the evidence regarding what makes 
franchising work could be enhanced and that some of the ambiguities in the current 
evidence could be eliminated if researchers considered the effects of different design 
and process elements in relation to each other and to the external context. The studies 
by Srinivasan (2006), Inma and Debowski (2006), Kosová and Lafontaine (2010) and 
Gillis and Combs (2009) are a few examples of how such research can be conducted. 
Such research will also allow a better determination of the transferability of evidence to 
other industries and countries and the provision of more focused decision-support to 
practitioners.
 We recommend that researchers identify the synergies between and within 
ownership structures, business format elements, contract elements, behavioral and 
interaction aspects, age and size as factors in outcomes of franchising. Researchers 
should also look for neutralizing effects (e.g., can the positive effect of support neutralize 
the negative effect of payments; see Michael & Combs, 2008). We also suggest further 
study into the relative importance of different factors in shaping outcomes. For example, 
Dubost et al. (2008) found intangible relationship issues to be as important as or more 
important than support services, whereas Abdullah et al. (2008) found the opposite 
to be true in another industry and country. We also recommend investigating the 
outcomes for franchisor, franchisees and customers in relation to each other, i.e., multi-
level investigation, as trade-offs may exist (e.g., in the extent of support; see e.g., Shane, 
2001, and Minguela-Rata et al., 2010), the perceptions of the actors may differ, and the 
outcomes for one actor may have consequences for the actions and outcomes of other 
actors (e.g., Bordonaba-Juste & Polo-Redondo, 2004, 2008a). To date, only a few studies 
have conducted this type of combined research, although Elango and Fried called for 
such studies as early as 1997. Consequently, we also recommend that the factors that 
have only been investigated from either the franchisee or the franchisor perspective be 
examined from both perspectives. In addition, we recommend that researchers employ 
more mixed-method designs in addressing these research challenges, as such designs 
will help them to further develop theories regarding what makes franchising work (e.g., 
Creswell, 2003). 
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 A contextualized approach will also help researchers to determine whether it is truly 
problematic that the current empirical studies mostly focus on the US and the restaurant/
food sector or whether the results of such studies can be generalized to other countries 
and industries with similar systems. We suggest here, among other topics, research on 
multi-unit franchises, as such firms are often larger in the US than in smaller (European) 
countries, and size may have an impact on the benefits and drawbacks of using this 
ownership structure (Shane, 2001). 
 This review has revealed two additional gaps in the evidence at the franchisee level 
that require further attention. First, few studies on outcomes at the franchisee level 
used more than only satisfaction measures6, whereas ultimately ‘hard’ results, such as 
financial performance and survival, are also important. Secondly, although the research 
findings suggest that franchisees play an active role in making their franchises successful 
(e.g., Merrilees & Frazer, 2006; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999; Parsa, 1999), studies at the 
franchisee level have primarily focused on what franchisors should do to create better 
outcomes for their franchisees (see all the studies on support, control, and contracts). It 
is crucial that researchers also examine how franchisees can make their own unit(s) more 
successful. Some relevant research questions are: how can franchisees most successfully 
exploit their business format (see e.g., Merrilees & Frazer, 2006 for a starting point) and 
how can the frequency, quality and type of interaction between franchisees within a 
system contribute to their success (see Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2010 for a starting point). 
 We also argue that the gap in our understanding of what makes franchising work for 
customers must be filled, as this knowledge will be extremely relevant for practitioners 
and will enable them to make their systems more successful (see e.g., Dant, 2008 for 
relevant questions to investigate). 
 In addition to making these broader recommendations, we suggest that researchers 
address two important but not yet properly investigated topics: the level of uniformity 
and knowledge transfer within franchise systems. This review suggests that controlling 
all franchisee decisions is not beneficial despite the basic principle of uniformity in 
franchising (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). Further insight is required into the optimal 
equilibrium between uniformity/control and adaptation/autonomy, given a particular 
business format design and context (see Cox & Mason, 2007, Cochet et al., 2008, and 
Dant & Gundlach, 1998 for a starting point). In addition to agency theory (e.g., Kidwell 
et al., 2007) and knowledge perspectives (e.g., Komoto, 2005), complexity theory (e.g, 
Anderson, 1999; Burnes, 2005) and organizational ecology (e.g., Burgelman, 1991) could 
provide interesting new perspectives for this research. We also recommend research 
6 Satisfaction measures have almost exclusively been used to investigate the effects of qualitative & instrumental support, 
initial control, decentralized decision-making, fair and protectory contracts, commitment, trust, communication, and 
dependence on outcomes at the franchisee level. 
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on the most effective mechanisms for transferring different types of knowledge and 
on the outcomes of knowledge and innovations that are generated by franchisees 
and franchisors (see Paswan & Wittmann, 2009; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Cumberland & 
Githens, 2012 for a starting point). Other relevant topics include the effectiveness of 
different selection methods to identify suitable franchisees (HRM perspective) (see for 
a starting point e.g., Ryan & Tippins, 2004, Rynes et al., 2002, Wright & Boswell, 2002, 
in combination with the studies on franchisee attitudes and skills mentioned in this 
review) and the best ways to develop close relationships within franchise systems (see 
e.g., Rodriguez, 2005; Rahatullah & Raeside, 2008).
 Finally, some of the empirical studies presented here have strengths that should be 
preserved in future research. These strengths include the use of longitudinal designs 
in studies of survival and growth and the use of methods that control for age and size. 
Moreover, because many challenges and relationships are not unique to the franchising 
context, research can benefit from a wide range of other studies on inter- and intra-
organizational cooperation. Generating connections with other fields may also 
encourage mutual learning. 
Limitations 
Although we conducted a systematic review, an absence of publication bias cannot 
be guaranteed as this review was limited to empirical peer-reviewed journal articles 
written in English. Moreover, the diversity of perspectives used to study franchising 
resulted in a multitude of outcome conceptualizations that we had not anticipated, 
and we used rather broad outcome concepts in our databases search. Consequently, 
our initial search did not identify all relevant articles. An extensive reference check 
that identified many additional relevant articles resolved this limitation. A limitation of 
our analysis is that the level of evidence presented in the studies was not rated. This 
choice could have distorted our overview to some extent. However, such a distortion 
was prevented as we considered the methodologies used if different studies presented 
different results. Readers can evaluate the possible interpretative elements in our 
thematic analysis by examining the extensive tables provided online, which present 
the findings of individual studies. By focusing on factors within franchise systems, we 
largely disregarded the influence of general economic and commercial factors within 
countries and industries. Clearly, these factors can also affect outcomes (see, e.g., 
Shane & Foo, 1999). Finally, franchisors and researchers who are interested in successful 
international expansion may use this review as a starting point but should also consider 
the literature on the factors that influence such expansion because these factors were 
not examined exhaustively in this review (see for a starting point e.g., Grewal et al., 2011; 
Frazer, Merrilees & Bodey, 2007b).
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Appendix: Additional supporting information of the systematic 
review
Table S1: Overview of studies on outcomes of factors within franchising
All 
studies
Ownership 
structure
Business 
format 
aspects
Contractual 
aspects
Behavioral 
and 
interaction 
aspects
Age and 
size (firm 
and system 
level)
Number of studies 126 34 49 37 58 50
Methodology:
Quantitative 101 29 38 32 43 47
Qualitative 16 4 4 2 10 1
Mix 9 1 7 3 5 2
Outcome type*:
FO: financial 21 13 2 4 2 11
FO: survival 20 6 6 8 6 15
FO: growth 12 3 5 7 1 6
FO: success 6 1 3 0 5 0
FO: managerial 
effectiveness 7 5 0 0 2 0
FE: financial 27 3 10 5 16 10
FE: survival 9 2 3 5 6 8
FE: satisfaction & intention 
to remain 43 0 24 12 33 7
FE: success, competitive 
advantage, overall 
performance
8 0 5 0 7 2
CUS: satisfaction 2 2 0 0 0 0
Industries:
Restaurant/food 41 17 15 7 16 17
Automobile, gasoline 5 0 3 0 5 0
Hotel 8 6 0 1 1 0
Real estate brokerage 4 0 1 2 2 2
Other retail/services 15 2 5 3 12 4
Various 57 12 25 25 24 28
Not described 2 0 2 0 1 0
Countries:
USA 77 26 26 28 30 34
CAN 5 2 4 3 4 2
AUS 11 0 9 2 6 5
ESP 9 3 2 0 4 3
FRA 8 5 1 3 1 2
UK 6 0 2 0 5 1
*FO = franchisor, FE = franchisee, CUS = customer
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Table S1: Overview of studies on outcomes of factors within franchising (continued)
All 
studies
Ownership 
structure
Business 
format 
aspects
Contractual 
aspects
Behavioral 
and 
interaction 
aspects
Age and 
size (firm 
and system 
level)
Countries:
Other European countries 6 0 4 1 5 3
Other Oceania 1 0 0 0 1 1
Asian countries 7 0 4 2 5 1
South American countries 2 0 2 0 1 0
Theoretical perspectives: 
Agency 34 20 7 12 7 19
Resource (constraint, 
dependence etc) 20 13 6 4 2 9
Efficient contracting 1 1 1 1 0 1
Transaction costs 4 0 1 1 3 2
Relational (e.g. social 
exchange, relational 
marketing)
20 0 7 0 17 3
Learning, knowledge 6 2 4 0 0 4
Contingency 2 2 0 0 0 1
Entrepreneurial 4 1 3 1 2 2
Strategic 4 1 2 0 2 1
Legal 1 0 1 1 0 1
Other 19 7 5 2 7 8
None / not specified 38 1 17 20 28 12
*FO = franchisor, FE = franchisee, CUS = customer
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Abstract 
Background. Business format franchising is an organizational form that originates from 
the business sector. It is increasingly used in healthcare, being a promising organizational 
form for improving the competitiveness and efficiency of organizations, the quality of 
care, and the professional work environment. However, evidence is lacking concerning 
how these healthcare franchises should be designed to actually deliver the promised 
benefits. This study explores how the design of the central element in franchising, the 
business format (i.e., brand name, support systems, specification of the products and 
services), helps or hinders the achievement of positive results.
Methods. A qualitative comparative embedded case study was conducted. The cases 
focused on three Dutch healthcare franchises providing mental healthcare, hospital 
care and care for the intellectually disabled. The data were collected through document 
analyses, observations, and 96 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with franchisors and 
unit actors (franchisees, unit managers, professionals). The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim. A conceptual model based on a systematic review of studies 
in other industries was used as an initial method for coding the data. New inductive 
codes were used to enrich and extend the analysis. The data were subjected to within-
case and cross-case comparative thematic analyses. 
Results. Different business format designs have different effects on results, as perceived 
by franchisors and unit actors. The analysis revealed how this variation in perceived 
effects can be explained by different dynamics with regard to system-wide adaptation, 
local adaptation, professionals’ resistance to change, ease of knowledge sharing, 
bureaucracy, overhead, uniform brand presentation, accelerating effects and reliable 
performance levels. The analysis resulted in a new typology of four types of business 
formats, showing how combinations of business format elements facilitate or hinder 
the achievement of different types of results.
Conclusions. Practitioners using healthcare franchising as a model to improve client-
related, strategic, organizational and professional results should carefully consider how 
to design their business format in order to facilitate the achievement of desired results. 
The developed typology can be used as a starting point for these practitioners and as 
a basis for future scholarly research. Further quantitative research is recommended to 
confirm the results.  
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Introduction
The organizational model of franchising is increasingly applied by healthcare 
organizations to overcome challenges such as increasing competition (Cutler, 2002), 
rising expenditures (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012), deficiencies in quality of care (IOM, 
2001), poor diffusion of innovations (Nembhard et al., 2009) and unsatisfied professionals 
(Gigantesco et al., 2003). Franchising originates from trade and industry and involves 
a contractual arrangement between two firms: the franchisor and the franchisee. The 
franchisee buys the right to provide health care services with the use of the franchisor’s 
business format (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). The business format consists of a brand 
name, support systems, and specification of the products and services that need to be 
delivered (Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Komoto, 2005). Franchisees deliver services at locations 
close to clients while being supported with tried-and-tested practices, knowledge 
sharing facilities, and other operational and management support as described in 
the business format (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Hogan et al., 2006; Montagu, 2002). 
In some franchise systems, certain units are owned by the franchisor and operated by 
employed managers who use the same business format as franchisees. Currently, in the 
USA, there are at least 35 healthcare franchises in sectors such as elderly and home care, 
eye and hearing care, (para)medical care, and mental health care1, 21 in the Netherlands, 
and 15 in both the UK2 and Canada. 3 Fifty-three social healthcare franchises in various 
Asian and African countries were documented in 2011 (Schlein & Montagu, 2012).   
 Those who start operating a healthcare franchise expect it to be a successful 
model, either for commercial or social reasons. Two types of franchises are used in 
which actors partially have similar expectations. The first is a model with small-scale 
independent entrepreneurs (i.e., a stand-alone model) (Stephenson et al., 2004). In 
developed countries, this type is often used as an alternative to large bureaucratic 
healthcare organizations. Actors expect that the combination of local entrepreneurship 
and support through the business format stimulates the professional satisfaction, 
efficiency and quality of care. This is thought to be achieved by restoring the autonomy 
of professionals in care provision while supporting them with effective practices and 
developed innovations (Hogan et al., 2006; Montagu, 2002). Additionally, providers 
expect that the shared positioning with a brand name and clearly defined services may 
assist in the creation of competitive advantages (Knott et al., 2008; Agha et al., 2007b). 
In the second type of model, existing organizations become a franchisee for part of their 
1 http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/healthcare/indexhlth.html, http://www.bison.com/Healthcare_Franchises, 
http://www.franchisedirect.com/healthcareseniorcarefranchises/15 retrieved 24 May 2013
2 http://www.franchisesales.co.uk/search/care-services-franchise-health-care-franchises, http://www.franchisedirect.co.uk/
carefranchises/175, retrieved 24 May 2013
3 http://canada.franchisesales.com/search/health-care-franchise-2, http://canada.franchisesales.com/search/care-franchise 
24 May 2013
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care services (i.e., fractional model). Franchisees who choose this model also expect to 
improve their competitive position, quality of care, efficiency, financial performance and 
professional work environment. They expect to achieve these results through proven 
practices from the business format, the operational support (Christensen & Curtiss, 
1977), the shared branding (Agha et al., 2007b), the possibilities for knowledge sharing 
and development (Knott et al., 2008; Agha et al., 2007b), and the access to innovations 
originating from the franchisor and other franchisees (Knott et al., 2008). 
 However, difficulties may also arise. Franchising requires uniformity to achieve 
economies of scale and to build a strong brand name. This can reduce professionals’ 
autonomy and decrease their work satisfaction or the quality of care for customized 
services (Montagu, 2002). Moreover, professionals can misuse their powerful roles to 
resist the implementation of certain business format elements that are necessary to 
reach competitive advantage and efficiency but are not in the professionals’ interests 
(Montagu, 2002). Controlling the quality of services provided by professionals may also 
be difficult for the franchisor because he may lack the specialized knowledge to do so, 
yet the system’s reputation depends on the quality of services provided (Knott et al., 
2008; Montagu, 2002).
 Although increasingly pursued, healthcare franchising seems to produce varying 
results. Both positive (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Agha et al., 2007a; Evans et al., 2009; 
Ngo et al., 2009, 2010) and negative outcomes (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Evans et 
al., 2009; Shah et al., 2011) have been found for clients, professionals and organizations 
in both developed and developing countries. Determining what accounts for these 
differing results is becoming increasingly important, as interest in franchising is growing. 
A recent systematic review showed that studies on this issue in healthcare are scarce 
(Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti & Huijsman, 2014a). However, studies in other industries have 
indicated that variations in the business format design between franchises explain the 
varying results across franchises. The business format influences results across franchises 
because it defines what support units receive (Grünhagen et al., 2008; Tuunanen and 
Hyrsky, 2001), how much control they experience (Gillis & Combs, 2009; Knott, 2003) 
and how strong the brand name is (Gillis & Combs, 2009; Tuunanen & Hyrsky, 2001). 
The question is whether these findings will apply to healthcare as well. We therefore 
empirically explore the following question: How is the business format design perceived 
to facilitate or hinder the achievement of positive results with franchising, and why? 
 
Objectives of the study
This study aims to contribute to the knowledge on how the organizational model 
of franchising can be effectively applied in healthcare. To this end, we qualitatively 
explore the views of franchisors and unit actors (franchisees, professionals, unit 
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managers) regarding the help or hindrance of their business format design – a key 
element in franchising – in realizing strategic, organizational, professional and client-
related results. We explore their experienced relationship between the design of 
business format elements and the achievement of results and their explanations for the 
perceived relationship. The analysis provides in-depth insight regarding which designs 
of a business format are likely to promote positive results and which other structural, 
strategic and behavioral decisions may have to be made in the franchise system to 
ensure that the desired results are achieved. We integrate our findings in a model 
that can be used as a starting point by franchise practitioners and as a basis for future 
research. 
Conceptual model to explore the role of the business format in healthcare 
franchises
A systematic analysis of studies that have investigated the influence of the business 
format in other sectors (see systematic review of Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti & Huijsman, 
2014b, p. 8-10 for a detailed overview) have indicated that multiple business format 
elements affect the achievement of results. We used these insights to build a conceptual 
foundation for exploring the role of the business format in healthcare. 
 Insights from other sectors show that the design of two business format components 
influences the results achieved within franchises. The first is the ‘front’ of the business 
format, which constitutes elements related to the positioning toward customers 
(Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). The positioning toward customers comprises the brand 
name strength and the franchise concept, which includes the collection of the attributes 
of the products and services of the franchise and the presentation thereof (Kaufmann & 
Eroglu, 1998). This component determines the attractiveness of the business format to 
customers (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998) and has been shown to be important for realizing 
positive strategic and organizational results for franchisors (Gillis & Combs, 2009) and 
franchisees (Michael & Combs, 2009; Hing, 1996). 
 The second component is the ‘back’ of the business format and comprises the format 
facilitators. These are the operating and management structures that aim to ensure that 
unit actors deliver the services in their units as defined in the positioning component 
and to build a strong brand name (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). Studies in other sectors 
have shown that the design of two types of facilitators influences results: support 
services and control systems. Support services include elements that assist unit actors in 
starting up and operating a unit (e.g., training). Control includes the specifications and 
limitations from the franchisor to ensure that unit actors behave as deemed necessary 
(e.g., rules on client contact). 
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 Studies have indicated that design differences in the type, amount and quality of 
support services are a major reason for varying results across franchise systems. First, 
support services only positively affect results if they are of sufficient quality because low-
quality support is less helpful (Lewis & Lambert, 1991). Second, only those franchisors 
that provide appropriate types of support positively affect their own strategic and 
organizational results (Grünhagen et al., 2008; Shane et al., 2006) and as well as the 
franchisees’ satisfaction and performance (Michael & Combs, 2008; Merrilees & Frazer, 
2006). The types of support that are appropriate to franchisees partially depend on 
what the franchisees want or need. For example, Merrilees and Frazer (2006) found 
that marketing support was appropriate to promote results for higher-performing 
franchisees, whereas training and operational management support were more 
appropriate for younger and lower-performing franchisees. Third, studies showed that 
results across franchises vary because of differences in the amount of support provided. 
While extensive support can benefit franchisee results (Minguela-Rata et al., 2009), it can 
have negative effects for franchisors, supposedly because developing and providing 
extensive support is expensive and labor-intensive (Shane, 1998).   
 Studies have indicated that differences in control levels are another reason for 
varying results across franchises. The design of three control elements was found to 
affect results: the selection of franchisees, the level of standardization and the level of 
centralized decision-making. First, studies have shown that the use of ample information 
and assessment methods to select franchisees with the right attitudes and expectations 
reduces the likelihood of unsatisfied franchisees who will quickly abandon the franchise 
(Tuunanen, 2002) and increases success (Morrison & Lashley, 2003). However, such strict 
selection can hinder rapid growth in system size (Clarkin & Rosa, 2005). Second, studies 
have shown that greater use of standardized operating instructions has financial benefits 
for franchisees, presumably because these steer them toward the tried-and-tested 
practices of the franchisor and to act in the interests of the clients and the entire system 
(Kidwell et al., 2007; Knott, 2003). However, standardization may only be beneficial in 
the first contract years. In later years, franchisees’ adaptation to the local context may be 
more beneficial (Komoto, 2005). For franchisors, greater standardization may also have 
negative effects, as it can undermine the franchisees’ innovation efforts (Gillis & Combs, 
2009). Third, more centralization may be positive for a franchisor (Shane, 2001), while 
franchisees may benefit more when decision-making is more decentralized (Kidwell et 
al., 2007; Baucus et al., 1996) because it reduces opportunistic behavior (Kidwell et al., 
2007).   
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Methods
Research design
We conducted a qualitative multiple embedded case study. Several cases were 
investigated at several levels of analysis (Yin, 2003). The levels of analysis included 
both the franchisor level and the unit level, as research has shown that studying both 
is necessary to fully understand the processes and results created within franchise 
systems (Elango & Fried, 1997). Qualitative research enabled us to explore these 
franchises in-depth and build a theory of how and why different business format 
elements are perceived to affect the achievement of results in a rarely investigated 
organizational form in healthcare – a franchise. The use of three franchise systems in 
three different healthcare sectors enabled us to confirm our findings (replication) and to 
identify diverging patterns across settings, thereby reaching more explanatory power 
and generalizability (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Halinen & Törnroos, 2005). Within-case 
comparisons further enhanced the validity (Yin, 2003). A conceptual model was used 
to focus attention on particular themes, to achieve a deeper analysis of an unexplored 
phenomenon and to extend theory (Yin, 2003). 
Research setting
We conducted our study in the Netherlands, where approximately 21 healthcare 
franchises exist. Depending on the service provided, the franchises are reimbursed 
through (compulsory social) health insurance or private payments. Franchises 
providing hospital care, in-patient mental health care and in-patient long-term care for 
the disabled, youth and elderly are prohibited from working for-profit under Dutch law. 
Franchises providing other types of care officially can work for-profit, but many of them 
still do not have profit-making as their ultimate or only goal. Franchising is often used to 
improve quality, costs, and the work environment of care professionals. 
 Our cases were theoretically sampled as is recommended for a multiple case 
study (Patton, 1990). First, we chose franchises providing different types of healthcare 
because scholars have theoretically assumed that this difference may play a role in how 
the business format is designed, the behavior of actors and the experienced results 
(Montagu, 2002). Second, we selected systems with existing organizations as franchisees 
(fractional model) and systems that started-up with individual entrepreneurs (stand-
alone model) because it has been hypothesized that the existing work methods, 
culture and involvement of a larger-scale organization in a fractional model may lead to 
different requirements and effects of support and control in the business format (Agha 
et al., 2007b). We only used cases that had operated for at least three years and that 
were willing to share their sensitive insights. 
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The selected franchises provide mental healthcare (system 1), hospital eye-care 
(system 2) and care for the intellectually disabled (system 3). A description of the cases 
regarding the elements of interest in this study is provided in Table 1. As shown in this 
table, system 1 and 2 both started franchising to obtain a stronger positioning in a 
market that became increasingly competitive as a consequence of changing policies 
and regulations by the Dutch government. They also aimed to improve the quality 
and efficiency of care in existing organizations, both for idealistic and competitively 
instrumental reasons. Under Dutch law, both systems are obliged to work not-for-profit. 
System 3 was founded to provide a qualitatively better alternative to regular care for the 
intellectually disabled. The system officially is a for-profit system. 
Data collection
The data were collected through semi-structured interviews, observations, and 
document analyses. These methods were used complementarily and improved validity 
through data triangulation (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Interviews were appropriate 
for gathering rich data about the actual design of the business format elements and 
the dynamics underlying their effects, as we could ask for experiences, perceptions 
and feelings (Patton, 1990). To limit bias and acquire a representative overview, we 
purposively selected our interviewees based on characteristics that were shown to 
affect behavior and experienced results in prior research. Franchisor representatives 
with different functions were selected, as were units with varying ages (experience in 
the system) and operating in different geographical regions. Within each of the units, 
respondents with different functions were interviewed. All of the units and individuals 
who were selected for an interview were willing to participate; thus, selection bias is 
unlikely. A total of 96 interviews with 87 respondents (24 franchisor representatives, 
37 professionals, 55 franchisee representatives, 14 company-owned managers; some 
respondents had two roles) were conducted between 2009 and 2012. Some respondents 
were interviewed more than once to obtain additional information and to check for 
developments over time. 
 A predetermined topic list based on the conceptual model was used during the 
interviews to increase the reliability and validity (see Table 2). The interviews lasted 
1.5 hours on average and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Documents were 
analyzed to prepare the interviews and to complement and triangulate the interview 
findings. Observations of meetings and daily practice were used to stimulate new lines 
of inquiry, to triangulate, and to obtain additional insights by observing the effects of 
the control and support elements in practice (e.g., discussion about the benefits of 
more control). During the observations and document analyses, the topic list from the 
interviews was used to ensure consistency.  
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Table 2: Topic list used in the interviews, observations, and document analyses
1) experienced results of franchising; 
2) perceived contribution of their business format design, and more specifically: a) franchise concept, 
b) the brand name, c) perceived quality, type, amount of support, d) level of control (selection, 
standardization, decision-making rights), and – if relevant – the reason for choosing these designs; 
3) dynamics that result from these designs that explain the perceived effect; 
4) other aspects that lead to differing results despite using the same business format.
This study took a managerial and organizational perspective. Neither ethical approval of 
an Institutional Review Board nor written informed consent was required for this study 
according to the Dutch relevant legislation (law on medical scientific research with 
people (WMO), formal criteria Erasmus Medical Ethical committee4) because no medical 
data were used and patients were not involved in any way. 
 
Data analysis 
The data were thematically analyzed. Themes were derived both deductively, using the 
theory from other industries, and inductively. We started by connecting deductively 
derived codes to the data. We subsequently refined the analyses by inductively applying 
new codes. We then used within-case comparison techniques to enrich and deepen 
the analyses. The consequent analysis was written down per case in a case report that 
was member-checked with case representatives to verify, adapt and complement the 
analysis. We then searched for consistent and distinct patterns among the three cases to 
further develop the analyses (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994). To 
verify and complement the analyses, the results of the between-case comparisons were 
member-checked in an advisory board meeting with representatives of all of the cases. 
Results
We first describe how the actors in the case study systems perceive their business format 
design to affect their achievement of positive results with franchising overall. We then 
analyze how actors feel that their pursued positioning, support services and level of 
control contribute to these experienced effects, as well as what dynamics explain these 
perceived effects. 
4  http://www.erasmusmc.nl/commissies-cs/metc-cs/573270/reikwijdte [in Dutch]
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The experienced effects of the business format design in healthcare 
franchising
Consistent with differences in the design of the business format of the three case study 
systems, actors across systems differ in their perceptions of how their business format 
contributes to the achievement of positive results with franchising. Generally, the actors 
feel that their business format mainly either stimulates the achievement of positive 
results or has no impact. Only some perceive that the design of their business format 
hinders their financial performance, as well as the quality of care and work satisfaction 
in one system (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Perceived influence of the business format on the achievement of various results 
within franchises over time*
Franchise 
system
Actor Competitive 
advantage
Financial 
performance
 & efficiency
Survival Growth Quality 
of care
Work 
satisfaction
1 Franchisee 
and manager
+/0 +/0/- +/0 + +/0/- +/0/-
Professional +/0 +/0 0 n.a. +/0/- +/0/-
2 Franchisor + First years: -, 
now: +
+ + + n.a.
Franchisee 
and manager
+/0 +/0/- +/0 n.a. + +/0
Professional +/0 +/0 +/0 n.a. + +/0
3 Franchisor + First years: -, 
now: +
+ + + n.a.
Franchisee 
and manager
+ +/0/- + n.a. + +/0
Professional 0 0 0 n.a. + +/0
* see table 1 for a description of the design of the business format of each of the cases
+ = perceived as facilitating to achieve this result type, - = perceived as hindering to achieve this result type, 0 = no 
perceived effect on the achievement of this result type. In determining the score, the focus was on shared agreements 
and disagreements. When respondents within the same actor-group varied in their opinion or when all respondents 
reported both positive and negative effects, a +/- sign was assigned. 
 As can be expected, franchisors primarily perceive positive effects of their business 
format design in achieving the types of results important to them: growth, competitive 
advantage, survival, quality of care, and financial performance after the initial years of 
establishment. Franchisees perceive stimulating effects as well, but they also see more 
negative or lack of effects. The franchisees in system 3 – who, in contrast to the other 
systems, all started a new unit with the use of the business format – are the most positive 
overall. Except for work satisfaction, for which some experience no effect, and for 
financial performance, for which some observe no or a hindering effect, the franchisees 
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report experiencing only stimulating effects of their business format in achieving 
positive results. Some of the franchisees of system 2 – who engage the business format 
as an “additional tool” in their organization – also do not see a contribution to their 
competitive advantage and survival. The same applies to system 1, but here, some also 
perceive a hindering effect on achieving a high quality and work satisfaction, mainly 
during the initial years of the establishment of the franchise. Unit managers and 
professionals primarily perceive similar effects as the franchisees. This is not surprising 
as they work with the same business format and many professionals also fulfill a role as 
franchisee or unit manager. Therefore, we use the term ‘unit actor’ to commonly refer to 
franchisees, and the terms unit managers and professionals when a finding applies to all 
of them. 
Positioning toward customers: Perceived influences on results
How franchises position themselves toward customers is perceived to play an important 
part in the results of franchising. Specifically, the brand name strength and the concept 
play significant roles. 
Strength of the brand 
The respondents consistently reported that a strong brand name is advantageous, 
particularly through providing a strong position toward health insurers and the (local) 
government. A strong brand name legitimizes the preservation of financing for the 
franchised care, which basically increases the likelihood of survival, positive financial 
performance for units, and competitive advantages. Nevertheless, a strong brand 
name provides no guarantee for financing in a regulated healthcare environment with 
changing policies and regulations. A strong brand name is also believed to stimulate 
the quality of care and the work satisfaction because it provides a sense of belonging 
and additional motivation to perform well: “It is nice to belong to something, you carry out 
a message together, and you have a strong brand name behind you that you need to keep 
strong together, work hard to keep that brand name strong, that nothing happens that will 
harm the brand.” (franchisee system 3).  Consequently, when a brand name is strong (as 
in system 3), it is regarded as a valuable resource and as a major reason for purchasing a 
franchise. When a brand name is not yet sufficiently strong in the perceptions of the unit 
actors (as in system 2), it is felt that the business format could offer more advantages. 
The actors initially expected that they would also gain by attracting more clients with 
their brand. However, this assumption appeared not entirely true for systems 1 and 2 
due to production limits forced by insurers and the government to contain costs and 
because healthcare insurers continued purchasing care of all healthcare providers in 
the hospital and mental healthcare sector rather than purchasing larger volumes of care 
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of only a selection of better-performing healthcare providers. As a franchisee of system 
1 puts it, “We designed [our franchise formula] based on content but also particularly on 
strong logistics and service because we were convinced that patients will vote with their feet 
when we deliver high quality care and that the market will come to us, as is normal in a 
market where you do a better job than others. But we do not have a normal market.” Despite 
the advantages of branding, franchisees also consider branding as a risk because the 
mistakes of others can also affect them. However, no respondent considers this risk to 
outweigh the advantages. 
Concept 
Consistent with the theoretical framework, documents and interviews highlighted 
the importance of a concept including health care services that are valued by clients, 
purchasers (e.g., insurers), and referring providers. It seems that clients are attracted 
to a franchise because they like the concept, not particularly because it is a franchise. 
In system 1, respondents report that many clients found the optimistic approach, 
specialized treatment programs and office-like interiors to be attractive, and clients of 
system 3 were said to value the idea of a small-scale family-like atmosphere in a nice 
house where clients live as normal a life as possible. However, the cases show that 
governmental and political influences in healthcare can lower the demand or viability 
of the franchise, even if clients value the concept; system 1 received lower demand after 
the introduction of a financial contribution for clients, intended budget cuts for care for 
the intellectually disabled would have resulted in the discontinuance of new units, and 
production limits in hospital care reduced the possibilities of helping more patients. 
The concept also partly determines whether (potential) unit actors find the franchise 
attractive. The franchisees and a part of the professionals of system 1 liked the idea of 
specialized evidence-based care provision, while others disliked this idea and resisted 
changing their work methods; some even left. Hospitals and doctors found the idea of 
preserving the entire spectrum of eye-care and striving for excellence attractive. Many 
unit actors in system 3 were attracted to the idea of providing care in an autonomous 
unit after being disappointed in regular institutions. 
Thus, the positioning component of the business format plays an important role in 
how franchises are valued. However, the support services and control systems in the 
business format should support realizing this positioning in practice. Therefore, the 
remainder of this section focuses on how support and control affect the achievement 
of positive results.
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Support services: Perceived influences on results
Interviews, documents and observations consistently indicated that appropriate 
support services in regard to quality, type and amount facilitate the achievement of 
positive results with franchising. What exactly is appropriate partially differs for different 
types of results, for unit actors with different attitudes, skills and ages, for different 
types of franchise (fractional or stand-alone) and healthcare services, and for different 
perceived levels of contractual payments. We elaborate on these findings below. 
 A certain level of support services is perceived to positively relate to strategic, 
organizational, professional and client-related results for several reasons. First, for 
the franchisor, the provision of such support helps them to grow, create competitive 
advantages and survive by retaining and attracting unit actors to the system. Second, for 
franchisees, the support involves less risk and a stronger positioning in an environment of 
increasing competition and budget cuts from the government and insurers. Particularly 
for those franchisees that start up a new unit (system 3), the support also decreases 
the resources needed: “If you do it by yourself (…) a) you need the financial resources, and 
b) you are far more vulnerable and you need to find out everything by yourself. And when 
something happens, you have nothing to rely on; you have no back-up.” Third, unit actors 
feel that such support helps them to deliver high-quality, efficient care with less burden 
to themselves because they have to spend less resources in determining appropriate 
work methods: “We could learn our lessons, we knew where we had to go, and we had 
the tools to do it.” (professional system 1). Moreover, when ample support in non-care 
related activities is provided by the franchise, unit actors have to spend less resources in 
execution. As a franchisee of system 3 describes it, “I do not have to spend too much time 
with non-care-related tasks, such as quality policies, but I can spend ample time providing 
care. I find that I now already spend too much time doing administration (…) Imagine the 
time that is spent when you have to do it all by yourself.” Fourth, the cases show that the 
knowledge and experiences embedded in the support services accelerate improvement 
and implementation in local units because it is not necessary to “reinvent the wheel 
everywhere” and it persuasively shows the unit actors better working methods by peers. 
Fifth, the support steers the behavior of unit actors toward desirable performance levels 
and a uniform presentation, which is perceived to help stimulate quality of care, survival 
and competitive advantage.   
 However, from the perspective of both the franchisors and unit actors, the amount 
of support should not be too large. First, for the franchisor, extensive support requires 
a great deal of overhead, rendering the franchise relatively inefficient and expensive. 
As the franchisor of system 3 puts it, “We need to remain efficient; we want to keep our 
overhead at 4.5%. So that implies that you must also dare to let it go.” When the franchise 
system ages, more support can be provided with the same level of overhead, owing to 
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greater experience and more developed services. According to the franchisor of system 
2: “We notice that over time our investments in new franchisees become lower. You can do it 
much more efficiently. You have much higher standards and ready-to-use material.” Second, 
excessive support can hinder the quality of care, efficiency, competitive advantage, and 
work satisfaction in situations where local adaptation is important, such as in services 
that are complex and/or require customization and in units in which the franchised 
practices are added to existing and non-franchised practices (fractional model). The 
support then contains non-feasible and non-valuable practices for local units. As a 
franchisee of system 2 explains: “By adding your own input, you keep it with your own 
culture, your philosophy, what fits within your own [unit].” Third, extensive support can 
lead to the resistance and dissatisfaction of unit actors, particularly when it is presented 
as fixed and obligatory in a professionalized healthcare system like system 1. Unit actors 
then experience the support as a set of external work methods that they did not invent 
or own, feel violated in their autonomy, and feel that their opinions and capacities are 
not taken seriously. As several professionals of system 1 describe: “The question was, do 
you unthinkingly copy it. In other words, you do not have to think anymore; you can do it this 
way, while people also felt the need to participate in thinking about the developments,” and 
“Who says that they know it better?” Ultimately, the desirable level of support depends 
on the extent to which unit actors want to bring in their own ideas. As a franchisee of 
system 2 stated: “You have the feeling that it is partially something of your own because 
you have collaborated on developing it.”
 The positive effects of support are experienced only when the support is perceived to 
be of the appropriate type and quality, while the negative effects are aggravated when 
the type and quality is perceived to be inappropriate. Some support types are generally 
perceived to be helpful in achieving positive results across all systems: the operations 
manual, performance measurement and benchmarking, a franchisor representative 
(account manager), and support that aids in profiling for clients, insurers and the 
government in an increasingly competitive and complex environment (e.g., via website, 
lobby, and folders). For other support types, the perceived appropriateness differs for 
the two types of franchise organizations: whereas support in process improvement was 
valued by existing organizations that have become franchisees (system 1 and 2, fractional 
type), support in building rent, a bank loan, and a shared administration system was felt 
to be most important by franchisees that started up as a new unit (system 3, stand-
alone type). The appropriate type, quality and amount of support also differs across 
unit actors within the same system. Actors that differ in their performance levels, length 
of stay, and skills and attitudes have varying needs. Starting and less skilled unit actors 
primarily find support in starting up their units or implementing the formula helpful 
for realizing positive results. Older and higher-performing ones are more interested 
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in marketing, profiling, maintenance, and continuous knowledge exchange, and also 
desire a lower amount of support: “I know that I can call them when I need them. And 
that is enough. You can do it more by yourself.” (franchisee system 3).  In addition, some 
unit actors find it sufficient to share knowledge through the operations manual, the 
franchisor account managers, and professional scientific bodies. Others find facilitation 
of knowledge sharing meetings one of the most important tools in making a franchise 
cooperation valuable to professional healthcare organizations: “Those program councils 
with [professionals], they are very stimulating groups. People really like to participate in 
that. It is a very important medium of knowledge exchange for us. That is the place where it 
all happens.” (franchisee system 1). Unit actors also differ in whether they find training to 
be a valuable support type. Given these differences in the evaluation of support types, 
unit actors within the same system cannot all be satisfied in the same ways. 
 Franchisors and franchisees also evaluate the ultimate effects of the support 
services in relation to the level of contractual payments. From both the franchisor 
and franchisee perspectives, the contractual payments must enable the franchisor to 
provide high-quality support, develop improvement and innovations to maintain the 
value and competitiveness of the support services, and ensure brand recognition. When 
the franchisees perceive that they obtain inappropriate support in return for the level 
of contractual payments paid, they evaluate the overall contribution of the business 
format to their satisfaction and financial performance negatively. As the use and 
valuation of support services varies across unit actors within the same franchise system 
as a consequence of the variation in age, performance, attitudes and skills, so does the 
perceived reasonableness of contractual payments. In all of the systems, some of the 
franchisees express doubt about the worth of their payments, “It is a lot of money that 
you pay, if you use that money yourself you can also accomplish much things”, and fees have 
been a frequent topic of discussion. This discussion also regularly includes a discussion 
about the ‘ethical’ nature of asking fees in a societal sector like healthcare. Others within 
the same system feel that their payments are reasonable and are ultimately paid back 
by the efficiency gains of the support obtained, reducing the costs of healthcare overall, 
“When you see our turnover and you can use the (…)  support. If you see what they have 
achieved in those few years (…) In relation to that, you can be satisfied. And that you have 
to pay for it…if I were to try to achieve that by myself, I would not have succeeded.”  
Level of control: Perceived influences on results
Largely in line with our theoretical framework, our analysis shows that a certain level 
of control helps to ensure that actors deliver services as defined by the positioning 
component, either through the selection of new franchisees or through standardized 
instructions and centralized decision-making. Furthermore, our respondents in 
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healthcare highlighted the importance of a certain level of monitoring and enforcement 
in this endeavor. However, excessive control appears to have a hindering effect on the 
achievement of positive results with franchising. Several process dynamics explain why 
both very high and very low levels of control are thought to have a negative effect. The 
most appropriate level of control seems partially situation-dependent. We elaborate on 
these findings below. 
Control through the selection of new franchisees 
Actors in all of the systems feel that a stricter selection of potential franchisees – either 
via a strict procedure or via self-selection through providing extensive information 
about the franchise – stimulates the achievement of a strong competitive position and 
high client satisfaction. It is thought to do so because consistently high performance 
levels can be better guaranteed. As the franchisor of system 3 describes: “I think that 
you have to set high standards for which franchisees you want to include in your system, 
and even then it sometimes can go wrong with a franchisee (…) You want to have as much 
success as possible for your [clients].” Through enlarging the chance of having suitable 
franchisees with the right expectations, stricter selection is also felt to stimulate 
franchisee satisfaction. As less satisfied and lower performing franchisees require greater 
time investments from the franchisor, stricter selection also stimulates the efficiency of 
support provision. However, the beneficial effects of strict selection can contrast with 
achieving competitive and efficiency advantages through system growth, a goal that 
benefits from less control. Like a franchisee of system 3 illustrates: “At one moment, the 
speed of growth…with 20 new locations a year, you need to have 20 franchisees. Tensions 
arise. And then you actually select franchisees too easily; you select people that you regret 
in retrospect.” An initial focus on growth can then complicate the achievement of 
consistent quality levels and a uniform formula implementation. As the franchisor of 
system 2 stated: “When it is a franchise that everybody can join, what does it say then, that 
you are a member of the franchise? Because we want to position ourselves as a network that 
provides excellent care, and you say that all locations provide that excellent care.” 
Control through standardized operating instructions and centralized decision-
making
The case study systems differ in their level of standardized operating instructions for 
care and non-care activities as well as in the level of centralized decision-making (see 
table 1). The franchisors and unit actors from these varying systems reach a consistent 
conclusion: both extensively high and low levels of standardization and centralized 
decision-making are disadvantageous, although the optimal level differs across systems 
and result types. As our analysis indicates that the process dynamics underlying the role 
The Role of the Business Format     |    129
Ch
ap
te
r 4
of standardization and centralized decision-making are largely similar, we describe the 
role of these two control elements in one section.  
 A certain level of standardization and centralized decision-making of both care and 
non-care processes is thought to facilitate the achievement of competitive advantages, 
survival and quality of care by steering the behavior of unit actors toward desirable, 
solid performance levels and uniform presentation throughout the system: “Franchisees 
also say, I’d love to know what we must do and arrange at minimum, that my [unit] is OK, but 
that of my neighbor-franchisee is OK as well, because when something goes wrong there I 
have a problem too, we work with the same brand name.” (franchisor system 3). Therefore, 
unit actors request more control when they perceive it as being too low, like in system 
2: “You want to guarantee that when I arrive at a [franchise] location, I should get the same 
service, the same access, the same quality of care; you have to decide upon that with each 
other. It cannot be that you come to one place…. (…) This is what we want to guarantee; 
this is what we deliver.” Such a uniform presentation and predictable performance is 
felt to be particularly important when the franchise positions itself toward customers 
with predictable, efficient services, as in system 1, or when it is the desire of purchasers. 
More standardization and centralized decision-making also help stimulate the quality 
of care, work satisfaction, efficiency, competitive advantage, and survival by reducing 
the resources unit actors have to spend on choosing and applying appropriate and 
innovative work methods, allowing a stronger focus on the actual care provision. As the 
franchisor of system 3 stated: “As a franchisor we are very good in deciding and organizing 
everything around the unit and [franchisee], to make their unit work. And we select the 
franchisees on their suitability for care provision, in that respect they can do whatever they 
want.” Additionally, standardization and centralized decision-making stimulate results 
because they ensure a shared basis between units that makes system-wide adaptation, 
knowledge sharing, and performance monitoring relatively easier and more efficient. 
 However, the level of standardization and centralized decision-making should not 
be too high. For franchisors, extensive control leads to inefficiencies on the system-
level as a consequence of the overhead and bureaucracy required. Moreover, it can 
harm growth because many professionals do not feel attracted to systems that they 
perceive as leaving little room for their own ideas, even if this feeling does not reflect 
reality, as in system 2: “You give away a part of your right to say, and our physicians 
wanted to stay independent. They do not like the [franchisor] telling them what to do. 
The question of whether the franchise would improve our care delivery has hardly been 
a topic of discussion. It was quite easy: our physicians wanted to keep their autonomy 
and independence.” (potential franchisee in a newspaper). On the unit level, extensive 
standardization and centralized decision-making restricts local adaptation. This hinders 
creating local competitive advantages, quality of care, efficiency and work satisfaction 
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when customization to the customers’ needs is pivotal, according to the positioning 
component in the business format or the characteristics of the healthcare service: “It is 
so personal what happens; care is such an individual, personal thing that you really need to 
have freedom to have an impact” (franchisor system 3).  Excessive franchisor control also 
hinders achieving these positive result types when local adaptation of the franchised 
practices to the characteristics of the local unit is important, such as in units that offer 
both franchised and non-franchised services (fractional franchise type) or units that 
differ in size. The franchise then becomes an inefficient bureaucracy that wastes staff and 
money in developing and implementing products that are not valuable and feasible in 
the local context, like in the initial years in system 1: “They (...) said that everything needed 
to be done exactly as they did it in the [original] unit. But I cannot implement the same row 
of care pathways as they have there when I do not have as many care professionals as they 
have. That is impossible.” These characteristics can also lead to dissatisfaction among 
unit actors and resistance to change among professionals because they may feel that 
they have insufficient autonomy, that their ideas and expertise are unimportant or not 
taken seriously, and/or that they are no longer owners of their work. Such a situational 
misfit ultimately reduces the actual steering possibilities and uniformity of the formula. 
 In all, the findings suggest that higher levels of centralized decision-making and 
standardization are advantageous for topics that apply to the entire system and are 
thus more efficient to arrange centrally, as well as for those topics that are important 
for a uniform image or to realize the intended positioning toward customers. The 
levels should be lower for topics that require local adaptation to fulfill the customers’, 
professionals’ and local unit’s needs.   
Control through monitoring and enforcement 
All our case study systems monitor the quality and/or financial performance of units 
to reveal whether they perform as intended (e.g., via audits, benchmarking, measuring 
client satisfaction and waiting times). Both franchisors and unit actors argue that such 
monitoring is always important for results because it provides valuable opportunities for 
learning and steering. However, particularly when support and control levels are lower, 
monitoring is felt to be important for competitive advantage, financial performance and 
the survival of the franchise because the monitoring results then provide an opportunity 
to show the attributes and performance of the franchise to the outside world. 
 Once the monitoring instruments identify a gap, not all systems can easily force 
adequate performance or the use of standards across units; system 1 and 2 have relatively 
low possibilities of doing this, and system 3 has some possibility. The franchisor of 
system 2 argues that their low ability in this regard makes it harder to create competitive 
advantages and to quickly improve the quality and efficiency in the units, “There are no 
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sanctions when a [franchisee] does not want to do something, then we say ‘it’s a pity that 
you have not achieved that goal’, but it has no consequences. (…) Learning from business, 
you can do more with that.” Respondents feel that the healthcare culture, in combination 
with the involvement of professionals, makes it harder to employ such a hard franchisor-
franchisee relationship. However, various actors argue that even if there are possibilities 
to force in the context of less professionalized and complex healthcare services, 
persuasion is a better choice. As the franchisor of system 3 stated: “When a franchisee 
goes beyond what we find acceptable, then you have to be able as a franchisor to have a 
conversation, to talk about the real purpose of providing care within this formula, so that 
the franchisee says ‘oh yes, I have been so stupid’. If you succeed in that, that is much more 
valuable than just saying ‘this is not what we are doing here’ and withdraw his contract.”     
Discussion
This paper aimed to explore how franchisors and unit actors perceive the design of 
the business format to affect the achievement of strategic, organizational, professional 
and client-related results with franchising, and to identify the reasons for these effects. 
The study shows that a strong positioning toward customers (clients, insurers, referring 
providers) helps to achieve positive results. However, whether this positioning is 
realized as intended—and the positive results thus achieved—is perceived to be 
influenced by the design of the support and control systems. Differences in design 
have different perceived effects. In regard to support, the amount, the quality and the 
type of the support are perceived to influence results. In regard to control, results are 
perceived to be influenced by the manner in which new actors are selected, the level 
of standardization and centralized decision-making, the extent of monitoring, and the 
ability of the franchisor to force the use of standards and adequate performance. We 
identified various process dynamics that are responsible for these effects. Different 
support designs are perceived to lead to differences in the level of overhead, resistance, 
local adaptation, and the extent to which the presentation is uniform, the performance 
of units is predictable, and innovation and implementation are accelerated. These 
differences are perceived to subsequently influence results. Similar reasons are 
perceived to underlie the diverging effects of different control designs. Variations in the 
level of bureaucracy, ease of knowledge sharing, and system-wide adaptation appear 
to be additional reasons. The combination of the two dimensions ‘level of control’ and 
‘extent of support and its importance and quality’ leads to a typology with four ideal 
types of business formats that vary with regard to the preceding process dynamics, and 
thus vary in their effects (see Table 4). 
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Table 4:  Typology of support and control in business formats in franchising in healthcare
Process dynamics 
Types of business format
Extensive 
business format
(high control, 
much support of 
high importance 
or quality)
Supporting 
business format
(low control, 
much support of 
high importance 
or quality)
Bureaucratic 
business format
(high control, 
little support of 
low importance 
or quality)
Minimal 
business format
(low control, 
little support of 
low importance 
or quality)
Level of overhead (sys) High Medium Medium Low
Level of bureaucracy
(sys/unit)
High Low High Low
Ease of system-wide 
adaptation (sys)
High Medium Medium Low
Uniform presentation
(sys/unit)
High Medium Medium Low
Predictable / guaranteed 
performance levels 
(sys/unit)
High Medium Medium Low
Accelerating 
implementation of 
practices (unit)
Medium Medium Low Low
Resistance to change 
(clash autonomy) (unit)
High Low High Low
Ease of local adaptation 
(unit)
Low High Low High
Ease of knowledge sharing 
(unit)
High Medium Medium Low
 An extensive business format has high levels of support of high importance and 
quality, and units are heavily controlled. When used in the appropriate situation, this 
format helps to achieve results like efficiency, competitive advantages, and quality 
of care. It does so by making knowledge sharing easy, reducing the time unit actors 
spend on identifying appropriate work methods, and steering the unit actors’ behavior 
toward a uniform brand image, predictable performance, and implementation of 
system-wide changes. It is a suitable format for purchasers that desire geographically 
dispersed, uniform services and for unit actors that accept losing control and following 
the guidance of the formula. However, this format can lead to negative effects where 
professionals desire involvement and autonomy (“not invented by me”) and where 
units must heavily adapt to the needs of their localities. This format can also lead to 
inefficiencies through the overhead and bureaucracy required. Contractual payments 
can be relatively high to be reasonable. 
 A supporting business format combines substantial support of high perceived 
importance and quality with low control. This format is particularly valuable where 
clients and purchasers need customized care and where professionals seek autonomy 
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in local implementation and adaptation in their own context, while feeling unburdened 
by support services. The actual autonomy and ownership feeling are lower when the 
support services are directed at both care and non-care related activities. It is a less 
efficient format when many decisions could be made on the system level, rather than 
requiring participation, and when system-wide adaptation is so important in the 
healthcare market that the franchisor must exert substantial effort into persuading unit 
actors. System 2 shares characteristics with this format. 
 A bureaucratic business format is characterized by ample control and little support 
of low perceived importance or quality. This format can have various negative effects 
in most types of healthcare services as it gives little room for local adaption and 
professionals’ ideas, as well as causing unit actors to feel unsupported. This format 
can, however, potentially lead to positive results in environments where standardized, 
lower cost healthcare services are preferred by clients and purchasers and where 
customization is not important, but overall seems sub-optimal in healthcare. System 1 
used a business format in between the bureaucratic and extensive business format. 
 A minimal business format has low control and low support levels. This combination 
is suitable to satisfy clients and purchasers who seek customized care and/or when 
services are complex and professionalized, when professional associations play an 
important part in developing standards, or when unit actors desire autonomy and an 
ability to adapt locally. However, the low control and support levels are not very helpful 
for yielding substantial benefits from the franchise cooperation in regard to using 
suitable work methods and a uniform brand. Contractual payments should be relatively 
low in order to be reasonable. The format used by system 3 sits in between the extensive 
and minimal business format.  
 As also follows from the discussion above, none of the business format designs seem 
favorable or unfavorable in all situations. The perceived effects of the same format can 
diverge across unit actors differing in attitudes, skills and length of stay in the system. 
Different external contexts (e.g., competitiveness, whether purchasers desire uniformity 
and predictability), positioning manners, and types of service require different control 
and support levels, as do franchises that work with existing organizations (fractional 
model) versus franchises with stand-alone units. Franchisees evaluate the contribution 
of support to results in relation to the fees they pay, as does the franchisor for the support 
he can deliver in relation to the fees received. We have mapped all these findings in 
a new model (Figure 1) depicting how combinations of business format elements are 
expected to relate to results via multiple intermediating processes and how age, size, 
attitude, skills, type of franchise, context, and type of service seem to moderate these 
relationships. This model requires further research.
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Franchisor 
(perceived) results 
- competitive position  
- financial 
performance 
- efficiency 
- survival 
- growth 
- quality of care  
Unit actor (perceived) 
results 
- competitive position  
- financial 
performance 
- efficiency 
- survival 
- satisfaction & 
intention to remain 
Positioning towards customers 
-  Strength of brand name 
-  Products and services 
Potential moderators 
-  system age & size 
-  franchisee age (time of being franchisee) 
-
  
franchisee attitude & skills 
-  type of franchise / type of service 
-  external context  
Format facilitators: support 
-  Extent of support 
-  Quality of support 
-  Type of support 
Format facilitators: control 
-  Strictness of selection  
-  Extent of standardized operating 
instructions 
-  Extent of centralized decision-
making 
-  Extent of monitoring and 
possibilities for enforcement 
-  Accelerating innovation & 
implementation 
-  Uniform presentation 
-  Reliable / predictable  
performance levels 
-  More overhead 
-  System-wide adaptation 
-  Local adaptation 
-  Resistance to change 
-  Ease of knowledge 
sharing 
-  More bureaucracy 
Contractual payments 
-  Perceived reasonableness of 
payments 
Process dynamics 
- quality of care
Figure 1: Proposed model of the relationship among the business format, contractual payments 
and the results achieved within franchises to be tested in future research
 Our study shows that the franchise literature originating from other sectors can 
provide valuable insights to healthcare scholars and practitioners. However, there are 
also differences that require a specific approach in healthcare. First, strong branding 
seems predominantly stimulating through the strong position that it provides in 
relation to stakeholders like insurers and the government (less so by attracting clients). 
Second, we found that unit actors do not consistently feel extensive support to be 
stimulating. Some do not want extensive support, as they want to bring in their own 
ideas and experiment in their localities, rather than risking central support that may not 
be applicable. Extensive support is sometimes even perceived as an infringement on 
professional autonomy, and people can feel that their own capacities and visions are not 
taken seriously. These risks can particularly appear where existing organizations become 
franchisees because actors receive the support and routines of the franchise in addition 
to those of their organization. Third, although some standardization can indeed prevent 
actors from opportunistic activities (Kidwell et al., 2007), an appropriate balance between 
high and low standardization seems beneficial to gain the advantages of standardization 
(achieving desired performance, acting as one system, sharing knowledge, deriving 
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efficiency) on the one hand, and the advantages of freedom (delivering customized 
care on a local level with autonomy) on the other hand. For similar reasons, our study 
suggested that a balance between centralized and decentralized decision-making has 
positive effects for all. When a level of standardization or centralized decision-making 
is used that is inappropriate to the local situation of units and ideas of professionals, it 
results in waste because of resistance or threat to leave the system. Finally, we observed 
that franchises with business formats that are valued by customers and unit actors can 
still encounter difficulties because of the involvement of multiple external stakeholders 
(e.g., changing governmental policies, budget cuts). 
Limitations and directions for future research  
The study also has some limitations that provide directions for future research. First, we 
lacked suitable data to quantitatively investigate results and to quantitatively support 
the qualitatively experienced, analyzed and interpreted relationships between results 
and business format elements. Therefore, we recommend large-scale quantitative 
tests of the developed model (see figure 1) in a longitudinal design. Ideally, such 
research includes a baseline qualitative and quantitative study and one or more follow-
up quantitative measurements in franchise systems that have planned to change a 
particular business format design element. Interviews in between the measurements 
should identify any affecting concurrent developments. Alternatively, a similar design 
could start with identifying typically low-, medium- and high-scoring franchise systems 
on a particular business format design element. Second, the study investigated the 
perceived impact of the business format design on client-related results as perceived 
by unit actors and franchisors, rather than as perceived by clients themselves. Scholars 
should investigate the relationship between the business format design and customer-
related results (e.g., satisfaction, medical condition, costs) at the level of the customers 
themselves to really reveal what is the most valuable design to them (clients, insurers, 
referring providers). Third, the generalizability of the results of this in-depth qualitative 
study of three Dutch franchises is uncertain. Particularly in for-profit environments 
and low- and middle income countries, the motives of actors for franchising and thus 
the perceptions about the most desirable business formats to enhance the chance of 
success, may differ. Therefore, similar studies in other contexts are required. Finally, 
although we could draw our conclusions based on significantly diverging perceptions 
identified by within and between-case comparisons, it is possible that comparison 
with franchisors and unit actors that ‘failed’ or ceased franchising would have led to 
additional and fine-tuned insights in the choices that should not be made to enlarge 
the chance of success. Therefore, further research should compare the perceptions of 
operational franchisors and unit actors with failed/ceased ones. 
136    |     Making Franchising in Healthcare Work
Conclusions
This study suggests that practitioners that use healthcare franchising as a model to 
achieve positive client-related, professional, strategic and/or organizational results need 
to carefully design their business format to increase the likelihood of actually achieving 
positive results. Franchisors seem to be able to stimulate results for all stakeholders 
if the positioning component comprises products and services that are valued by 
customers and (potential) unit actors and a strong brand name. They should try to avoid 
both extensively high and low levels of support and control to units, choosing instead 
the optimal level that partially diverges across systems, contexts, and unit actors. The 
processes of system-wide adaptation, local adaptation, knowledge sharing, predictable 
performance, uniform presentation, accelerated innovation and implementation, 
bureaucracy, level of overhead, and resistance to change explain why certain levels of 
support and control are related to results in different situations. It seems important to 
attune the type and amount of support and the level of control to the type of the service 
(e.g., desirable level of customization and professionalization), the external context, the 
franchise type, the unit actors’ skills, attitudes and years of working in the system, and 
the prioritization of goals (e.g., is growth and efficiency prioritized over quality and 
work satisfaction). Potential purchasers should determine whether the characteristics 
of the business format fit to their desires. The preceding conclusions are summarized in 
a typology and model that can be used as a starting point for practitioners and as a basis 
for future scholarly research. Further research is needed in other contexts like for-profit 
environments and low- and middle income countries to determine the generalizability 
of our findings.
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Abstract
This paper explores how the ownership structure of professional healthcare franchises 
contributes to the achievement of positive results with franchising for the franchisor, 
the franchisee, professional service provider and clients. We conducted a comparative 
embedded case study with three healthcare franchises in the Netherlands using data 
from 101 interviews, observations and document analyses. We show that different 
ownership structures at the system-level, i.e., plural form, pure franchise, cooperative 
franchise, and the unit-level, i.e., stand-alone vs. fractional, active vs. passive, single 
vs. multi-unit, have different effects as perceived by franchisors, franchisees and 
professionals. Moreover, we reveal how this variation in experienced effects can be 
explained by differences in dynamics in regard to management, decision-making, 
control, steering, support, interests, learning and adaptation. Based on these analyses, 
we develop new typologies of ownership structures and show how combinations of 
system-level and unit-level structures can have mutually weakening or strengthening 
effects.  
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Introduction
Franchising is increasingly applied as an organizational model in healthcare to overcome 
the challenges healthcare organizations face today, while it is already a common channel 
structure in other industries. The healthcare industry is confronted with continuously 
rising expenditures (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012; Berry & Bendapudi, 2007), deficiencies 
and inequalities in the quality of care, and poor diffusion of innovations to improve 
quality and lower costs (IOM, 2001; Nembhard et al., 2009). Meanwhile, there is an 
increasing shortage of healthcare professionals, of which a significant percentage is 
unsatisfied with the work (Davies & Harrison, 2003; Giard, 2010; Gigantesco et al., 2003). 
To encourage care providers to counter the preceding challenges, various countries 
have moved their healthcare systems towards more privatization and competition 
(Cutler, 2002; Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). As a result, increasing attention has been 
given to organizational models from trade and industry that may provide an effective 
alternative for current models in healthcare (Hellströmm et al., 2010; Yasin et al., 2002). 
Franchising is one of them. 
 Franchising comprises a contractual arrangement between two firms: the franchisor 
and the franchisee. The franchisee buys the right to market goods or services with the 
use of the franchisor’s business format (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Combs et al., 2004). 
The business format consists of a brand name, support systems, and specification of 
the products and services that need to be delivered (Falbe & Welsh, 1998; Komoto, 
2005). Franchisees deliver health services at locations close to customers, while being 
supported with tried-and-tested concepts, training, knowledge sharing facilities, and 
other operational and management support (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Hogan et al., 
2006; Montagu, 2002). Websites and trade magazines indicate that around 50 franchise 
systems exist in the USA in various types of care (elderly and home care, eye and 
hearing care, dental care, paramedical care, medical care, pharmaceutical care)1. In the 
Netherlands, about 30 care franchises exist in, among others, home care, hospital care, 
mental healthcare, and care for the disabled. Websites report the existence of at least 15 
franchises in the UK2 and in Canada3.
 Those who start operating a franchise channel in healthcare expect it to be a 
successful model. Two types of structures are used in healthcare franchises of which 
actors partially have similar expectations. The first type is a unit structure with small-
scale independent entrepreneurs, comparable to most franchises in other industries (i.e., 
1 http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/healthcare/indexhlth.html, http://www.bison.com/Healthcare_Franchises, 
http://www.franchisedirect.com/healthcareseniorcarefranchises/15 retrieved 24 May 2013
2 http://www.franchisesales.co.uk/search/care-services-franchise-health-care-franchises, http://www.franchisedirect.co.uk/
carefranchises/175, retrieved 24 May 2013
3 http://canada.franchisesales.com/search/health-care-franchise-2 , http://canada.franchisesales.com/search/care-
franchise 24 May 2013
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a stand-alone model) (Stephenson et al., 2004). This type is often used as an alternative 
for large bureaucratic healthcare organizations. Actors expect that the combination 
of local entrepreneurship and support through the business format has the ability to 
improve the professionals’ satisfaction, efficiency and quality of care. This is thought 
to be achieved by restoring the autonomy of care professionals in care provision 
while supporting them with effective practices and developed innovations (Hogan et 
al., 2006; Knott et al., 2008; Montagu, 2002). In addition, healthcare providers expect 
that the shared positioning with a brand name and clearly defined services may assist 
in the creation of competitive advantages (Knott et al., 2008; Agha et al., 2007b). The 
second type is a structure where existing organizations become franchisee for a part 
of their care services. In this so called fractional model, the franchisee thus owns and 
offers both franchised and unfranchised products and services (Bishai et al., 2008). The 
actors who choose this model also expect to improve their competitive position, quality 
of care, efficiency of care delivery, financial performance and the professionals’ work 
environment. They expect to achieve these results through the proven practices from 
the business format, the operational support (Christensen & Curtiss, 1977), the shared 
branding (Agha et al., 2007b), the possibilities for knowledge sharing and development 
(Agha et al., 2007b; Knott et al., 2008), and the access to innovations originating from 
the franchisor headquarters and other franchisees (Knott et al., 2008). 
 However, difficulties may also appear. Franchising requires uniformity to achieve 
economies of scale and to build a strong brand name. This can reduce the professionals’ 
autonomy and lower their work satisfaction or the quality of care for customized services, 
particularly when the actual care provision is heavily standardized by the franchisor 
(Montagu, 2002). Moreover, professionals can misuse their powerful role in care 
provision to resist the implementation of business format elements that are necessary 
to reach competitive advantage and efficiency, but which are not in the professionals’ 
interests (Montagu, 2002). Controlling the quality of services provided by professionals 
may also be difficult for the franchisor as he may lack the specialized knowledge, 
whereas the system’s reputation depends on the quality of services provided (Knott et 
al, 2008; Montagu, 2002). There is also a risk of a contradiction of interests between the 
franchisor and the franchisee, such as when franchisors are more profit-oriented than 
quality-oriented (Pozniak, 2006). 
 Although increasingly pursued, franchising in healthcare seems to produce varying 
results. Both positive (e.g., Agha et al., 2007b; Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; Evans et al., 
2009; Ngo et al., 2009, 2010) and negative outcomes (e.g., Christensen & Curtiss, 1977; 
Evans et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2011) have been found for clients, professionals and 
organizations. Answers regarding what accounts for these differing results become 
increasingly important as the interest for franchising is growing and the need to find 
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valuable models in the healthcare sector is urgent. A recent systematic review showed 
that studies on this issue in healthcare are lacking (Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti & Huijsman, 
2014a). However, studies in other industries indicated that the ownership chosen by 
franchises is an important explanation for the varying results across franchises (e.g., 
Bordonaba-Juste et al., 2009; Hsu & Jang, 2009; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Michael & 
Combs, 2008; Perrigot et al., 2009; Shane, 1998, 2001; Vazquez, 2009). The ownership 
structure describes which actor(s) own the units and the business format in the system 
and who daily operates each of these units. Thus, the ownership structure partly 
determines the position and roles of the actors in the franchise channel. The question is 
whether and how these findings will apply to professional healthcare services as well. 
In this study we aim to contribute to the knowledge on how franchising can be 
effectively applied in healthcare. To this end, we explore the views of franchisors, 
franchisees and professionals regarding the help or hindrance of ownership structures 
in realizing strategic, organizational, professional and client-related results. We explore 
their experienced relationship between the achievement of results and their system-
level and unit-level ownership structure, as well as their explanations for the perceived 
relationships. 
 In addition, this study aims to fill a gap in the literature about franchising – an 
important and frequently used type of marketing channel (e.g., Young & Merritt, 
2013). There is a lack of an integrative empirical insight regarding how combinations 
of system-level and unit-level structures used in practice influence results for multiple 
stakeholders. Prior studies focused on the single influence of one type of ownership 
structure and investigated the perspective of either the franchisor (e.g., Bradach 1995, 
1997; Dant & Kaufmann 2003; Shane 1998, 2001) or the franchisee (e.g., Darr et al., 
1996; Michael & Combs, 2008). Moreover, the literature lacks empirical explanations 
for the effects of ownership structures on results. Such insights may help to predict 
how combinations of ownership structures are likely to work out and which other 
structural, strategic and behavioral choices should be made in the system to ensure 
that the desired results are achieved. Prior studies generally used quantitative methods 
(e.g., Perrigot et al., 2009; Hsu & Jang, 2009; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Shane, 1998) and 
comprised primarily theoretical assumptions about explanations for the effects of 
ownership structure that were not empirically verified (e.g., Michael & Combs, 2008; 
Shane, 1998, 2001) (see review of Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti, & Huijsman, 2014b, for an 
overview). Moreover, ownership structure types such as cooperative franchise structures 
and fractional ownership have not yet received attention from empirical research. This 
study takes the first steps in filling these gaps by extending the evidence base with the 
construction of an integrative model through in-depth qualitative empirical research, 
showing how (combinations of ) ownership structures shape the achievement of results 
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from the perspective of franchisors, franchisees and professionals and which dynamics 
are responsible for these effects.   
Theoretical background 
Scholars from various disciplines have investigated the influence of system-level and 
unit-level ownership structures on results of franchising in other sectors, employing a 
diversity of theoretical perspectives. We used these insights to construct a theoretical 
background to empirically explore the contribution of the ownership structure in 
professional healthcare franchises and the dynamics that explain this contribution. 
The influence of the system-level ownership structure
On the system level, actors must choose who owns the units and the business format: 
the franchisees, the franchisor or both.  This entails a choice between a pure franchise, 
a plural form or a cooperative franchise structure (see box 1). Prior research has shown 
that the choices that are made with respect to these ownership structures influence the 
results achieved. 
Box 1: Ownership structure types
System level
· Pure franchise: all units are owned by franchisees. The franchisor owns the business format. 
· Plural form: both franchisees and the chain (franchisor) own units. The franchisor owns the business 
format. 
· Cooperative franchise: units are owned by franchisees. The business format is owned by some or all of 
the franchisees. 
Unit level
· Stand-alone versus fractional franchise: owning only one particular franchise versus owning a larger 
organization than the franchised part only. 
· Passive versus active ownership: owner of the franchises has delegated the responsibility for the daily 
operation of the unit to a unit manager versus daily operation by the owner himself. 
· Single-unit versus multi-unit: one versus more units owned by one franchisee
Pure franchise and plural form 
Prior studies have used various theoretical perspectives as a basis to investigate the 
influence of choosing a system with only franchisee-owned units (pure franchise) or a 
system with both franchisee-owned and franchisor-owned (i.e., company-owned) units 
(plural form). From a theoretical point of view, the use of franchisees has advantages over 
using company-owned outlets. Following resource-based theories, franchisees facilitate 
system-growth to build a strong brand name and reach economies of scale because 
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they bring financial, informational and managerial resources (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003; 
Hsu & Jang, 2009; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Following risk-sharing theory, this use of 
franchisees’ capital reduces the franchisors’ risks (Hsu & Jang, 2009). According to agency 
theory, using franchisees is advantageous because they have lower incentives to shirk 
their duties as compared to company-owned managers. As independent entrepreneurs 
they have more incentives to perform well. This also reduces the monitoring costs 
required (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Hsu & Jang, 2009; Rubin, 1978). Following organizational 
learning theory combined with an agency perspective, franchisees also bring the 
innovations that are required to maintain the system’s long-term viability. Through their 
entrepreneurial incentives, franchisees are primarily focused on explorative learning 
(innovations) to better adapt to local circumstances (Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001). 
 However, theories also delineate disadvantages of using only franchisees. From an 
agency point of view, moral hazard problems can occur in franchisee units, particularly 
in case of high monitoring costs. To maximize personal benefits the franchisees may 
be inclined to underinvest and deliver inferior services whilst attracting customers 
through the franchisor’s reputation, harming the entire system (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 
1969; Srinivasan, 2006). Moreover, the income streams derived from the franchisees 
may be uncertain for the franchisor, as the franchisees’ performances are not under the 
franchisor’s control (Bradach, 1997; Srinivasan, 2006). From an organizational learning 
perspective, the use of only franchisees also undermines the uniformity in the system 
because the innovation efforts of franchisees reduce the level of standardization. 
Moreover, knowledge sharing in such systems is difficult as the franchisees’ incentives 
are directed at local learning rather than sharing developed knowledge with other units 
(Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001). Thus, the use of franchisees only lowers the franchisor’s 
control over the processes, services and profits in the system (Heide 1994; Srinivasan, 
2006). Following diversification theory, using only franchisees also implies a less-
diversified operation mode, increasing the franchisor’s risk (Koh et al. 2009).   
 Therefore, scholars have theoretically argued and empirically confirmed that 
a combined use of franchised and company-owned units can deliver the most 
optimal results in various circumstances because these two types of structures have 
complementary and synergic dynamics. Studies empirically showed that plural forms 
can profit from the innovation efforts of their entrepreneurial franchisees while they 
simultaneously can better control the uniformity and quality of their product through 
company-owned units (Bradach, 1997; Cliquet, 2000; Dant & Kaufmann, 2003; Sorenson 
& Sørensen, 2001). Consistent with these advantages, various studies have shown that 
plural forms predominantly perform better than pure franchises in regard to survival 
(Bordonaba-Juste et al., 2009), financial performance (Hsu & Jang, 2009; Koh et al., 2009), 
and efficiency (Perrigot, Cliquet, & PiotLepetit, 2009). However, studies also empirically 
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showed drawbacks of plural forms. The interests between the two types of units can 
diverge, different management styles are needed, the risk for conflicts is higher, and 
franchisees can become anxious (Cliquet, 2000). Indeed, through combining contingency 
theory with agency and transaction cost theory, Srinivasan (2006) found that only some 
franchisors financially gain in plural forms. Small chains may even experience weaker 
financial performance compared to those using a pure franchise structure if they also 
have high financial liquidity and a lasting advertising strategy.  Based on these findings 
we expect primarily facilitating effects of plural form use in professional healthcare 
franchises. However, powerful professionals that claim their autonomy (Mintzberg, 
1983; Montagu, 2002) may change the dynamics underlying the simultaneous use of 
company-owned and franchised units, and thus its effects. 
Cooperative franchise
In practice, systems show structural variety beyond the frequently investigated 
pure franchise and plural form that may impact on the results that franchises obtain 
(Hendrikse & Jiang, 2011). Some systems use a cooperative franchise, which means that 
the business format is owned by the franchisees instead of a separate independent 
franchisor. A hierarchical relationship with a powerful franchisor is absent (Hendrikse 
& Jiang, 2011). The U.S. chain Best Western hotels, Straw Hat Pizza, the Dutch drug 
store DA, French retail chain Intermarché and Austrian Intersport are some examples of 
cooperative franchises. It has been hypothesized that this structure may be a valuable 
structure when system growth has slowed or when the incentives for franchisees to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities are low due to an imbalance of power (Hendrikse 
& Jiang, 2011). Through developing an incomplete contracting model, Hendrikse and 
Jiang (2011) modeled that a cooperative franchise structure regularly is an inefficient 
model because the franchisor does not invest in this structure due to a lack of power 
and returns. It can be a competitive structure when “highly specific, non-contractible 
local assets are most important for the creation of value of the franchise” (Hendrikse 
& Jiang, 2011, p. 338). Franchise scholars have not yet empirically investigated these 
theoretically modeled effects of a cooperative franchise structure nor have they 
empirically confirmed the hypothesized explanations for these effects.
The influence of the unit-level ownership structure
On the unit level, actors must choose between a stand-alone versus a fractional franchise, 
passive versus active ownership, and multi- versus single-unit ownership (box 1).  Prior 
research has shown that the choices that are made with respect to these ownership 
structures influence the results achieved.
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Stand-alone versus fractional franchise
Franchisees can operate a franchise unit in which they exclusively provide franchise 
products and services – a so called stand-alone ownership structure (Stephenson et al., 
2004) – or they can own and offer also other products and services (Bishai et al. 2008). 
It has been hypothesized that a fractional structure can lead to suboptimal results 
because fractional franchisees have less motivation to change their working methods 
towards the franchise standards if no direct advantages in these standards are perceived 
or if the franchised services are only a small fraction of the total services offered (Agha 
et al., 2007a). However, a fractional structure may also facilitate in the initial phase, 
since the use of an existing infrastructure in fractional franchises implies that no time 
and resources have to be spent on starting-up a unit (Ngo et al. 2009). Despite these 
hypotheses, no study has yet empirically examined how the choice of a stand-alone or 
fractional structure actually facilitates or hampers in achieving the desired results. 
Passive versus active ownership
Following an agency perspective, authors have hypothesized that passive ownership 
of franchised units negatively affects results. It is thought that passive ownership 
removes the important advantages of franchising over company-owned units in regard 
to incentives and monitoring. Similar to company-owned managers, the non-owner 
managers employed by passively owning franchisees have lower incentives to perform 
well (Michael & Combs, 2008; Shane, 1998). Moreover, through passive ownership 
an additional layer is introduced that needs to be managed (Shane, 1998).  Indeed, 
Michael and Combs (2008) confirmed that passive ownership is disadvantageous for 
the survival chances of franchisees. Although Shane (1998) also found a negative effect 
on the survival chances of franchisors, Vazquez (2009) showed that this effect is likely 
to be contingent. When the operations manual is not specific and local knowledge is 
important, this ownership structure appeared to be unwise for franchisors (Vazquez, 
2009). However, none of these studies empirically investigated the correctness of the 
assumption regarding incentives, nor did they provide other explanations for the effect 
of passive ownership. Because operations manuals in professional healthcare services 
do not allow extensive specification, local knowledge is often important, and the care 
service is produced by the interaction between a professional and a client in a local unit, 
a hindering effect of passive ownership use on results can be expected. 
Multi-unit versus single-unit ownership
Following the resource constraint theory, authors have hypothesized that the choice for 
multi-unit ownership positively influences system growth because it provides access 
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to human and financial capital (Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). This 
explanation was empirically confirmed by Bradach (1995) in a case study of fast food 
chains, revealing that multi-unit franchises can grow easier because the re-use of 
existing franchisees implies that fewer resources have to be used to finding franchisees 
for new units. However, from an agency and efficient contracting point of view the 
effect of multi-unit franchise on the survival chances of the system is assumed to be 
more equivocal. Multi-unit franchise requires codification of the franchisor’s monitoring 
mechanisms to lead down in the contract with the multi-franchisee, because the 
multi-unit franchisee takes over the monitoring from the franchisor. This codification is 
assumed to be problematic for new franchisors as they cannot yet foresee all situations 
in which franchisees will shirk, enlarging the chance for opportunistic behavior of 
franchisees once multi-unit franchise contracts are used (Shane, 1998). Indeed, Shane 
(1998) found that the use of multi-unit ownership lowers the survival chances of new 
franchisors. However, the effect seems to differ for large franchisors, for which Shane 
(2001) found a positive survival effect. From an efficient contracting perspective the 
benefits of multi-unit franchise for this group of franchisors are thought to outweigh 
the costs and risks of codification. The costs of codification are spread over more units, 
the multi-unit franchisees can take over the increasingly expensive selection process 
from their franchisors, and there is less risk for information distortion as compared to 
the establishment of a hierarchy that is inevitable for large system monitoring (Shane, 
2001). Studies have not yet empirically confirmed these assumed explanations for 
the influence of multi-unit ownership. In his case study, Bradach (1995) found two 
other explanations for the diverging effects of multi-unit ownership as compared to 
single-unit ownership. Whilst multi-unit franchisees are a little less locally responsive, 
they facilitate system-wide adaptation because franchisors have to persuade fewer 
franchisees to implement changes.  
 Only a few studies have considered the influence of multi-unit ownership on the 
results of franchisee units. Reasoning from theories about knowledge transfer, Darr et 
al. (1995) hypothesized and confirmed that multi-unit franchisees have lower unit costs 
of production because knowledge transfer occurs more easily between same-owner 
units, owing to more regular communication, meetings and personal acquaintances. 
Bates (1998) showed multi-unit ownership to be advantageous for the survival chances 
of new establishments, hypothetically because they have the advantage of being run by 
experienced owners.  
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Methods
Research design
We conducted a multiple embedded case study. Several cases were investigated at 
several levels of analysis (Yin, 2003). The levels of analysis were the franchisor and the 
unit level, as research has shown that studying both is necessary to fully understand 
the processes and outcomes created within franchise systems (Elango & Fried, 1997). 
A qualitative case study was used as it enabled us to explore in-depth how different 
ownership structures are perceived to affect the achievement of results in the rarely 
investigated professional healthcare franchises. It also enabled us to build a theory 
about the dynamics behind ownership structures that explain why and how structures 
have these effects. We investigated multiple cases to confirm findings (replication) and 
to identify diverging patterns across settings. It thus helped to reach more explanatory 
power and generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003; Halinen & Törnroos, 2005). 
Within-case comparisons further enhanced the validity of the results (Yin, 2003). We 
used the findings from prior studies in other industries to focus attention on particular 
characteristics and themes, to achieve a deeper analysis of an unexplored phenomenon 
in healthcare and to extend theory (Yin, 2003; Kauppila, 2010). 
Research setting: Professional healthcare franchises in the Netherlands
We conducted our study in the Netherlands, a country with 16.7 million inhabitants 
and around 22 different healthcare franchises in 2009. Some of these franchises did 
not survive and various new franchises were started. Anno 2013 there are around 30 
franchises, operating in different healthcare sectors: elderly care, home care, mental 
healthcare, paramedical care, hospital care, youth care, and care for the intellectually 
disabled. Most of them are not-for-profit organizations. Depending on the sector 
and service provided, the franchises are reimbursed through the Exceptional Medical 
Expenses Act (AWBZ) – an act that finances long-term care and uninsurable medical 
risks -, the health insurance act (Zvw) – comprising health insurance for cure -, or the 
Social Support Act (WMO) – an act in which municipalities are responsible for the 
arrangement of support for people with a disability. In both the AWBZ and the WMO, 
clients have a choice between ‘care in kind’ or a personal budget that allows them to 
buy care by themselves (Shäfer et al., 2010). Some franchises require a complementary 
private payment or use private payments by clients as their only financial resource. 
The financing based on a personal budget or private payments provides franchises the 
most flexibility and the least bureaucracy, but franchises also continue to exist in ‘care in 
kind’ and health insurance. Particularly existing providers become franchisee or  set up 
a franchise in these last two acts, as it is difficult for new providers on the market to get 
access to reimbursement, especially in the AWBZ. 
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 We theoretically sampled our cases as is recommended for a multiple case study 
approach (Patton, 1990). First, we selected cases that vary in their ownership structure 
to be able to investigate the effect of different ownership structures, to uncover the 
dynamics behind the different structures, and to reason through these dynamics how 
combinations of structures affect results. We selected the cases in such a manner that 
we covered every ownership structure type at least one time. Second, we selected cases 
that differed in healthcare sector (different financing, regulations) and types of services 
provided by different professionals, because scholars have theoretically assumed that 
these differences may play a role in franchise design in healthcare and in the achieved 
results (see e.g., Montagu, 2002). We only used cases that had operated for at least 
three years and where the people involved were willing to share their sensitive insights 
(Clarkin, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989). The selected cases operate in the mental health care 
(system 1), the hospital eye-care (system 2) and the care for the intellectually disabled 
(system 3) (table 1). 
Table 1: Ownership structures of case study systems
Case 
Study 
System
System-level structure Unit-level structure
Pure, plural or 
cooperative
Multi or single-unit Passive or active Fractional or stand-alone
Pure Plural Cooperative Multi Single Passive Active Fractional Stand-alone
1 X X X X
2 X X X X
3 X* X* X X X
* Only recently changed into plural form. Has been a pure franchise for a long time. 
Franchise system 1
Franchise system 1 was initiated in 2004 by four mental healthcare organizations to gain 
a stronger market position. It was established in response to the introduction of market 
competition by the Dutch government. The franchise offers specialized ambulatory care 
to adults. The initiators became both shareholder and franchisee of the franchise and 
developed a separate body that would function as the franchisor. The franchise was 
developed as a fractional franchise with passive ownership: existing organizations would 
become franchisee and would redesign a part of their care delivery using the business 
format, whereby employed managers would conduct the daily operation of the units. 
Care professionals provide care as an employee, serve as employed manager, or serve in 
both roles; they do not own a unit by themselves. Because additional franchisees were 
not found and the franchisor director position did not have any real power, the separate 
franchisor director position was removed. The system-level ownership structure of this 
system is thus a cooperative franchise. Each of the franchisees owns multiple units. The 
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system has 28 units, with unit sizes between 10 and 100 FTE employees. The provided 
care is reimbursed through the health insurance act (Zvw). The units operate under a 
business format with a shared access system, standardized protocols, care pathways, 
marketing, intranet, outcome measurement and knowledge-sharing meetings. 
Franchise system 2
Franchise system 2 was founded by a specialized ophthalmology hospital in 2003 
with the take-over of an ophthalmology department of a general hospital to gain a 
stronger position through the provision of high-quality, efficient care in an increasingly 
competitive market. After obtaining two additional ophthalmology departments in 
other hospitals, the specialized hospital began franchising in 2007, leading to a plural 
form system. A private liability company of the specialized hospital is the franchisor, and 
general hospitals are the franchisees. It is a fractional franchise with passive ownership: 
only the ophthalmology departments of hospitals are franchised and a manager 
and a professional from the department conduct the daily operations of the unit. 
Professionals do not own a franchise by themselves; they work either in a partnership 
that is independent from the hospital (ophthalmologists) or as an employee (e.g., 
optometrists). The franchisor provides a business format with a brand name, operations 
manual, intranet, marketing and advisory support. There are also opportunities to 
share knowledge with other units. The franchise is aimed at improving the quality 
and efficiency of care and the work satisfaction of professionals in the ophthalmology 
department (e.g., through task shifting and optimization of care pathways), and at 
gaining a stronger position in the market and towards insurers. The provided care is 
reimbursed through the health insurance act (Zvw). The unit sizes vary between 10 to 
23 FTE workers, including independent ophthalmologists working in a partnership. The 
system has 11 franchised and 3 company-owned units.  
Franchise system 3
System 3 was founded in 2003 by a father who was highly dissatisfied with the quality 
of regular care that was available to his intellectually disabled son. The father wanted 
a place where disabled individuals could live as normal a life as possible, with ample 
opportunities to engage in pleasant activities and receive love and attention. To achieve 
these goals, he developed a franchise in which two care professionals own and operate 
a small-scale, full-time living facility, i.e., stand-alone units that the franchisees actively 
own. Each franchisee owns one unit. The founder assumed that this structure would 
lead to highly committed professionals with the autonomy to provide care to their 
own standard. Each franchisee hires two to five FTE employees to assist in providing 
care. The franchisor provides a business format, including an operations manual, initial 
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training, facilitation of the care building and a loan, an administration system, quality 
measurement, advisory support and the brand name. In 2010, the pure franchise system 
changed to a plural form system by adding some company-owned units to the franchise 
system. The provided care is reimbursed through personal budgets of clients via the 
AWBZ or the WMO. The system contains 99 franchisees and 8 company-owned units. 
Data sources 
Data were collected by semi-structured interviews, observations, and strategic and 
operational archival documents (see table 2). 
 These methods were used complementarily and allowed to improve validity through 
data triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Interviews were deemed appropriate for 
gathering rich data about the dynamics underlying the effect of ownership structures, 
as we could ask for experiences and feelings (Patton, 1990). A total of 101 face-to-face 
interviews with 91 respondents (37 professionals, 55 franchisee representatives, 24 
franchisor representatives) were conducted between 2009 and 2012 by the primary 
author (table 2). Some respondents were interviewed more than once to obtain 
additional information and to monitor developments. In order to limit bias and to 
acquire a representative overview (Eisenhardt & Gaebner, 2007) we selected franchisor 
representatives with different functions and units with a varying age, region and 
ownership structure. Moreover, within each unit respondents with different functions 
were interviewed. A predetermined topic-list was used for the interviews to increase the 
reliability and validity of the study. Every interview focused on the following topics: 1) 
experienced results of franchising, 2) perceived contribution of every system-level and 
unit-level ownership structure used in the system in achieving the desired results (i.e., 
facilitating and hindering effects), and - if relevant - the reason for choosing a particular 
structure (particularly for franchisors), 3) dynamics that result from these structures that 
explain the perceived effect of ownership structure, 4) other aspects that can lead to 
differing results despite using the same ownership structure. Every topic was covered 
in each interview with ample room for new topics and detailed reflections brought 
in by the respondent. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to over 2 hours, with an 
average of 1.5 hours. They were recorded and transcribed verbatim by the interviewer. 
Documents were used to prepare the interviews in the cases and to complete and 
triangulate the findings from interviews. Observations of meetings and units were 
used to stimulate new lines of inquiry, to triangulate, and to provide additional insights 
by observing the interactions between actors within particular ownership structures 
(e.g., observing how decision-making evolves in the cooperative structure in system 1). 
During the observations and document analyses the same topic-list was used as in the 
interviews to ensure consistency. 
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Data analysis 
We did not translate the data into English until writing this paper in order to avoid loss 
of nuances and possible misinterpretations of the data. We began the analysis process 
by reading the interview transcripts and documents several times while applying codes 
to the data. We manually applied codes within Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis software 
package. We attached memos to preserve initial analyzing thoughts. The structures 
as described in the theoretical background were used as a basis for coding. As is 
recommended for case studies by various authors (e.g, Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Dul & Hak, 2008) we then used cross-case and within-case 
comparison techniques to further conduct the analysis for each of the codes. During 
this analysis process we applied new codes to the data to refine the analysis. We started 
within searching for consistent and distinct patterns within our cases regarding the 
(perceived) effect of an ownership structure on different types of results by different 
actors (franchisor, franchisee and professional) and the explanations for these effects. 
The consequent analysis was written down in a case report per case that was member-
checked with representatives of the case to verify and complement the analysis. We 
then searched for consistent and distinct patterns between our cases. We constructed 
matrices where we scored the perceived influence of a structure on the achievement 
of a particular result type with + (facilitating effect), - (negative/hindering effect) or 0 
(no perceived effect). In determining the score, the focus was on shared agreements 
and disagreements; as a result, a diverging perception of one out of all respondents 
did not receive attention in the final analysis. When some of the respondents from the 
same actor-group observed a positive effect while others perceived a negative effect 
or when all of the respondents reported both positive and negative effects, a +/- sign 
was mapped. We compared the contrasting ownership types to enrich and confirm the 
analysis. Whenever possible we selected interview citations that were representative 
of the perceptions of some respondents or that clearly illustrate a conclusion. Where 
concise, illustrative citations were absent for a conclusion, we summarized the 
conclusion in text without illustrating it with a citation. To verify and complement the 
analysis, the results of the between-case comparisons were member-checked in a 
meeting with representatives of all of the cases. 
Results 
We first describe how the franchisors, franchisees and professionals perceive their system-
level ownership structure to affect the achievement of positive results with franchising. 
Then we analyze which dynamics explain these perceived effects. Subsequently, we do 
the same for the unit-level structures. 
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The system-level ownership structure: perceived influences on results
The system-level ownership structure is perceived to affect results. Franchisors, 
franchisees and professionals differ in their perceptions. Franchisors feel that a system 
structure with both franchised and company-owned units, i.e., a plural form, is the most 
advantageous ownership structure that positively contributes to all types of results of 
importance to them (growth, efficiency, financial performance, competitive position 
of the system, survival, quality of care for clients). Franchisees are less positive. They 
perceive primarily zero or sometimes even negative effects of the use of a plural form on 
their competitive position, the efficiency of care, the quality of care for their clients, and 
their own work satisfaction. Franchisees are the most positive about a pure franchise 
structure, with positive perceived influences on all results except survival (where they 
see zero effect). They have mixed feelings about the influence of a cooperative structure. 
Professionals are also the most positive about the influence of a pure franchise structure 
on the results that they find the most important (quality of care for their clients, efficient 
care provision, their own work satisfaction); their perceptions on the other structures 
are neutral or mixed (see table 3). 
 The analysis reveals that these perceived differences in effects are related to two 
structural characteristics of these system-level ownership structures. First, whether 
there is an independent central franchisor agency that owns and controls the business 
format. In a pure franchise and plural form, such an agency is present; in a cooperative 
franchise, it is absent: the franchisees together form a board that has the decision-
making power. Second, whether company-owned units are present or not (plural form 
versus pure or cooperative franchises). 
The presence or absence of an independent central franchisor agency that owns 
and controls the business format
Actors in our study perceive that the presence of an agency stimulate franchisee 
satisfaction as well as system- and unit-level financial performance, efficiency, 
competitive advantage and quality of care. They feel that the absence of an agency 
tends to have a hindering effect on the achievement of these results. The analysis reveals 
that this difference in effects can be explained by differences in management, interests, 
decision-making, system-wide adaptation, learning (development) and control.
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Table 3: Perceived influence of ownership structures on the achievement of results  
Ownership structure
Competitive 
advantage
Financial 
performance 
& efficiency
Survival Growth
Quality of 
care
Work 
satis-
faction
System 
level 
ownership 
structure
Cooperative 
franchise 
system 1
FE:
PROF:
0/-
0
FE:
PROF:
+/-
0
FE:
PROF:
0
0
FE:
PROF:
+
0
FE:
PROF:
+/0
+/0
FE:
PROF: +/0
Plural form 
system 2
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0/+
FE:
PROF:
0
0
Plural form 
system 3
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0/-
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0/-
+/-
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0/+
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0/-
0/-
FE:
PROF:
0
+/-
Pure 
franchise 
system 3
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/0
+/0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0/-
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
+
FE:
PROF:
+
+
Unit level 
structure: 
fractional 
and stand-
alone
Fractional 
system 1
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+/-
FE:
PROF:
+/-
0
FE:
PROF:
+
+/0
FE:
PROF:
+
0
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+/-
FE:
PROF:
0/-
0/-
Fractional 
system 2
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+/-
+/-
FO:
FE:
PROF:
-
+/-
+/0/-
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+/0
+/0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/-
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0/-
+/-
+/-
FE:
PROF: +/-
Stand-alone 
system 3
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
+
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0/-
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
+
FE:  
PROF:
+/-
+/-
Unit level 
structure: 
passive 
and active 
ownership
Passive 
ownership 
system 1 
and 2
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0/-
0
0
FO:
FE: 
PROF:
0/-
0/-
0/-
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0/-
0/-
0/-
FE:  
PROF:
0
0
Active 
ownership 
system 3
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
+
+
+
FO:
FE: 
PROF:
+
+
+
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:  
PROF:
+
+
+
FE:  
PROF:
+/-
+/-
Unit level 
structure: 
multi-unit 
ownership
Single-unit 
system 2
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FE:
PROF:
0
0
Single-unit 
system 3
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/0
+/0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+/0
0
0
FO:
FE:
PROF:
+
+
+
FE:
PROF:
+
+
Multi-unit 
system 1
FE:
PROF:
+/-
0/-
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+/-
FE:
PROF:
+
0
FE:
PROF:
+
0
FE:
PROF:
+/-
+/-
FE:
PROF:
0
0/-
+ = perceived as facilitating to achieve this result type, - = perceived as hampering to achieve this result type, 0 = no 
(perceived) effect on the achievement of this result type
FO=franchisor representatives, FE=franchisee representatives, PROF=professionals working in a unit (either as franchisee or 
as employee or in a partnership)
Without an independent central agency there is a lack of a coordinating and organizing 
mechanism for the entire system to achieve all the intended aims (i.e., no managing 
force). Instead, franchisees try to manage the system by themselves, often with a focus 
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on their own interests, leading to suboptimal results. The process of decision-making 
about changes and improvements appears to be another reason for the predominantly 
hindering effect of agency absence. Basically, the absence of an agency could stimulate 
system- and unit-level efficiency, quality and satisfaction, because realistic and feasible 
decisions for units are more likely and decisions can be made instantly. As a franchisee 
puts it, “With a separate agency you create your own administrative busyness. Then you 
are busy with persuading the agency of why you would not do a particular thing, and that 
agency had to bring all the parties together and try to reach consensus. Now we have to 
reach that consensus by ourselves and can directly do that during our discussion, we can 
directly put our discussion into action.” Franchisees argue that this “decision-making 
in consultation instead of being dictated from the agency above” also enlarges that 
chance for commitment and satisfaction with decisions by professionals, because 
“the professionals more have the feeling that it is something from their own.” However, in 
practice decision-making is often felt to be more inefficient by franchisees, as “We have 
to negotiate about everything, you cannot make a fast decision for everybody.” No one 
can make a breakthrough when interests conflict and consensus is not reached. This 
situation regularly results in slower change and improvement in the system. Therefore, 
multiple franchisees, managers and professionals feel that their franchise cooperation 
leads to less competitive advantage, efficiency and quality improvement than would be 
possible, lowering their satisfaction with the franchise. The same applies to the regularly 
slower, less efficient and suboptimal system-wide adaptation processes that result from 
the absence of an agency that can steer on adaptation of all units whilst accounting for 
the common interests. 
 The presence or absence of an agency that supports in the development of 
knowledge, improvements and innovations in the system appears to be a fifth reason for 
diverging effects. Without an agency the franchisees themselves must learn and invest 
in development. This can slow improvement and innovation in the franchise network 
because the franchisees have less time to do that than an agency and are inclined to 
prioritize the own above the common interests. The latter also implies that they do not 
want to freely share all the things they have developed that might be beneficial for the 
entire system. They say that “We have developed this, we do not want to share that for 
free, we want to have something back, we have invested in it.” Negotiations and “complex 
discussions only about money” sometimes distract from improving results across all the 
units. 
 A lack of control in absence of an agency is the final explanation for diverging effects. 
While a central agency can control the implementation of the business format to warrant 
quality and uniformity, people from the system without an agency told that “We do not 
have a referee person who is [not a franchisee] and who could say: ‘we have agreed to do this 
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in the operation manual. You could not do this, but then I have to remove that brand name 
from your building because that is the task I got.”  They feel that this situation harms results 
because some uniformity is important for a strong brand name and for delivering the 
services as expected by clients. As a franchisee puts it, “It’s not good when there are too 
many degrees of freedom in the formula, too low levels of fulfilling the standards, you have to 
be quite strict on that. Because you work with one shared brand.”  Respondents do however 
mention that forced implementation can stride with the autonomy professionals and 
managers in healthcare are used to, leading to less satisfaction. With an agency, the 
autonomy depends on how heavily the agency controls the business format. In none of 
the cases this has led to a conflict yet.
Presence or absence of company-owned units
Other differences in the effects of system-level structures stem from the presence or 
absence of company-owned units. Effects diverge because the presence or absence 
of such units is related to differences in management, control, steering, system-wide 
adaptation, interests and development on the system-level, and local adaptation, 
interests, decision-making and management on the unit-level. 
 The franchisor organization is responsible for the management of the company-
owned units and has the ultimate decision-making responsibility. Although primarily 
having advantages, the franchisors feel that this responsibility also has some 
disadvantages. It makes the management of company-owned units more time 
consuming and costly than franchisee units, for example in regard to personnel. “With 
our company-owned units we got all the HRM problems of those units (...) It took a lot of time 
to deal with all these issues. “ (system 2). The franchisor also runs larger financial risks by 
investing own resources in company-owned units. However, the franchisors argue that 
these disadvantages are regularly outweighed by the better abilities and information 
that it provides them to manage the entire system, making the use of company-owned 
units advantageous overall. First, the franchisor earns the revenues of the company-
owned units, which are regularly larger than the fees received from franchisees (“We 
make a little more profit on a company-owned unit”).  Second, the franchisors use this 
financial advantage to develop and improve their system for both themselves and their 
franchisees. Third, the franchisor spreads risks by earning both the company-owned 
units’ revenues and the franchisees’ fees.  Fourth, with company-owned units franchisors 
have their own safety net for solving problems, “At one location, the franchisees suddenly 
dropped out and we had to take over that immediately. And then we observed that we 
actually did not have an organization to do that quickly and easily.” Fifth, franchisors can 
sample substantial information in their own units instead of being dependent on the 
possibly colored information provided by their autonomous franchisees. Franchisors 
argue that this helps them to better manage their franchisees.  
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 Franchisors feel that this ‘objective’ information sampling in company-owned 
units also provides them with other advantages that help to better warrant quality, 
competitive advantage, survival and efficiency. First, it allows better control of the 
business format; an advantage that was particularly noticed by the franchisor that had 
only franchised units in the past “We provide the formula, so we must take care that it stays 
that particular formula, that the ranges of the formula stay the ranges, that people do not 
surpass those ranges too much. Before we had far less substantive and financial information 
to do [that], the company-owned units have provided that.” Second, they feel that they 
are better able to steer the franchise system in the direction that they deem the most 
positive overall with a focus on system interests instead of risking a focus on franchisee 
interests only. Third, a franchisor argues that they have learned a lot from operating 
own units because “We can think better about new opportunities to improve our quality 
to be able to continue with leading the way in the sector, because we now better know 
what happens on the shop floor.” The franchisors feel that this information advantage – 
combined with the possibilities to experiment with changes in the own units (instead 
of being dependent on cooperation of franchisees) – help them to anticipate better 
on the opportunities and threats that units face and to keep franchisees satisfied with 
the formula because the daily operations of the units educate them as to the type of 
support needed by franchisees. 
 Franchisors feel that company-owned units also stimulate positive results of the 
entire system because these units can be used as a credible show-case to persuade 
the autonomous franchisees. This facilitates system-wide adaptation. “We started the 
implementation of a quality system in company-owned units. We could show a smooth 
working system to our franchisees. That really worked.” This situation basically also 
facilitates control. In the own units franchisors can better steer and control compliance 
with prescriptions from the operations manual, such as regular quality evaluation with 
customers. By subsequently using these units as a show-case of importance to the 
franchisees, uniform implementation and good performance levels are stimulated. Yet 
it appears that professionals that claim their autonomy and ideas – such as physicians – 
can prevent the franchisor from having more control and steering in company-owned 
units than in franchised units, thereby loosing most of the advantages of company-
owned units. 
 However, the franchisees and professionals have other, less positive, views on the 
effects of the presence of company-owned units. They do not see the advantages that 
franchisors see, but some even saw disadvantages. This finding is not surprising given the 
fact that franchisees in franchise systems always strive for autonomy whilst franchisors 
seek control and steering (Kidwell et al. 2007). First, the franchisees and professionals in 
our cases feel that the franchisor organization at times prevails the own interests above 
the interests of the unit professionals and customers in managing and deciding about 
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the company-owned units, threatening the quality of care and reputation of the system. 
As a franchisee of system 3 puts it, “All responsibilities are delegated to the manager of 
all company-owned units, the actual boss of those units. And that person is not a care 
professional, has no sense of care, and determines whether personnel can be attracted for a 
particular unit or not. I heard once that she only gave permission for an uncertified worker; 
a certified one would be too expensive. It is again a manager that works from the interest 
of an organization and not from the interest of the resident. That is dangerous”. Initially, 
franchisees in system 3 were afraid that the quality and reputation of their system would 
also be harmed by the fewer incentives that company-owned professionals would have 
as non-owners to perform well. But they do not see this happen in practice, possibly due 
to the type of service (care) and the intrinsic motivation of the professionals. Second, 
they feel that the professionals in company-owned units have less autonomy to locally 
adapt to the customers’ needs, particularly in system 3. They argue that this lowers 
their satisfaction and care quality, particularly because the interests can diverge. As a 
professional of system 3 said, “We do not get permission to build a shed for our residents 
to tinker freely and make a mess whereas it would be a lot nicer for our residents and our 
employees to have that.  Now we always have to clean up and only have this table. It is 
frustrating that we cannot do what we like to do. When we were franchisees, the shed was 
already there for a long time.” Third, company-owned units are confronted with slower 
decision-making because permission is needed from the franchisor organization, 
lowering the efficiency and agility on the unit level.  
 Despite the perceived disadvantages of company-owned units, the possibility to work 
in a company-owned unit also has some advantages for professionals and managers. 
First, they like the opportunity to be involved in learning and developing together with 
the franchisor organization. As a respondent from system 3 describes, “New things are 
tested in our company-owned part of our system first, and some professionals deliberately 
choose to be more involved in those developments by becoming a company-owned 
manager instead of a franchisee.” Second, they like the easier access to the knowledge of 
the franchisor organization. Third, some of them like to have less risk and responsibility 
compared to what they would have as a franchisee. 
 
The unit-level ownership structure: Perceived influences on results
Stand-alone versus fractional franchise
Fractional units are part of a parent organization whereas stand-alone units are 
independent. Although two of our cases consciously choose a fractional structure as 
they wanted to improve their existing organizations by franchising, such a structure 
appears to have various hampering effects on the actual achievement of the desired 
results. A stand-alone structure is felt to be more helpful to positive results (table 3). 
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 The diverging effects of a stand-alone and fractional unit structure are first due to 
differences in freedom in managing, steering, controlling and deciding about one’s 
unit and in whose interests are put first. In contrast to the regular situation in many 
large, traditional care organizations, professionals in stand-alone franchise units can 
autonomously manage, steer, control and make decisions with a focus on the unit’s 
interests, creating a very agile unit. They are no longer dependent on management 
layers and other departments; the organizational structure is flat. This situation is felt 
to stimulate quality and efficiency of care and makes many of them satisfied with their 
work. As a professional puts it, “We can directly change something in the care when we 
think that is necessary, you can directly change it. And that’s very pleasant because we 
can directly see the result of our change. We therefore are able to keep the quality very 
high, we are continuously busy with improving, adapting, improving. That’s why we are 
continuously satisfied by our work, that you can see, hey, we’ve done it!” Nevertheless, the 
large autonomy cannot satisfy all professionals. Some ultimately prefer to be told what 
to do and stop being a stand-alone franchisee. 
 A fractional franchise unit in contrast is dependent upon multiple stakeholders in 
the parent organization for its decision-making. Consequently, decision-making is often 
as slow and complex as in the original parent organization, hampering an actual quick 
improvement by the franchise cooperation. As a professional of system 2 describes, “We 
have made a business plan for that change, but then the physicians have to agree with it 
and deliberate about it, now it is at the executive manager and the financial manager, and 
the operating room manager also has to think about it because they maybe lose patients. 
So it takes so much time.” This slow improvement at times leads to dissatisfaction and 
frustration. This situation is worsened by the regular heavier focus on the interests 
of the parent then on the individual unit. The parent uses the franchise as long as it 
advantageous for the performance of the organization. But the implementation of 
business format elements that could elevate the unit results are impeded if they put 
the interests of other departments at risk or if they conflict with policies in the parent 
organization. In every unit there is thus only partial steering and control on the local 
business format implementation. This situation results in less reliable performance levels 
and less uniformity across units, making it harder to create competitive advantages with 
a strong brand name towards insurers, referring providers and clients. As a franchisee of 
system 2 puts it, “You want to guarantee that when I arrive at a [franchise] location, I should 
get the same service, namely, the same access, the same quality of care…It cannot be that 
you come to one place….this is what we guarantee; this is what we deliver”. Moreover, 
some professionals and managers feel tensioned because they have to deal with the 
sometimes contrasting requirements of two organizations: “I have plans and guidelines 
that I have to follow from my parent organizations, and I have guidelines of the franchise 
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organization (…). So I have to meet the requirements of both. I find that difficult and 
complex sometimes” (professional system 1).
 The diverging effects of stand-alone and fractional ownership are also due to 
differences in adaptation and learning (development). Most stand-alone professionals 
are highly satisfied as they have ample room to locally adapt their care to the needs and 
wishes of their customers and themselves. In a fractional structure the local adaptation 
of the franchised unit regularly is more restricted. In contrast to stand-alone franchisees, 
actors in the fractional structure also have an ambivalent commitment to joint learning in 
the system. The parent companies, at times, retain the time investment in joint learning 
in the franchise by preferring their own production targets, and some professionals and 
unit managers are more committed to the parent than to the franchise organization. 
The units therefore sometimes profit less from the efficiency and innovation that could 
results from knowledge sharing and development in the franchise cooperation. Some 
actors therefore conclude, like a franchisee of system 1, that “I think that we should really 
deliberate about what the advantages are of working under a large umbrella of the parent 
or whether to create more of our own character within the franchise organization to work 
more efficiently and more cheaply within that organization, and make use of the potential 
of innovation.” 
 Differences in support and service provision are a final reason for diverging effects. 
Owing to these differences, some organizations and professionals still prefer a fractional 
structure. In a fractional structure, the units have double support: support from their 
parent and support from the franchise system. The fractional units are therefore felt 
to be less prone to failure and bankruptcy. Moreover, it is felt that the use of the brand 
name strength and size of both the parent and the franchise brings an additional 
competitive advantage to the fractional unit. Multiple professionals also feel more 
unburdened from secondary tasks because of the double support, like a professional of 
system 2, “Going commercially with the partnership outside the hospital was thought to be 
scary. Because then you miss the whole structure of the hospital. When you are going to do it 
by yourself you have to take up much more management tasks, become a real entrepreneur. 
And most of the ophthalmologists just want to be ophthalmologist, doing patient care.” 
Respondents from the fractional systems also feel that the quality of service is likely 
to be higher for those customers that need both franchised and non-franchised care, 
because continuity of care is more easily arranged when both types of care are part of 
the same organization. 
Active versus passive ownership
An active owner is a professional that both owns the unit and conducts the daily 
operations and management, whereas a passive owner has delegated this responsibility 
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to a manager and/or professionals. All actors perceive active ownership as advantageous 
to achieve positive results and passive ownership as disadvantageous or not affecting 
results (table 3). 
 The respondents firstly attribute the different effects to differences in management, 
decision-making, steering and control. Active owner professionals can autonomously 
manage, steer and make decisions, and have full control over the implementation of 
the business format and improvements in their unit; the organizational structure is flat. 
They can directly make changes and improvements in their care delivery rather than 
deliberating about it with management layers. As a client from system 3 illustrates, 
“When we are not satisfied or want a change in the care provision, we know that we have 
to announce that to [the franchisee], the communication is direct; also when they want 
to announce something they directly do that. That is fantastic. Before, when my child 
lived in a large organization, we sometimes said something to an employee and nothing 
happened.” This situation is felt to facilitate the delivery of efficient, high quality care 
and satisfies many professionals with their work. In passively owned units in contrast, 
the professionals and unit managers are for major issues often ultimately dependent 
on the owner for approval, and the owner cannot steer the entire behavior of the unit. 
As the franchisor of system 2 argues, “Sometimes the [owner] agrees with what we want 
to do but the professionals do not want it. And sometimes it is the other way around, that 
the [owner] does not want because they for example have to cut costs.” There is thus only 
partial mutual control over the business format implementation and what happens in 
the unit. They feel that this situation reduces uniformity and efficiency levels across the 
entire system. 
 Secondly, the diverging effects are attributed to differences in interests and learning. 
The respondents find that active ownership stimulates quality and efficiency of care. 
As active owners, professionals are focused on fulfilling their own and their customers’ 
interests. They have incentives to continuously learn and experiment to further 
improve performance and to provide customized continuous care. As the franchisor 
of system 3 puts it, “You really see that people who previously worked as an employee in 
a large organization develop themselves enormously once they become an entrepreneur. 
The ownership is the most important, that you are responsible for your residents and that 
the success or failure of the unit heavily depends on your own energy, time investment, 
enthusiasm. That feeling really brings about another type of energy in people.” (franchisor 
system 3) Many active professionals are also satisfied with their close involvement and 
the high quality of care they can provide. However, some become dissatisfied because 
they find that their continuous involvement asserts too heavy an impact on their work-
life balance. In the passively owned units, the individual motivation and willingness of 
the professionals and managers determine whether the focus is on the interests of the 
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customers and the unit. Unless their individual motivation and willingness is strong, 
their focus as non-owners is more on their personal interests and the interests that 
the owner directs them to follow. When the professionals or managers see benefits in 
business format elements, they are enthusiastic to implement them. But they are not 
if they are prone to hold on to their own working methods, as an example in system 2 
clearly shows, “We were talking about control by phone after surgery; it is in our business 
format and experiences in other hospitals show that it is positive for both the hospital 
and patients. But then we are talking about it and then they are again discussing about 
it, unsure, unwilling. So it took a long time to implement it.” The actors feel that this likely 
lower commitment and  the lower control levels also lead to less uniformity in business 
format implementation, making it harder to build a strong brand name for the entire 
system. 
Multi-unit versus single-unit franchise
Every franchisee in system 1 owns multiple units, while the franchisees in the two other 
systems each own one unit. The actors in system 2 do not see much of an effect of 
their single-unit structure because their fractional structure eliminates some single-unit 
characteristics such as autonomous decision-making. The other systems show that both 
structures have advantages and disadvantages in achieving results (see table 3). 
 Multi-unit franchise is felt to facilitate growth, survival and competitive advantage 
when new franchisees are scarce because unit expansion occurs through the existing 
franchisees. Multi-unit franchise also stimulates efficiency and financial performance 
through reducing the search costs for suitable new franchisees and reaching economies 
of scale for franchisees to earn back their investments. Opinions differ in regard to 
whether multi-units facilitate quality and efficiency improvement through knowledge 
sharing. Some see that there are economies of scale as “I observe that sharing knowledge 
and tuning ideas is easier with units belonging to our own organization. It is more difficult 
to do so with the units of other [owners]. They have different manners.” Others do not 
experience easier knowledge sharing between units of the same franchisee than of 
different franchisees, particularly not between units that are located at distance from 
each other. 
 Multi-unit franchising is also thought to have hindering effects as compared to a 
single-unit structure. Decision-making in units in the multi-unit structure sometimes 
occurs more slowly because permission of the multi-unit management must be sought. 
This management layer makes a multi-unit structure more costly in its daily operations 
and restricts local learning and adaptation in the unit, reducing the possibilities 
to improve quality of care in the own localities. However, the extent to which the 
possibilities for local decision-making, learning and adaptation are actually restricted 
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depends on how much freedom the multi-unit franchisee gives to the individual 
unit and the freedom in the business format. Professionals of system 1 feel that the 
management layer also partially removes the attractiveness of franchising because 
“There is less room for entrepreneurship of the unit manager. And a franchise is actually 
particularly a nice organizational form when there are local franchisees everywhere who 
can safely choose entrepreneurship in healthcare. And that is not what you see in this 
organization now.” Finally, using multi-unit franchise makes it harder to control uniform 
business implementation in the early years of existence because every franchisee 
implements the not yet fully developed business format in its own way. As a respondent 
describes, “There has been an explosion of growth of new units of [franchisees], suddenly 
all these new units were there, and all were thinking about the best way to build their unit 
and were developing new ideas. You can imagine that there was hardly any control about 
all these things whereas the brand name suddenly appeared everywhere.” 
Conclusion and discussion
The role of ownership structures in achieving results 
This paper showed that the ownership structure used by professional healthcare 
franchises is perceived to affect the achievement of positive results with franchising 
for franchisors, franchisees, professionals and clients. Moreover, it revealed that 
differences in management, control, steering, interests, support, adaptation, learning/
development and decision-making processes are the underlying dynamics that can 
explain why different system-level and unit-level ownership structures have different 
perceived effects. On the system level, the combination of the two dimensions ‘with or 
without an independent central agency’ and ‘with or without company-owned units’ 
leads to four ideal types of system-level ownership configurations that vary in regard to 
the preceding dynamics and thus in their effects (see figure 1).   
 A hierarchical franchise has (many) company-owned units and a central franchisor 
agency. From the franchisor’s perspective, this structure is the most facilitating to 
achieve all types of results – a finding that is consistent with most findings on the plural 
form in other industries (e.g., Bradach, 1997; Perrigot et al., 2009). For the franchisors, 
this structure combines the strengths of both franchised and company-owned units: 1) 
the steering, control, learning capacities, and quick decision-making of the company-
owned units that can also be used to better manage and support franchisees, and 2) 
the motivation, resources, local learning and adaptation capacities of the franchisees. 
The strengths of 1) may be more difficult to realize when professionals claim their 
autonomy, reducing the facilitating effects of the combination of the two structures. 
However, the franchisees and professionals appear to be less enthusiastic about the 
168    |     Making Franchising in Healthcare Work
effects of this structure, or are indifferent. The franchisees and professionals do not 
necessarily experience the advantages of the presence of company-owned units that 
the franchisor sees for them (better support, innovations, system-wide adaptations) and 
feel that a larger focus on system interests can harm both reputation and quality. The 
structure may lead to dissatisfaction and lower quality and efficiency levels, because 
professionals in company-owned units may have less autonomy to locally adapt to 
their customers’ needs and the units are less agile because they need approval from 
the central agency. Franchisees and professionals therefore see a shared power franchise 
– with only franchisee units – as the most facilitating structure to achieve the results 
they desire, due to the combination of support and cooperation on the one hand and 
autonomy in managing and operating their own unit on the other. The franchisors, in 
contrast, are less enthusiastic about this structure. They feel that their dependence on 
information from franchisees and their diminished steering abilities hamper achieving 
a strong competitive position, their survival chance, and an efficient operation.  
Company-
owned 
units 
Independent central agency 
No 
company-
owned units 
(=only 
franchisees) 
Hierarchical franchise 
• central support in developing
improvements and  innovations 
• top-down learning (development) by
experimenting 
• focus on system interests
• central decision-making
• central management
• centralized control
• system-wide adaptation based on
persuasion and compulsion 
• system-wide steering
Shared power franchise 
• central support in developing
improvements and innovations 
• mutual learning (development) by doing /
trial and error 
• focus on mutual interests
• partial central decision-making by
consultation 
• decentralized management
• partial centralized control
• system-wide adaptation based on
commitment 
• unit steering
Partnership franchise 
• bottom-up learning (development) by
experimenting
• focus on unit interests
• decision-making on consensus
• partial central management
• partial decentralized control
• partial decentralized system-wide
adaptation efforts 
• system-wide steering
Autonomous franchise 
• individual learning (development)
• focus on individual interests
• decision-making on  consensus
• decentralized management
• decentralized control
• decentralized system-wide adaptation
efforts 
• unit steering
No independent central agency 
Figure 1: Typology of system-level ownership structures in franchising
 In an autonomous and a partnership franchise, the franchisees together form a board 
to manage and steer the entire system: an independent central franchisor agency with 
allocated power is absent. In an autonomous franchise, the franchisees are unified 
through working together under the same business format but in the daily operations 
they operate particularly independent from each other with a focus on their own 
interests. Similar to what was modeled by Hendrikse and Jiang (2011), this structure 
does not seem particularly efficient. System-wide decisions, adaptations and control are 
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only achieved when all or most franchisees agree. These characteristics imply a high 
risk of conflict: actors strive for the fulfillment of their own interests and ultimately, 
nobody can force a decision. This structure provides franchisees and professionals 
with autonomy and involvement, but also with less support in secondary tasks. All 
these characteristics increase the difficulty of achieving competitive and efficiency 
advantages with the franchise. In a partnership franchise, the franchisees are slightly 
more connected because they also own some units together. This shared governance 
responsibility leads to more system-wide steering and management, facilitating slightly 
more efficiency than an autonomous franchise structure. The quality levels in company-
owned units may be more at risk than in an autonomous franchise. The focus is more 
on the solid performance of the entire unit instead of on the interests of the individual 
professional who owns the unit and his customers. Similar to an autonomous franchise, 
the risk for conflicts is high. 
Table 4: Dynamics of unit-level ownership structures
Stand-alone vs fractional Active vs passive Single-unit vs multi-unit
Stand-alone Fractional Active Passive Single-unit Multi-unit
Management 
unit
Autonomous Plural Autonomous Delegated Singular ‘Division’
Decision-
making unit
Autonomous Dependent Autonomous Dependent Autonomous Dependent
Steering unit Autonomous Shared / 
plural
Autonomous Shared / 
plural
Autonomous Central
Control 
implementation
Full Partial Full Partial
Interests Unit Parental 
organization
Unit Personal 
and owner
Local 
adaptation
Autonomous Restricted Based on 
incentives 
or intrinsic 
motivation
Based on 
command 
or intrinsic 
motivation
Autonomous Restricted
Learning 
(development) 
and knowledge 
sharing in 
system
Based on full 
commitment
Based on 
ambivalent 
commitment
Loose 
connections 
between 
units
Stronger 
connections 
same-owner 
units in 
neighborhood 
Support Central Central and 
parent
 The combination of the system-level configurations with different unit-level 
structures can change the actual effects. This study shows that every unit-level 
structure has its own dynamics (see table 4) that facilitate the achievement of particular 
results and make it more difficult to achieve others. A stand-alone, active and single-
unit structure facilitates the achievement of a high work satisfaction of professionals 
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and a high quality of care through providing franchisee-professionals with ample 
autonomy to locally learn, adapt, decide and steer. In passive, fractional and multi-unit 
ownership, the professionals are at times still dictated by non-professionals, restraining 
them from behaving how they would like. Moreover, as was hypothesized (Agha et al., 
2007a; Michael & Combs, 2008; Shane, 1998), the lack of ownership incentives and the 
presence of both franchised and unfranchised services sometimes also hamper the 
change of working methods and the commitment to both unit and system success. 
However, as some existing organizations consciously choose to join a franchise with 
their organization, these ownership structures are inevitable. Some professionals also 
ultimately prefer passive and fractional ownership because of their lower responsibility 
and higher support levels. Moreover, as in many professional organizations (Nam et al., 
2010; Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991), in all franchise structures, the professionals 
regularly have a powerful impact on whether changes are being implemented, 
particularly those professionals in partnerships. The autonomous, direct decision-
making and singular management in stand-alone, active and single-unit franchises 
stimulate an efficient care delivery, although economies of scale in knowledge sharing 
seem easier to achieve in a multi-unit franchise – a finding similar to the uncovered effect 
of Darr et al. (1995). To facilitate growth, the multi-unit franchise structure is suitable, 
which is consistent with what could be expected from findings in other industries (e.g., 
Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). This structure seems particularly helpful when new franchisees 
are scarce.
 The combination of the characteristics of a unit-level and a system-level structure 
can strengthen or make it more difficult to achieve particular results. The dynamics that 
make a hierarchical franchise a stimulating structure from the system’s perspective – 
central control, decision-making and management, system-wide steering and system-
wide adaptation – are weakened in combination with a fractional unit structure. That 
is, the plural management, steering and control, the dependent decision-making, the 
focus on the parental interests and the ambivalent commitment to system learning 
and adaptation that characterize the fractional structure make it hard for the franchisor 
to actually exert the central and system-wide influence. With passive ownership 
partially having the same underlying dynamics as a fractional structure, the same kind 
of argumentation applies. However, fractional and passive unit ownership also does 
not appear to be the preferred combination with other system-level structures if one 
wants to achieve positive results with franchising. That is, the preceding characteristics 
make decision-making by consultation, decision-making by consensus, system-wide 
adaptation based on commitment, and partial (de)central control even more complex 
and prolonged, thereby making it more difficult to achieve competitive, survival, 
financial and quality advantages. In contrast, the achievement of the results that are 
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facilitated by the different system-level structures is at least not to be hampered and 
even be stimulated by combining it with stand-alone, active and single-unit structures. 
The autonomy in unit management, decision-making, steering and local adaptation 
and the full control over ones unit in these structures keep the way clear for central 
and system-wide influence (as in hierarchical and shared power franchise) as well as 
(partially) decentralized and cooperative dynamics of system-level structures (as in 
shared power, partnership and autonomous franchise). 
 However, we found indications that hampering effects of ownership structure do not 
necessarily have to lead to negative results in practice because various other factors also 
play a role in the ultimate results. These other factors can neutralize or compensate the 
hampering effects in practice. Thus, systems with an autonomous franchise structure or 
passive ownership can still deliver high quality care and realize rapid improvement ability 
when the professionals and franchisees are highly committed to the system or their own 
unit, even though the structure in itself does not facilitate these qualities. Likewise, the 
lower control levels in an autonomous franchise can stimulate the work satisfaction of 
the franchisees and the professionals that have a desire for ample autonomy, but such 
work satisfaction is also possible to achieve in hierarchical and shared power franchises 
if the central agency gives the franchisees and professionals sufficient autonomy within 
the business format. Similarly, facilitating effects of particular ownership structures do 
not necessarily translate in a contribution to positive results in practice in healthcare 
services. Autonomous and powerful professionals at times prevent the franchisor 
from having significant control, system-wide adaptation and learning opportunities, 
reducing the actual stimulating effects of a hierarchical (plural form) franchise. 
 We have mapped all these findings in a new model (see figure 2), depicting how 
combinations of system-level and unit-level ownership structures are expected to relate 
to results via multiple intermediating system-level and unit-level processes, and how 
attitudes, skills, business format control and type of service seem to moderate these 
relationships. As our study focused on the effect of ownership structure on results, the 
study primarily suggested a unilateral effect. There may however be bilateral dynamics. 
For example, one of our cases changed the system-level ownership structure towards 
a structure with both franchised and company-owned units, because they noticed that 
the achievement of some results was hampered by the absence of particular processes 
within a shared power franchise, such as top-down learning by experimenting and 
central management. Further research should confirm the existence of unilateral, 
bilateral, moderating and mediating effects.
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Study contributions  
This study made two major contributions. This paper is the first to provide an in-depth 
structured insight in how one of the major design factors in a franchise – ownership 
structure – can help or hamper in realizing the potential of franchising in healthcare 
for multiple actors. This contribution of our paper is noteworthy, given the increasing 
use of franchising in response to multiple challenges in healthcare, the significance of 
the sector, and the lack of evidence to support evidence-based operation to realize the 
potential.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Franchisor 
(perceived) results 
- competitive position 
- financial 
performance 
- efficiency 
- survival 
- growth 
- quality of care 
Franchisee and 
professional 
(perceived) results 
- competitive position 
- financial 
performance 
- efficiency 
- survival 
- quality of care 
- satisfaction 
 
System-level processes 
- System-wide 
adaptation 
- Decision-making 
- Management 
- Control 
- Interest focus 
- Learning 
(development) and 
knowledge sharing 
- Steering 
 
     AND 
 
Unit-level processes 
- Local adaptation 
- Decision-making 
- Management 
- Control 
- Interest focus 
- Learning 
(development) 
- Steering 
 
System-level ownership structure 
 
- Franchised units only  
OR  combination 
franchised and company-
owned units 
 
         AND 
 
- Independent central 
agency present 
OR   absent 
 
         AND 
 
Unit-level ownership structure 
 
- Stand-alone  OR fractional 
 
         AND 
 
- Passive  OR  active 
 
                AND 
 
- Multi-unit OR single-unit 
 
-  Attitude & skills unit 
-  Business format control 
-  Age franchise system 
-  Type of service (degree of professionalism / 
autonomy claim)  
Figure 2: Proposed model for the relationship between ownership structures and results to be 
tested in future research
 Second, this study contributes to franchise research in a broader sense. This study 
is the first to empirically uncover the dynamics underlying the effects of all system-
level and unit-level ownership structures on results for franchisors, franchisees and 
professionals. Through this we are able to show that the results of every single structure 
will in practice be partly dependent on the structures that are concurrently used and 
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we can show how combinations of structures on both the system and the unit level 
are likely to work out in practice for all parties. This provides a more realistic picture 
as compared to most of the existing research that quantitatively considers only one 
structure for either franchisor or franchisee, providing better decision-making support 
to practitioners. Additionally, these uncovered dynamics  help to determine what other 
choices should be made within the franchise system – for example in regard to the type 
of support provided, control instruments, selection choices – to compensate for flaws 
in the ownership structure in order to ensure that the desired results are achieved. The 
typologies and model developed in this study can be used as a basis for future research. 
Our study also provides empirical insight in the functioning of two not yet empirically 
investigated ownership structures: cooperative and fractional franchise structures. 
Directions for future research  
Because these new insights were retrieved from an in-depth study of three cases in 
healthcare, further research is required to confirm and extend these insights. First, 
we recommend large-scale quantitative tests of the developed model (see figure 2) 
both within and outside the professional healthcare sector, incorporating multiple 
combinations of system- and unit-structures, intermediating processes, moderating 
variables and result types from multiple actor perspectives. Second, such research 
should also provide further insight in whether and how the comparative value of 
different (combinations of ) ownership structures changes over time. Research in other 
industries showed  that the value of particular single structures changes over time 
(see e.g., Shane, 1998, 2001, for single vs. multi-unit ownership, and e.g., Kosava & 
Lafontaine, 2010 for plural forms). Third, further research should also resolve the limited 
focus of our study on ownership structure only. Although this focus was required to 
study the role of ownership structure in-depth, research has shown that the ultimate 
results of franchising are dependent on the compatibility and cohesion with many 
other structural and behavioral aspects (see e.g., Nijmeijer et al. 2014b for an overview). 
Fourth, science and practice could benefit from further investigations of how franchisees 
experience the plural form. This study signaled a discrepancy between the franchisees 
not seeing any value from this structure and the franchisors assuming advantages for 
the franchisees in terms of receiving better support and a show-case for tried-and-
tested improvement. The only prior study from the franchisee perspective confirmed 
some of these advantages in retail and service industries (Perrigot & Herrbach, 2012). 
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to explore how one can make the theoretically promising 
franchise model for healthcare work. The overall question was: “How are the structural 
design and process dynamics of healthcare franchises related to achieving positive 
strategic, organizational, professional and client-related results?” In the following sections, 
answers are provided on the research question, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodology are considered, and the main findings are discussed. The discussion 
concludes with implications and recommendations for research and practice. 
Conclusion: No blue print for making franchising in healthcare 
work
The main conclusion of this thesis is that there is not one unequivocal manner to make 
franchising in healthcare work. Which structural design elements and process dynamics 
are related to achieving positive results with franchising, and how, depends on whether 
one looks from the perspective of the franchisor or the unit actors, the desirable types 
of results, and the contexts and combinations in which the design elements and process 
dynamics are used. We elaborate on this conclusion below. 
Choices in structural design and process dynamics 
On an aggregated level, the theoretical and qualitative studies indicated that the actual 
strategic, organizational, professional and client-related results achieved in healthcare 
franchises are dependent on how franchisors and unit actors design their business 
format and ownership structures, the relative height of contractual payments, the 
attitudes and skills needed, the cohesiveness in which the franchisor and unit actors 
relate to each other, and the type of franchise model used. The quantitative study 
confirmed that these aspects are related to the overall results experienced by unit 
actors. A partially contradictory picture emerged from the perspective of the franchisor. 
The overall quantitative results perceived by franchisors were related only to the level 
of relational cohesion between the franchisor and unit actors and the design of the 
business format (see table 1). 
256    |     Making Franchising in Healthcare Work
Table 1: Overview of the choices in structural design and process dynamics related to overall 
results 
Design element or 
process dynamic 
Description Results 
franchisor 
perspective
Results 
unit actor 
perspective
Qual Quant Qual Quant
Business format
Strength of 
positioning toward 
customers 
Extent to which the presentation and collection of 
attributes of the healthcare services are perceived 
to be unique and attractive and presence of well-
known brand.  
+ + + +
Appropriate support 
in regard to type, 
amount, quality 
Amount, quality and type of support (e.g., 
training, marketing) that suitably and sufficiently 
assist franchisees and unit managers in starting-
up and operating their unit. 
+ + + +
Level of control non-
care activities 
Extent to which the behavior and performance of 
units is controlled in regard to non-care related 
activities (through selection, decision-making, 
standardization, monitoring). 
+ or - + + or - +
Level of centralized 
decision-making 
about care 
Extent to which decisions about care provision 
in the units are made centrally (centralization of 
decision-making rights).  
+ or - 0 + or - -
Level of 
standardization of 
care 
Extent to which content and manner of care 
provision by unit actors is controlled by 
standardized operating instructions.  
+ or - 0 + or - +
Ownership structure
Non-cooperative vs 
cooperative system 
Business format is owned by an independent 
central franchisor agency versus by some or all of 
the franchisees. 
+ 0 + +
Plural form vs pure 
franchise system 
Units are owned by both the franchisor and the 
franchisees, versus units are owned by franchisees. 
+ 0 0 or - +
Active vs passive unit 
ownership
Franchisee-owner does the daily operations 
of the unit himself versus franchisee-owner 
has delegated the responsibility for the daily 
operation to an employed manager.
+ 0 + +
Single vs multi-unit 
ownership
Franchisee owns one versus more units. 
 
+ or - 0 + or - +
Contractual payments
Reasonable height 
of contractual 
payments
Extent to which the payments are reasonable 
relative to what franchisees receive in return in 
regard to branding, support, development and 
system management. 
+ Not + +
Attitudes and skills
Adequate attitudes 
and skills of 
franchisor
Extent to which attitudes and skills of the 
franchisor are adequate to successfully manage 
and operate the system. 
+ 0 + +
Adequate attitudes 
and skills of unit 
actors 
Extent to which attitudes and skills of the 
franchisees and unit managers are adequate to 
successfully manage and operate their unit(s). 
+ 0 + +
+ = positive relationship; - = negative relationship; 0 = no or neutral relationship
Qual = qualitative study, Quant = quantitative study
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Table 1: Overview of the choices in structural design and process dynamics related to overall 
results (continued)
Design element or 
process dynamic 
Description Results 
franchisor 
perspective
Results 
unit actor 
perspective
Qual Quant Qual Quant
Relational cohesion
Level of task 
cohesion
Extent to which franchisor and units closely 
cooperate as partners with attuned tasks, roles, 
respect and attention to each other’s needs, share 
knowledge, communicate, and are mutually 
involved in improving and innovating.  
+ + + +
Level of social 
cohesion
Extent to which the franchisor and the units trust 
each other, are mutually committed to making the 
entire system and individual unit(s) successful, are 
not focused on individual interests (opportunistic 
behavior) and have low conflict levels. 
+ + + +
Type of franchise
Stand-alone vs 
fractional type of 
franchise
Units exclusively provide franchised products and 
services versus units offer both franchised and 
non-franchised services (i.e., franchised services 
are part of a larger organization). 
+ 0 + +
+ = positive relationship; - = negative relationship; 0 = no or neutral relationship
Qual = qualitative study, Quant = quantitative study
 More specific, the thesis indicates that both the franchisor and the unit actors 
experience more positive results when the level of task cohesion and social cohesion 
among them is larger and when the business format includes a stronger positioning 
toward customers and appropriate support services. The role of the level of control in 
the business format in shaping overall results differs for different control elements and 
from the franchisor and unit actor perspective. Actors in both groups quantitatively 
experienced better overall results when they perceived more extensive control of non-
care activities. Whereas unit actors also experienced better overall results when they felt 
more standardization of care activities and more decentralized decision-making about 
care, the designs of these control elements seem to matter less from the perspective of 
franchisors. This conclusion partially contradicts the qualitative study which indicated 
that control of care and non-care activities has both positive and negative effects from 
the perspective of both the franchisors and unit actors. 
 The mixed methods design also produced contradictory results regarding the role 
of ownership, attitudes and skills, and type of franchise in making franchising work 
from the franchisor perspective. The theoretical and qualitative findings indicated 
that franchisors would benefit from employing a plural form, non-cooperative system 
structure and stimulating active ownership by franchisees of one or more units. By 
contrast, the quantitative findings suggested that franchisor’s experienced overall 
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results do not differ across ownership choices. Also the use of a stand-alone type of 
franchise and appropriate attitudes and skills were unexpectedly not quantitatively 
related to franchisor’s experienced overall results. From the unit actor perspective by 
contrast, the ownership structures, attitudes and skills, and stand-alone type of franchise 
were positively related to overall results of franchising, albeit the positive relationship 
with a plural form was somewhat unexpected. Also a reasonable level of contractual 
payments to the franchisor was of importance to them. 
Despite the presence of all these aggregated, overall relationships with results, the 
thesis also indicates that one actually should dig deeper than these overall relationships 
to really understand what makes franchising work for whom in which situation. We 
elaborate on that conclusion in the next sections.  
Conclusion
At an aggregated level, unit actors experience more positive overall results of franchising in 
healthcare when: 
• the business format includes a strong positioning, appropriate support, control of non-
care activities, standardization of care, and decentralized decision-making about care;
• a non-cooperative, plural form system structure is used and franchisees actively own a 
single unit;
• the contractual payments are reasonable relative to what is received in return;
• the attitudes and skills of franchisors and unit actors are adequate to fulfill their role;
• the level of relational cohesion is higher;
• a stand-alone type of franchise is used.  
At an aggregated level, franchisors experience more positive overall results of franchising in 
healthcare when:
• the business format includes a strong positioning toward customers, appropriate 
support, and control of non-care activities;
• the level of relational cohesion is higher.
The findings between the methods in the mixed methods design are partially contradictory 
in regard to the role of ownership, attitudes and skills, and type of franchise from the 
franchisor perspective. 
Pivotal role of process dynamics 
The business format, ownership structures, relational cohesion, type of franchise, 
contractual payments, and attitudes and skills are perceived to relate to results of 
franchising because each of these aspects produces various process dynamics. As a 
consequence of these process dynamics, the presence and direction of the relationships 
with results regularly differ for different types of results. The process dynamics that are 
produced by support and control in the business format, relational cohesion, ownership 
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structures, and franchise type are partially overlapping, diverging and contrasting to 
each other. 
 This thesis for example showed that more support and control in the business 
format basically can help promoting competitive advantage, survival and quality of 
care  through steering the behavior of unit actors toward desirable performance levels 
and a uniform presentation. However, these designs can also hinder the quality of care, 
efficiency and work satisfaction by reducing the chance that business format practices 
are feasible and valuable to local units, by stimulating resistance of professionals, and 
by reducing their ownership and autonomy feeling. By contrast, through more task 
and social cohesion one enlarges the chance of feasible and valuable practices in the 
franchise and retains the opportunities for professionals to incorporate their own ideas. 
More control and social cohesion facilitate efficient knowledge sharing, but at the same 
time reduce (short-term) efficiency on the system-level through the larger overhead 
levels required. Task cohesion, a plural form, non-cooperative system-level ownership, 
support and control help stimulating the quality of care, work satisfaction, efficiency, 
competitive advantage and survival by accelerating innovation and implementation 
(no reinvention of the wheel) and by reducing the resources unit actors have to spend 
on choosing and applying appropriate work methods. However, support, control and 
plural form ownership can also negatively affect these result types by restricting the 
ability of unit actors to adapt to the local customers’ needs and create an efficient fit 
with local practices. Such local adaptation and efficient local management and decision-
making are stimulated by choosing a stand-alone franchise type, active and single-unit 
ownership. Whether the process dynamics underlying the system-level ownership 
structures in healthcare (steering, management, decision-making, control, interests) 
really play a role in results from the franchisor perspective is uncertain as quantitative 
relationships between ownership and overall results were absent. 
 The positioning, contractual payments, and attitudes and skills lead to a different type 
of process dynamics than the preceding ones, thus having a different function in making 
franchising in healthcare work. The positioning toward customers is essential because 
it determines whether customers and (potential) unit actors find the formula attractive 
and because it motivates actors to work hard on its achievement and maintenance. 
All the other process dynamics and structural design elements in the franchise system 
need to contribute to realizing the desired positioning. As systems differ in how they 
want to position themselves (e.g., highly customized care in a hospitable climate vs. a 
predictable care trajectory for clients within a fixed interval of time), so do the process 
dynamics and structural designs required. Through their own appropriate attitudes and 
skills, unit actors are able to suitably apply, complement and locally adapt the business 
format and make optimal use of the ideas of their peers and franchisor. Franchisors with 
appropriate attitudes and skills are able to fulfill their roles in regard to business format 
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development and adaptation, behavioral steering and cooperation with unit actors in 
a manner that suits their particular franchise sytem. Which attitudes and skills exactly 
are appropriate depends on the process dynamics one wants to generate. A level of 
contractual payments that is reasonable from the franchisee perspective ensures that 
the franchisor has sufficient resources for the desirable level of support, control, and 
innovation development in the system while the costs of care and franchise membership 
are acceptable. 
Conclusion
·	 Different choices in regard to the design of support and control in the business format, 
relational cohesion, ownership structures and franchise type are related to results of 
franchising because they produce a variety of partially overlapping, diverging and 
contrasting process dynamics. 
·	 These process dynamics include: local adaptation, management and decision-making; 
accelerated innovation and implementation of practices that are feasible and valuable 
to units; efficiently choosing and using care and non-care practices; synergy realization; 
facilitation of knowledge sharing; uniform presentation; system-wide adaptation; 
steering toward predictable performances; resistance to change; more bureaucracy; 
greater overhead levels. 
·	 Dependent on the types of results one wants to achieve and the desired positioning 
toward customers, different process dynamics are desirable, and thus different choices in 
regard to support and control, relational cohesion, ownership and franchise type. 
·	 At least from the perspective of unit actors, appropriate attitudes and skills and 
reasonable contractual payments make franchising work further because they help to 
really obtain potential benefits from the franchise cooperation.  
Importance of situational fit
As also follows from the preceding conclusion section, this thesis indicates that making 
franchising work requires situational fit. Given their interdependencies, all of the choices 
that are made in regard to the design of the business format, ownership structure, 
relational cohesion, attitudes and skills, type of franchise, and contractual payments need 
to fit to each other. Moreover, considering the overlapping, diverging and contrasting 
process dynamics underlying these choices and the consequent different relationships 
with different types of results, different combinations of structural design elements and 
process dynamics are optimal in different situations. The optimal combination seems 
to depend on how the franchise wants to position itself toward customers, which 
results one wants to achieve for whom, the type of healthcare service and healthcare 
professional, how the external context looks like (e.g., purchasing policies of insurers), 
and the age and size of the franchise. The thesis for example showed that franchisors 
and unit actors that aimed to improve the quality and efficiency of care with franchising 
felt that they primarily benefited from back-office support to reduce the amount 
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of resources spend in non-care related work and from accelerated innovation and 
implementation. A franchise design supporting ample local adaptation was thought 
to be pivotal for complex healthcare services requiring substantial customization to 
deliver high-quality care. A uniform presentation and predictability were thought to be 
more important for a competitive position toward purchasers of care in case of more 
standardizable services. 
 The thesis also indicated that it partially differs across unit actors within the same 
franchise system how situational fit is to be achieved. Unit actors with different attitudes 
and skills, performances, and length of stay in the system have partially different needs 
and desires in regard to the type and extent of support, control, height of contractual 
payments, ownership, and ‘composition’ of relational cohesion (e.g., not all unit actors 
feel the need to share knowledge themselves and to be actually involved in developing 
innovations). These internal differences in situational fit imply that it is hard, if not 
impossible, to produce entirely optimal situational fit for all actors in one franchise 
system. 
 Given the importance of situational fit, one obtains only one piece of the puzzle of 
how to make franchising in healthcare work through studying aggregated, quantitative 
relationships with overall results.  
Conclusion
Making franchising in healthcare work requires situational fit. That is, the most appropriate 
combination of process dynamics and structural design elements depends on the desired 
positioning of the franchise towards customers, the desirable results, external context/
market, type of healthcare service/professional, age and size.  In combining process 
dynamics and structural design elements, one needs to account for their interdependencies, 
including their partially overlapping, diverging and contrasting effects. The configuration in 
which situational fit is achieved partially differs across unit actors within the same system. 
Producing entirely optimal situational fit for all actors and for all result types in one system 
seems impossible.  
Start of a new typology of franchise organizations in healthcare
Through abstracting out the conclusions of the thesis, roughly three ideal-types of 
franchise configurations can be distinguished that seem suitable to make franchising 
work in different situations: a soft/loosely coupled franchise, a back-office franchise, and 
a full care franchise (see table 2). Relational cohesion is important and functional in all 
three configurations of healthcare franchises. Ownership and type of franchise are not 
included in the typology. The process dynamics they produce can strengthen or weaken 
the effects of the three ideal-types. These three configurations of franchise organizations 
are a rough starting point; they require further research and development. 
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 In a soft/loosely coupled franchise the franchisor and unit actors work relatively 
independent from each other. They particularly work together in developing and sharing 
improvements and innovations, using the same brand and core attributes in providing 
services. The level of support and control are relatively low. Relational cohesion is a 
major uniting factor between actors that also facilitates developing and improving 
together. Unit actors are entrepreneurial, independent, and willing to cooperate with 
peers. Contractual payments are low as the input from the franchisor is relatively small. 
This type of franchise is particularly suitable to deliver high-quality care and stimulate 
work satisfaction when healthcare services are relatively complex, professionalized 
and customized, and when uniformity and predictability of the process of healthcare 
delivery is less important to customers. This type is also suitable to efficiently innovate 
to continuously adapt to changing markets and client desires. Clearly demonstrating 
and communicating the core attributes and performances of the services to customers 
must help establishing the brand name in absence of other uniformities. 
 A back-office franchise is primarily directed to unburdening healthcare providers 
and generating economies of scale in non-care activities like administration and ICT. 
Consequently, the level of control and support are high for non-care activities and low 
for care-related activities. Relational cohesion is important to obtain synergy from the 
franchise cooperation and to ensure local fit of the franchised practices. Unit actors must 
be entrepreneurial and independent in care provision, willing to cooperate with peers, 
and accept steering and loosing control in non-care activities. This franchise type is 
primarily suitable to stimulate the quality of care, efficiency of care, and work satisfaction 
when many administrative and organizational tasks can be arranged centrally or in 
cooperation; professionals have more time left to provide care and economies of scale 
are obtained. Similar to the soft/loosely coupled franchise, this type is suitable for 
relatively complex, professionalized services or services requiring customization and 
when uniformity and predictability of the care process is less important. 
 A full care franchise is focused on the entire organization and process of care delivery. 
Consequently, the level of support and control are high, as is the level of contractual 
payments. Relational cohesion must prevent resistance of professionals and ensure 
local fit of the franchised practices. Unit actors must accept steering and losing control 
and must be willing to follow the guidance of the formula. This franchise type is 
primarily suitable to stimulate the efficiency and competitive position when many tasks 
and activities of local providers can be arranged centrally or in cooperation, when quick 
adaptation to nation-wide changes is important, and when uniformity and predictability 
are important to purchasers and clients. This type is also beneficial for the quality and 
efficiency of care when the care services require less customization and are relatively 
easy to standardize and replicate, and when professional bodies play an important part 
in developing care standards that can be complemented in the franchise.   
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Table 2: Situational fit of three ideal types of healthcare franchises
Soft/loosely coupled 
franchise Back-office franchise Full care franchise
Pivotal characteristics
Focus Accelerated improvement 
and innovation, using 
same brand and core 
values
Unburdening healthcare 
providers and yielding 
economies of scale in 
non-care activities
Optimal performance 
through focus on entire 
organization and process of 
care delivery
Role of relational 
cohesion
Facilitating and uniting 
factor
Facilitating factor, 
ensuring local fit
Preventing resistance, 
ensuring local fit
Support level Low Low care activities; 
high non-care activities 
(e.g., administration, ICT)
High
Control level Low Low care activities; 
high non-care activities
High
Attitudes and 
skills needed 
from unit actors
Entrepreneurial, 
independence, willing to 
cooperate and involve 
with peers
Acceptance of steering 
and losing control in 
non-care activities, 
entrepreneurial and 
independence in care, 
willing to cooperate and 
involve with peers
Acceptance of steering 
and losing control; follow 
guidance of formula
Contractual 
payments
Low Medium High
When suitable and valuable
 Process 
characteristics
Individual development 
and innovation expensive, 
time-consuming, difficult
Many administrative and 
organizational tasks that 
can be arranged centrally 
or in cooperation
Many care and non-care 
related tasks and activities of 
providers can be arranged/
determined centrally or in 
cooperation
Type of service / 
professional, 
type of 
positioning
Relatively complex, 
relatively professionalized, 
requiring customization
Relatively complex, 
relatively professionalized, 
requiring customization
Less complex, less 
customization, relatively 
easy to standardize and 
replicate; or services in which 
professional associations 
play an important part in 
developing care standards
External context 
/ positioning
Changing markets or 
client needs; uniformity 
and predictability in 
process of healthcare 
delivery less important 
for positioning toward 
purchasers (insurers, 
regional care offices, 
government, clients) and 
clients
Cost pressures; uniformity 
and predictability of 
process of healthcare 
delivery less important 
for positioning toward 
purchasers (insurers, 
regional care offices, 
government, clients) and 
clients
Medium changing markets or 
client needs, requiring quick 
nation-wide adaptation; 
uniformity and predictability 
in healthcare services are 
important for positioning 
toward purchasers (insurers, 
governmental offices, clients) 
and clients
Pivotal types of 
results 
Quality, efficiency 
of innovation, work 
satisfaction
Quality, efficiency of care, 
work satisfaction
Efficiency, competitive 
position, quality (if used in 
appropriate situation)
264    |     Making Franchising in Healthcare Work
Methodological considerations
This thesis provides a comprehensive initial evidence base regarding the structural 
design elements and process dynamics related to success in franchising. It does 
so through using a mixed methods design that sequentially integrated systematic 
literature reviews, a qualitative multiple embedded case study and a quantitative cross-
sectional survey, with inclusion of the perspectives of franchisors and unit actors. The 
literature reviews gave theoretical grounding for the empirical studies. The qualitative 
multiple embedded case study in three healthcare franchises in different sectors was 
instrumental in refining, complementing and adapting the theoretical background to 
the empirical situation of Dutch healthcare franchises. It also helped gaining an in-depth 
understanding of the reasons underlying the identified relationships and developing 
a survey instrument appropriate for this situation. Through the quantitative study in 
nineteen healthcare franchises from five different sectors, we were able to triangulate 
findings and obtain quantifiable insights from a larger population of healthcare 
franchises. Nevertheless, this thesis also has several methodological limitations that are 
considered below. 
Formulating conclusions with inconsistencies between methods in mixed 
methods design
The mixed methods design with systematic reviews, a qualitative study and a quantitative 
study was instrumental in producing the theoretically grounded in-depth and broad 
findings in this thesis, but also makes it hard to formulate clear conclusions about which 
main structural design elements and process dynamics are related to results. Particularly 
from the perspective of franchisors, various inconsistencies were found between the 
theoretical and qualitative findings on the one hand, and the quantitative findings on 
the other hand. These inconsistencies evoke the question whether the truth is more 
reliably reflected by extensive qualitative data sampling in three franchise systems or by 
41 quantitatively surveyed franchisor representatives from nineteen franchise systems. 
We ultimately gave more weight to the statistical quantitative findings in formulating 
conclusions about the overall relationships with results given the sequential order of our 
methods, while acknowledging the contradictions with the theoretical and qualitative 
findings. 
Causal inferences: Conducting explorative research in real-life settings
Although all the empirically investigated relationships in this thesis were theoretically 
grounded, the conclusions need to be interpreted with caution because the research 
design does not permit making causal inferences. Thus, it remains uncertain whether 
the design elements and dynamics really affect results or are only related. It is hard to 
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develop causal inferences for complex organizational arrangements in real-life settings 
like franchising, in which many aspects relate to results. We lacked a suitable basis to 
employ the strongest research designs that are possible in such complex settings, 
because this was the first study that has comprehensively investigated this topic in 
healthcare. 
Use of perceptions from one data source in the quantitative study
Perceptual self-reported quantitative measures were used for design elements and 
dynamics as well as for results, all obtained from the same respondent. For some result 
types, particularly the quality of care, we had no choice because objective quality 
indicators that can be compared across healthcare sectors are lacking. Perceptual self-
reported measures have shown to be a valid and effective substitute (Hart & Banbury, 
1994; Inma & Debowski, 2006). However, it would have been beneficial for the validity 
to triangulate with available objective measures from other data sources like annual 
reports (e.g., solvability for financial performance). Using objective result measures 
would also have resolved the potential problem of common method variance (Conway 
& Lance, 2010), although we have no indications that this has biased our results (see 
chapter 7).   
Role of the researcher in the qualitative study
The data sampling and analysis in the qualitative study were primarily conducted by 
one researcher. Although theory was used as a framework, it is possible that other 
researchers would have interpreted and clustered the structural design elements and 
process dynamics partially different (Yin, 2003). The interpretations were checked 
for correctness, clarity and consistency through member checks by case reports, 
presentations and advisory boards, and through the involvement of a research team in 
judging and fine-tuning the analyses. Interview quotes in the case reports and articles 
permit readers to evaluate the interpretative elements in the analyses. A part of the 
qualitative findings could be triangulated by the quantitative study. Nevertheless, the 
validity of the findings would have been strengthened by systematically checking, 
complementing and refining the analyses through a Delphi-study or concept mapping 
study with case representatives (or other experts), resulting in a validated framework 
of success factors of franchising in healthcare (Plochg & Van Zwieten, 2007; Swanborn, 
2002). The closer involvement of the researcher in one of the cases made it challenging 
to keep distance for the sake of objectivity, but also provided unique possibilities to 
follow developments over time and continuously sharpen and reflect on interpretations. 
The theoretical framework, comparison with the other cases, the research team and 
advisory boards helped maintain objectivity. 
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Investigating heterogeneous franchise systems in different healthcare 
sectors
Investigating franchises in different healthcare sectors is beneficial for the generalizability 
but increased the difficulty of comparison. The heterogeneity in healthcare services 
provided and professionals involved now and then made it hard to distinguish between 
perceptions that were the consequence of this heterogeneity and that were shaped 
by differences in structural designs and process dynamics. Our within-case analyses 
helped making clearer distinctions. 
 The heterogeneity in franchise systems also made it complicated to distinguish clear 
actor groups at the unit level. Initially, the focus was only on franchisees. Soon it became 
clear that a broader focus was required to obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
how franchising works. Franchisees, unit managers and professionals were included; 
professionals often had a franchisee or unit manager role as well. Depending on the 
topic of analysis and convergence of perceptions, these roles were aggregated or 
separated. Distinguishing similar roles across cases was complicated: while a franchisee 
in one system was an independent entrepreneurial professional at a small-scale facility, 
a franchisee in another system constituted an organization with professionals and 
managers operating a unit. This heterogeneity alone at times led to a difference in 
perspective and perception. We partially resolved this issue in the quantitative analysis 
by including a ‘type of franchise’ control variable. Nevertheless, it is likely that we have 
lost some nuance in our analyses through our distinctions and aggregation of all types 
of unit actors across systems in one ‘unit actor’ group. 
Provisional framework of what makes franchising in healthcare work
In all, the insights of what makes franchising in healthcare work are provisional and 
need further development. First, it remains partially unknown whether the designs and 
dynamics are related to all types of results or to only some because a single overall 
measure of results was used in the quantitative study. Thus, the thesis does not provide 
quantitative large-scale insight in which choices should be made to achieve a particular 
type of result (e.g., quality of care). Moreover, it does not reveal potential trade-offs 
between results, such as between maximization of profits and the provision of high 
quality care (Pozniak, 2006). Second, we have not quantitatively investigated if the 
process dynamics indeed mediate the relationships with results for both the franchisors 
and the unit actors, and how strong. Third, only operational franchise systems with at 
least one franchisee were included. Comparison with franchisors that failed to contract 
at least one franchisee and with franchisors and unit actors that have quit franchising 
may would have led to additional or fine-tuned insights. Fourth, the small number of 
franchisors included in the quantitative study due to the relatively young healthcare 
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franchise industry prevented subgroup analyses for different types of healthcare (e.g., 
mental healthcare vs. home care). The qualitative study indicated that different types of 
healthcare may require different designs and levels of relational cohesion as they differ 
in the level of professionalization and customization. The small sample also hindered 
quantitative investigation of the conclusion of situational fit. Finally, although the 
inclusion of multiple different healthcare sectors strengthens the generalizability of our 
findings, actual generalizability to other countries need to be established. 
Discussion of the findings
Five themes can be extracted from the findings in this thesis that merit further discussion. 
The need to adapt insights from business to make franchising in healthcare 
work
This thesis shows that the franchise literature originating from business can provide 
useful insights regarding how to make franchising in healthcare work. The clusters of 
structural design elements and process dynamics related to results are largely similar. 
However, their role and detailing regularly differ from business as a consequence of 
the combination of imperfect market mechanisms, the pivotal role of healthcare 
professionals, and the delivery of personal, intimate services that require at least some 
customization (Berry & Bendapudi, 2007). Thus, although the insights from business can 
be used as a basis, adaptation and complementation is required to make franchising in 
healthcare work. This conclusion is consistent with studies in healthcare that investigated 
other methods and organizational forms originating from business, like the time out 
procedure and crew resource management from aviation (De Korne et al., 2010), lean 
and six sigma (Proudlove et al., 2008), total quality management and business process 
reengineering (Yasin et al., 2002). We elaborate on this conclusion below.  
 We noticed that the role of various structural design elements and process dynamics 
differed from business or needed complementation. Contrary to business (Minguela-
Rata et al., 2009, 2010), a greater amount of support was not consistently considered 
more appropriate in healthcare. Through more moderate support levels, unit actors 
retained opportunities to incorporate their own professional ideas and meet the specific 
needs of local clients in need for care. Also in regard to control, both the franchisors and 
unit actors argued that unit actors need sufficient space, particularly in providing care in 
complex and customized services. Possibly even more than in business (Clarkin & Rosa, 
2005), it seems important in healthcare to provide unit actors with opportunities to 
provide input and be involved in developing innovations and standards to ensure that 
they feel ownership and fit and that they accept rather than resist their implementation. 
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The ultimate absence of a quantitative relationship with a plural form from the franchisor 
perspective may be explained by the involvement of healthcare professionals that 
reduce the control and steering advantages of company-owned units. It is also possible 
that altruistic motivations and strong professional norms (Andersen, 2009) resulted 
in fewer performance differences between unit managers and franchisees than in 
business. Even though business insights also indicated that contractual payments 
need to be reasonable from the franchisee perspective (Dubost et al., 2008), the social-
ethical character of healthcare makes reasonable payments even more important. This 
thesis also showed that strong branding regularly is not a sufficient condition in various 
healthcare sectors to increase client volumes; production limits and purchasing policies 
hinder significant shifting of volumes across providers. Together with the non-profit 
character of multiple franchises, this implies that franchises in healthcare regularly 
strive toward other types of results than those in business, asking for different structural 
designs and process dynamics.
 Various authors have also argued that copying the franchise model from business 
to healthcare can lead to problems that hinder success. Montagu (2002) argued that 
implementation of potentially beneficial business format elements can be hindered 
by professionals that misuse their powerful role to refuse implementation. This thesis 
shows that professionals indeed sometimes resist implementation, particularly when 
they feel that it is imposed too heavily and does not benefit their practice. Also the 
fractional type of franchise that is regularly used in the healthcare sector can hinder 
uniform implementation across units. Moreover, authors have warned that the use of a 
franchise model similar to business can threat the quality of care and work satisfaction 
of professionals because the uniformity required for branding and economies of scale 
restricts autonomy (Montagu, 2002). Following this thesis, in case of situational fit such 
a threat does not necessarily exist; the design and operation of the franchise must fit 
to the type of service/sector. Finally, authors have argued that successful franchise 
application could be hindered because controlling the quality of services provided by 
professionals may be difficult for the franchisor as he lacks the specialized knowledge, 
whereas the system’s reputation depends on the quality of services provided (Knott 
et al., 2008; Montagu, 2002). In this thesis, this issue was not directly brought to the 
front and framed as unique to franchising. In the entire healthcare sector, actors are 
considering and struggling how quality can be measured. 
 Different from business sectors, franchise systems in healthcare also have to deal 
with a regulated sector with complex rules and reimbursement systems, political-
ethical issues, clients that use but regularly not pay a service, and, dependent on the 
sector, a strong position of professional scientific bodies. This environment frequently 
does not stimulate, or even hinder, entrepreneurial or deviating activities. Financing 
is based on predefined activities; deviating activities are not (financially) stimulated 
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(Phillips & Garman, 2006). At least in the Netherlands, superiorly performing healthcare 
organizations with large demands for their services are regularly not rewarded; some 
organizations even bear financial losses because they are doing well. The content and 
application of laws and regulations restrict the possibilities to implement alternative 
work methods that do not entirely fit (Phillips & Garman, 2006; Timmermans et al., 2008). 
Ambiguities and uncertainties in changing governmental policies and regulations also 
negatively affect the development and growth of new organizational models. Historically, 
most providers and individuals in healthcare also do not feel taking entrepreneurial 
risks. As financing, policies and cultures differ across sectors (Timmermans et al., 2008), 
so does the entrepreneurial climate for franchise models. 
 The use of business insights to make franchising in healthcare work, and vice 
versa, also requires further research. The broad focus of this thesis has resulted in an 
initial overview. To really understand the differences and similarities one needs to 
investigate the role of individual design elements and process dynamics in-depth, with 
attention to the role of the external environment in business sectors with and without 
similar characteristics (e.g., compare highly professionalized medical services with 
professionalized advocacy franchise). 
Franchising from the customer perspective
This thesis does not provide insight in what the customers of franchise systems, i.e., clients 
and other purchasers (health insurers, regional care offices, local governments), actually 
value in franchise systems. The thesis only includes the perceptions of franchisors and 
unit actors about what makes franchising work for customers. However, ultimately the 
clients and purchasers should value healthcare franchises to make this organizational 
form work on the long term. Surprisingly then, also in other industries it is hardly known 
what it is that customers value about franchise systems and how franchises thus should 
be designed and operated to be successful (Dant, 2008). Consistent with the assumptions 
of authors in the literature about healthcare franchising, the franchisors and unit actors 
in our studies felt that their clients value franchising because they receive high quality 
care in their own localities through the combination of care provision in decentralized 
units and centrally arranged support, quality monitoring and standardization of best 
practices (Knott et al., 2008; Montagu, 2002). However, they perceived that clients only 
benefit from these characteristics if the franchise is designed and operated in a way 
that suits the type of healthcare services and the clients’ needs. The same applies to the 
potential ability for clients to easily identify the care through branding, transparency 
and uniformity in the franchise (Pozniak, 2006). Some franchisors and unit actors argued 
that the purchasers would benefit from the same characteristics as the clients in need 
for care.
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Suitability of franchising for healthcare professionals
An important question is whether healthcare professionals should desire to work in a 
franchise. This thesis shows that the answer on this question depends on the franchise 
system and professionals themselves. As long as the franchise design and dynamics fit 
to the type of healthcare services and the professionals’ needs and desires, a franchise 
can indeed provide a pleasant work environment in which professionals can focus 
on the provision of high-quality care in a supportive work environment with ample 
opportunities for knowledge exchange with peers, while earning a good income (Hogan 
et al., 2006; Knott et al., 2008; Pozniak, 2006). However, in case of a misfit a franchise 
can be a bad experience; the warnings for undesirable reductions of autonomy, 
impossibilities to develop an own identity, and hindrances to implement own ideas and 
products and services that fit best with the needs and wants of clients (Montagu, 2002; 
Knott et al., 2008) then become reality. 
Potential contrasts between the franchisor and the unit actors
Many franchise studies assume that franchisors and franchisees have conflicting 
interests. While franchisors seek control, franchisees always strive for autonomy (Kidwell 
et al., 2007). And while franchisors strive for high sales, franchisees benefit from higher 
unit-profits (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998). Overall, this thesis shows that franchisors 
and unit actors in healthcare indeed sometimes have different perceptions or pursued 
interests, of which some inevitably inherent to their differences in roles. However, this 
thesis also shows that diverging perceptions and interests can be partially prevented 
by ensuring situational fit. Franchisors indeed struggled with the issue of control versus 
autonomy, as hypothesized by for example Kidwell et al. (2007), but also recognized 
that, depending on the type of service provided, healthcare providers need a particular 
autonomy in their care provision to appropriately help their clients. Diverging 
perceptions and interests can also be partially prevented by greater task cohesion in 
the form of communication and mutual involvement in developing new standards. This 
finding is consistent with a subset of franchise studies (e.g., Clarkin & Rosa, 2005; Falbe 
& Dandridge, 1992) that argued that successful franchise relationships are based on co-
creation and entrepreneurial innovation of both the franchisors and franchisees, rather 
than by hierarchical steering, management and enforcement by the franchisor. 
Situational fit: Not one best practice to make franchising work
The conclusion that situational fit is required to make franchising in healthcare work is 
consistent with a subset of the franchise literature. Primarily the last decade, authors 
have shown that individual design and process choices can have different effects in 
different combinations (e.g., Barthelemy, 2008; Gillis & Combs, 2009). Acknowledging 
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the heterogeneity among franchise systems, authors have also tried to distinguish 
homogeneous groups based on age, size and pricing strategies (Carney & Gedajlovic, 
1991; Castrogiovanni et al., 1995) and to develop configurations of franchise organizations 
including structural, strategic and process-related features (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 
1998). Using Mintzberg’s typology of organizations, Castrogiovanni & Justis (1998) 
reasoned that franchise organizations use one of two hybrid forms: carbon-copy or 
confederation franchise. The first form shares similarities with the ‘full care franchise’ 
distinguished in this thesis, while the latter shares similarities with a ‘soft/loosely 
coupled franchise’. The conclusion also fits in the ‘configuration’ and ‘systems’ view in 
general organization theory (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; Mintzberg, 1983). 
Implications and recommendations for research 
Various implications and recommendations for further research can be formulated that 
will extend the theory and evidence base and help to provide better decision-support 
to franchise practitioners. 
More confidence in causal inferences through stronger research designs
Although it is hard to really ascertain causality in complex organizational settings, 
scholars could employ stronger research designs through using our findings as a 
starting point. Such research should employ a longitudinal design and focus on the 
influence of particular design elements or dynamics instead of the entire model. Ideally, 
it includes a baseline qualitative and quantitative study and one or more follow-up 
quantitative measurements in a small number of franchise systems that have planned 
to change the element(s) or dynamic(s) of interest. Interviews with key stakeholders 
between measurements should identify any concurrent developments that might 
also affect results. Alternatively, a similar design would begin with the identification of 
a few typically low, medium and high scoring franchise systems on the element(s) or 
dynamic(s) of interest in a large sample of systems. 
Investigate multiple types of results from different data sources in one 
study
As a complement to the overall quantitative results measure used in this thesis, research 
should include valid separate measures for different types of results. To strengthen the 
validity of such research each type of result preferably is measured by data from at 
least two data sources; one perceptual measure and one objective measure from for 
example public databases or annual reports. Separately measuring different types of 
results will provide quantitative insights in potential trade-offs between different types 
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of results when a particular design or process dynamic is used. Generating such insights 
would better support practitioners in determining how to design and operate their 
franchise to reach their prioritized goals (e.g., improve quality, obtain optimal financial 
performance). To obtain valuable insights such research should preferably include care-
specific, patient-related outcomes like accessibility and medical outcomes if research is 
conducted within one sector. 
More in-depth investigation of situational fit within franchise systems  
Quantitative or mixed methods investigation of the conclusion of situational fit would 
be a valuable extension to this thesis. Given the breadth and exploratory nature of the 
research in this thesis, more in-depth and confirmatory insights are needed to really 
provide reliable decision-making support to practitioners. Franchise practitioners can 
better decide how to design and operate their system and units when they understand 
why and how different choices are related. Such research should provide quantitative 
confirmation and more in-depth insight in whether and how the design elements, 
process dynamics, and types of healthcare services/sectors moderate and mediate each 
other, as illuminated in this research. 
Employ a multi-actor / multi-stakeholder approach
This thesis has shown the value of including the perspective of more than one actor in 
the same study. Investigating multiple perspectives helps practice determining which 
particular choices are beneficial for different stakeholders and for which choices interests 
diverge.  As a direct complement to this thesis, it is important to investigate which 
elements make franchising work from the client perspective. Are their (experienced) 
results primarily related to the positioning of the formula,  to the attitudes and skills 
of the unit actor(s), to the level of standardization and centralized decision-making, to 
the unit-level ownership structure? The role of attitudes and skills can be investigated 
through within-system comparisons between units; the role of the structural design 
elements only through quantitative cross-system comparisons or through investigating 
perceptions of clients that have switched care providers. Similar suggestions apply 
to adding the perspectives of insurers, regional care offices, local governments and 
referring providers. 
Investigate ‘failed’ franchisors and franchisees
Investigating ‘failed’ and ceased franchisors and unit actors will help to confirm and 
extend the insights in the choices that should not be made to enlarge the chance of 
success. A comparison of such failed franchisors and unit actors with operational ones 
will also help obtain more insights in the role of the external context: did ‘failed’ ones 
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operate in more hindering external contexts, or were they less able to cope with such a 
context than their successful counterparts?  
International comparisons with attention to the role of the external context
A cross-national study will be a valuable extension. It permits investigating whether 
different (combinations of ) designs, relationships and behaviors are required in different 
external contexts, given the differences in healthcare systems, rules, legislation and 
cultures across countries. Such a study also helps determining the actual generalizability 
of our findings to other countries and the role of the external context itself in the 
success of franchising. Moreover, through cross-national data sampling a larger number 
of healthcare franchises can be included. This larger sample size will permit performing 
subgroup analyses to identify if different types of healthcare services and functions on 
the unit level (franchisee, professional, unit manager) require different configurations 
to make franchising work. A larger sample size also permits obtaining a more in-depth 
insight in situational fit through investigating mediating and moderating relationships, 
as described above. 
Implications and recommendations for practice 
Implications and recommendations for organizations and professionals 
using franchising
Franchisors and unit actors embarking on franchising in healthcare must realize that 
there is not one best practice to make it work; situational fit is key. When developing a 
new franchise system, it seems wise for franchisors to first determine how the system 
wants to position itself toward customers and which results are desired for different 
stakeholders, while accounting to the type of healthcare service, healthcare market 
and type of healthcare professionals. Then they can determine which process dynamics 
are required. Subsequently, the desirable combination of franchise design elements, 
level of relational cohesion, contractual payments, and attitudes and skills can be 
established. For unit actors that want to join a franchise it seems wise to obtain reliable 
information about the system, including its functioning in daily practice (e.g., what is 
the actual involvement of unit actors in development), and determine whether it fits 
with their personal desires, their skills and the results they want to achieve. Franchisors 
and unit actors in existing franchise systems should regularly reflect whether there still 
is situational fit, and adapt accordingly. In all cases, successful franchising in healthcare 
requires a certain level of task and social cohesion. In particular, franchisors must involve 
healthcare professionals to develop (care) standards and share ideas, as this will reduce 
the resistance and ensures a valuable fit with localities.  
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 Particularly when franchise configurations similar to the soft/loosely coupled and 
back office ideal-types are used (see table 2), franchisors and unit actors must work 
on demonstrating their quality and costs with indicators of relevance to clients and 
other payers/purchasers. They must also ensure that the care services across units are 
delivered according to the core characteristics defined in the positioning component of 
the business format (e.g., hospitality) and must clearly communicate and demonstrate 
this to customers. Because the uniformity of care provision basically is lower in these two 
franchise ideal-types, the establishment of a strong brand-quality or –cost link depends 
on the experiences of clients in their actual service encounter and on the demonstrable 
quality and costs.
 In designing and operating their system, franchisors and unit actors must also take 
the possibilities and restrictions of national and regional rules, regulations and policies 
into account. Not all support types and knowledge sharing activities are allowed under 
competition law. Examples are benchmarking up-to-date information and shared bids 
on healthcare procurements with units that operate on the same market1. National 
contracting of local healthcare providers is hindered by both the financing system (e.g., 
requirement to contract with each regional care office in the AWBZ) and competition 
law, reducing one of the potential values of franchise cooperation. Franchisors must 
also consider the existing roles and activities of the scientific and professional bodies 
in their healthcare sector when designing their franchise system. Dependent on the 
sector, these bodies play a minor or major role in the development of standards and 
policies and in providing knowledge sharing facilities. Some anecdotal evidence 
from our studies suggests that a major role of these bodies can reduce the value of 
franchising in regard to facilitating knowledge sharing and innovation development, 
and can interfere with developing and uniquely profiling the franchise system based 
on (care) standards. Standards and conservative ideas of these bodies can also slow 
or hinder the implementation of particular innovative or adapted work methods. On 
the other hand, such existing care standards can be used as a solid basis for franchise 
development.    
Implications and recommendations for health insurers, regional care 
offices, and (local) governments
Society increasingly asks for small-scale, decentralized healthcare facilities and home 
care to keep healthcare affordable in the long term and to provide those in need with 
high-quality care. For more complex care a trend toward concentration and spread 
of care is stimulated by the Dutch government and scientific, professional bodies. 
Franchising basically is a suitable organizational model to support these societal trends. 
1  See ‘Richtsnoeren voor de zorgsector, maart 2010, ACM. 
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It combines large-scale knowledge sharing, innovation development and economies 
of scale in the back-office with local care provision by professionals. It could also 
provide possibilities for purchasing nation-widely available healthcare with predictable 
quality and costs. However, competition law, the financing system, and continuously 
changing and ambiguous policies hamper further growth and flourishing of healthcare 
franchising and similar types of organization. Governments and politics should work on 
more stability and long-term vision because many entrepreneurs will not dare to take 
risks in instable, continuously changing quasi-regulated markets. Moreover, together 
with banks, insurers and regional care offices, they should work on a more supportive 
entrepreneurial climate in healthcare by rewarding innovative, entrepreneurial activities 
and by providing space and financing for new, promising entrants on the healthcare 
market. Pay for performance models and personal budgets basically provide health 
insurers, regional care offices and local governments with possibilities to stimulate new 
promising organizational forms like franchising, but actual use of these possibilities by 
these purchasers is required. Nevertheless, this thesis also warns these parties that not 
every franchise system is to be trusted in fulfilling its promises; judging its situational fit 
and value is essential.
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Introduction and methods
Business format franchising is increasingly being used as a form of inter-organizational 
cooperation in healthcare. It is a promising model to efficiently deliver high quality 
care, provide professionals with a supportive work environment, and achieve positive 
strategic and organizational results. However, evidence is lacking concerning how these 
healthcare franchises should be designed and operated to actualize success. Therefore, 
this thesis aimed to explore the following research question: “How are the structural 
design and process dynamics of healthcare franchises related to achieving positive strategic, 
organizational, professional and client-related results?” 
 Because of the lack of research in healthcare regarding this topic, an exploratory 
sequential mixed methods study was conducted with three sequential steps. First, 
a theoretical framework was built around this question through conducting two 
systematic literature reviews; one of findings within healthcare and one of findings from 
other industries. Second, qualitative and mixed methods studies were used to refine, 
adapt, and complement the framework from other industries for healthcare on the 
basis of three cases in three different healthcare sectors. Third, a cross-sectional survey 
was developed to quantitatively investigate the framework for healthcare based on 
data from nineteen healthcare franchises in five different healthcare sectors. Data were 
sampled from both the franchisor and actors operating units to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of how healthcare franchises can be designed and operated successfully. 
Phase 1: Development of a theoretical framework through systematic 
reviews 
Chapter 2 and 3 present the two systematic literature reviews that were used as a 
theoretical foundation for the empirical studies. The review presented in Chapter 2 
aimed to identify the available empirical evidence regarding the results of franchising in 
healthcare for organizations, clients and professionals. The review included 15 articles. 
It reveals that the body of empirical knowledge is quite undeveloped. The evidence 
available so far shows that franchising has the potential to be valuable to healthcare 
practices, but that the actual results achieved vary within and across franchise systems. 
The available studies hardly provide insights into what factors produce those variable 
results. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 comprises a systematic review that aimed to collect all the 
empirical evidence from all industries on the structural design and process-related 
factors that make franchising work and to integrate this evidence in a framework. 
Through analyzing 126 articles, five major factor clusters with multiple sub-factors were 
identified that are related to the results of franchising: the ownership structure that is 
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chosen for the system and the units, the design of the business format, the design of the 
contract, the behavior of the franchisor and the franchisee and their interaction, and the 
age and size of the system and the units. The review also suggests that franchisors and 
franchisees should consider the compatibility and cohesion of these different aspects if 
they are to achieve optimal results, rather than assuming that all individual aspects have 
a universal similar effect. 
The findings from chapter 2 and 3 were used as a theoretical framework and to generate 
the topic list for the qualitative research. 
Phase 2: Adaptation and in-depth exploration of a framework of success 
factors of franchising in healthcare through qualitative and mixed methods 
studies
The studies described in the next three chapters of the thesis aimed to provide an in-
depth insight in how franchise organizations in healthcare are structurally designed 
and operated, and how these designs and process dynamics are perceived to promote 
or hamper achieving positive results. Moreover, the studies aimed to understand the 
underlying reasons for their importance to really grasp how healthcare franchises work 
and how effective choices can be made by franchise practitioners.   
The study described in Chapter 4 focused on the role of the business format. A qualitative 
comparative embedded case study was conducted with three healthcare franchises 
providing mental healthcare, hospital eye-care, and care for the intellectually disabled. 
Data were collected through 96 in-depth semi-structured interviews with franchisors 
and unit actors, observations and document analyses. The study reveals that the 
positioning toward customers, the type, quality and amount of support, and the level 
of control with regard to the selection of new participants, standardization, centralized 
decision-making, monitoring, and possibilities to force, are the elements that are 
perceived to be related to results for all parties. It is suggested that both extensively 
high and low levels of support and control to units should be avoided. A moderate level 
of support and control seems to stimulate results because system-wide changes, local 
adaptation, knowledge sharing, solid performance levels, accelerated innovation and 
implementation, and a uniform brand presentation are easily achieved, while the level 
of bureaucracy, overhead and resistance to change are relatively low. However, what the 
appropriate, moderate level of support and control exactly is seems to partially diverge 
for different franchise systems and unit actors. It seems important to tune the level of 
support and control to the desired positioning and the type of service (e.g., desirable 
level of customization), the ownership structure, the unit actor’s skills, attitudes and 
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experience, and to which goals are prioritized. It also seems important that the level of 
contractual payments is adapted to what is provided per the business format because 
franchisees must experience the payments as relatively fair. The conclusions are 
summarized in a typology of four types of business format and in a model that can be 
used by practitioners and scholars. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of the ownership structure. The research design and 
methods used are similar to chapter 4. The study shows that different system-level and 
unit-level ownership structures have different effects as perceived by franchisors and 
unit actors. The analyses reveal that the variation in perceived effects can be explained 
by differences in regard to management, decision-making, control, steering, support, 
interests, learning and adaptation. Based on the analyses, new typologies of ownership 
structures are presented and it is shown how combinations of system-level and unit-
level structures can have mutually weakening or strengthening effects. The study also 
provides indications that hampering or facilitating effects of ownership structures do 
not necessarily have to lead to negative or positive results in practice. The individual 
motivation and willingness of unit actors, the level of control in the business format, the 
degree of professionalism and claimed autonomy, and the age of the franchise system 
are other factors that may neutralize or compensate the facilitating or hampering 
effects in practice. 
Chapter 6 seeks to understand the role of the relationship between the franchisor 
and the units through an explorative sequential mixed methods study. The mixed 
methods study comprised a qualitative comparative embedded case study in three 
healthcare franchises, similar to chapter 4 and 5, and a sequential quantitative cross-
sectional survey of nineteen Dutch healthcare franchises from five different sectors. 
The study suggests that it is important for successful healthcare franchising to have 
communicatively open and cooperative relationships in which professional franchisees 
and unit managers feel to have the opportunity to contribute ideas and articulate 
their needs to the franchisor. Moreover, it seems important that there is ample trust 
and commitment between the franchisor and the unit actors. Relationships with these 
characteristics are helpful because they allow the realization of synergy and local fit, 
alleviate professional resistance to implementation, and prevent reinventing the wheel 
in developing improvements, innovations and valuable practices. This helps to ensure 
satisfaction in the units, survival from either the franchisor or unit perspective and, for 
most of these characteristics, quality of care in the franchise. Selective characteristics 
were also related to growth from the franchisor perspective and competitive position 
and efficiency of care and innovation from the unit actor perspective. 
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 All together, the chapters 4, 5 and 6 indicate which structural and behavioral 
decisions may have to be made in healthcare franchises to ensure that the desired 
results are achieved. The integration and aggregation of these findings resulted in a 
preliminary adapted framework depicting the success factors of healthcare franchising. 
Phase 3: Quantitative exploration of the framework of success factors of 
franchising in healthcare through a nation-wide cross-sectional survey
The study in Chapter 7 aimed to quantitatively explore the preliminary adapted 
framework for healthcare franchises. A nation-wide cross-sectional survey was 
conducted with nineteen healthcare franchises providing mental healthcare, hospital 
care, care for the intellectually disabled and youth care, paramedical care, and elderly 
and home care. Data of 41 franchisors (93% response rate) and 349 unit actors (67% 
response rate) were analyzed. Contrary to expectations from the findings in phase 1 
and 2, from the franchisor perspective only relational cohesion and a business format 
characterized by a strong positioning, appropriate support services and more control 
of non-care activities were related to results. From the perspective of unit actors in 
contrast, results are related to the business format elements and relational cohesion 
also found for franchisors, as well as to appropriate attitudes and skills, reasonable 
contractual payments, ownership structures, type of franchise, and system age. 
Discussion and conclusion
The main conclusion of this thesis is that there is no blue print to make franchising in 
healthcare work; it requires situational fit.  Multiple choices in regard to the design of 
support and control in the business format, level of relational cohesion, and, at least 
for unit actors, ownership structures and franchise type, are related to different types 
of results because they produce a variety of overlapping, diverging and contrasting 
process dynamics. At least from the perspective of unit actors, appropriate attitudes 
and skills and reasonable contractual payments make franchising work further because 
they help to really obtain potential benefits from the franchise cooperation. The most 
appropriate combination of process dynamics and structural design elements to make 
franchising in healthcare work depends on the desired positioning toward customers, 
desired results, external context/market, type of healthcare service/ professional, age 
and size. Producing entirely optimal situational fit for all actors and for all result types in 
one system seems impossible. Through abstracting out these conclusions roughly three 
ideal-types of franchise configurations can be distinguished that seem suitable to make 
franchising in healthcare work in different situations: a soft/loosely coupled franchise, a 
back-office franchise, and a full care franchise. 
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 The conclusions need to be interpreted with consideration of several methodological 
limitations. These limitations relate among others to the impossibility to make causal 
inferences, the use of one overall results measure in the quantitative study, the use of 
perceptions from one data source, and the investigation of heterogeneous franchise 
systems. 
 Considering the findings in the thesis we discuss that the insights from business 
need to be adapted and complemented for valuable use in the healthcare sector. 
Moreover, reflections are provided on the suitability of franchising for professionals and 
customers, and on potential contrasts between the franchisor and unit actors. 
The thesis concludes with formulating implications and recommendations for 
organizations and professionals embarking on franchising in healthcare, as well as for 
health insurers, regional care offices and (local) governmental organizations.
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Introductie en methoden
Franchising wordt in toenemende mate gebruikt als vorm van interorganisationele 
samenwerking in de zorg. Het is een veelbelovend model om efficiënte zorg van hoge 
kwaliteit te leveren, zorgverleners een prettige ondersteunende werkomgeving te 
bieden en goede strategische en organisatorische resultaten te behalen. Er is echter 
nauwelijks wetenschappelijk bewijs omtrent hoe deze franchiseorganisaties in de 
zorg zouden moeten worden vormgegeven en hoe actoren daarbinnen zouden 
moeten handelen om daadwerkelijk succesvol te zijn. Daarom wordt in dit proefschrift 
de volgende onderzoeksvraag geëxploreerd: “Hoe zijn de structurele vormgeving en 
procesdynamieken van franchise organisaties in de zorg gerelateerd aan het behalen van 
positieve strategische, organisatorische, professionele en cliëntgerelateerde resultaten?”
 Vanwege het gebrek aan wetenschappelijk bewijs is een exploratieve sequentiële 
mixed methods studie uitgevoerd waarin drie volgtijdelijke stappen zijn gecombineerd. 
Allereerst is een theoretisch raamwerk ontwikkeld door het uitvoeren van twee 
systematische literatuurstudies; een met bevindingen binnen de zorg en een met 
bevindingen uit alle sectoren. Vervolgens is het raamwerk verfijnd, aangevuld en 
aangepast voor de zorgsector middels kwalitatief en mixed methods onderzoek in 
drie cases uit drie verschillende zorgsectoren. Tenslotte is een cross-sectionele survey 
ontwikkeld om het raamwerk voor de zorg kwantitatief te exploreren op basis van data 
van negentien franchiseorganisaties in vijf verschillende zorgsectoren. In het gehele 
onderzoek zijn data verzameld bij zowel de franchisegever als de vestigingen (locaties) 
om een veelomvattend beeld te krijgen van de wijze waarop franchise in de zorg 
succesvol kan worden toegepast. 
Fase 1: Ontwikkeling van een theoretisch raamwerk middels systematisch 
literatuuronderzoek
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 omvatten de twee systematische literatuuronderzoeken die zijn 
uitgevoerd om een theoretisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen voor het empirische onderzoek 
in de zorg. Het literatuuronderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 had tot doel om het aanwezige 
empirische bewijs omtrent de resultaten van franchise in de zorg voor organisaties, 
cliënten en zorgverleners in kaart te brengen. Het onderzoek met 15 geïncludeerde 
artikelen laat zien dat de wetenschap omtrent dit onderwerp nog onderontwikkeld 
is. Op basis van de aanwezige studies wordt geconcludeerd dat franchising potentieel 
waardevol is voor de zorg, maar dat de daadwerkelijk behaalde resultaten variëren 
tussen en binnen franchise systemen. De studies geven nauwelijks inzicht in de redenen 
die mogelijk ten grondslag liggen aan deze wisselende resultaten. 
 Daarom was het systematische literatuuronderzoek in hoofdstuk 3 erop gericht om 
op basis van empirisch bewijs uit alle sectoren een raamwerk te ontwikkelen van alle 
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structuur en proces keuzes die franchise werkend maken. Het raamwerk is ontwikkeld op 
basis van 126 artikelen en bevat vijf hoofdclusters van factoren met diverse subfactoren 
die gerelateerd zijn aan resultaten van franchising: de eigendomsstructuur die wordt 
gebruikt op het niveau van het gehele systeem en de vestigingen, de vormgeving 
van het business format (formule), de vormgeving van het contract, het gedrag van 
de franchisegever en de franchisenemer en hun onderlinge interactie en de leeftijd en 
grootte van het systeem en de vestigingen. De resultaten van het literatuuronderzoek 
suggereren tevens dat het belangrijk is dat de franchisegever en franchisenemers oog 
hebben voor de compatibiliteit en samenhang tussen deze verschillende factoren, in 
plaats van te veronderstellen dat factoren in alle situaties hetzelfde effect hebben. 
De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 2 en 3 zijn gebruikt om een theoretisch raamwerk en een 
topiclijst te ontwikkelen voor het onderzoek in de zorg. 
Fase 2: Aanpassing en diepgaande exploratie van een raamwerk van succes 
factoren van franchise in de zorg middels kwalitatief en mixed methods 
onderzoek 
De studies in de volgende drie hoofdstukken van het proefschrift beogen diepgaand 
inzicht te geven in hoe franchiseorganisaties in de zorg zijn vormgegeven, hoe actoren 
daarbinnen handelen en hoe deze structurele vormgeving en procesdynamieken het 
behalen van positieve resultaten met franchise in de zorg bevorderen of belemmeren. 
Daarnaast beogen de studies inzicht te geven in de achterliggende redenen voor het 
belang van deze vormgeving en procesdynamieken om goed te doorgronden hoe 
franchiseorganisaties in de zorg werken en zouden kunnen werken. 
In hoofdstuk 4 staat de rol van het business format (i.e., de formule) centraal. Om de 
rol van het business format te bestuderen is een kwalitatieve vergelijkende ingebedde 
case studie uitgevoerd met drie franchiseorganisaties in de GGZ, gehandicaptenzorg 
en ziekenhuiszorg (oogzorg). Hierbij zijn data verzameld middels 96 diepgaande 
semi-gestructureerde interviews met franchisegevers en actoren binnen vestigingen, 
observaties en analyses van documenten. De studie laat zien dat de positionering 
naar klanten, het type, de kwaliteit en de hoeveelheid ondersteuning en de mate van 
control (beheersing) wat betreft selectie van nieuwelingen, standaardisatie, centrale 
besluitvorming, mogelijkheden tot afdwingen en monitoring een (gepercipieerde) rol 
spelen in de resultaten die worden behaald voor alle stakeholders. De bevindingen 
suggereren dat men zowel extreem veel als extreem weinig ondersteuning en control 
van vestigingen zou moeten vermijden. Een matige hoeveelheid ondersteuning en 
control lijkt resultaten te stimuleren omdat enerzijds systeembrede aanpassingen, lokale 
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aanpassingen, kennisdeling, goede prestatie niveaus, snelle innovatie en implementatie 
en een uniforme brand presentatie kunnen worden bereikt, terwijl anderzijds de mate 
van overhead, bureaucratie en weerstand van actoren binnen vestigingen (professionals, 
franchisenemers, vestigingsmanagers) binnen de perken blijft. Wat precies een 
passende hoeveelheid ondersteuning en control is lijkt gedeeltelijk te verschillen voor 
verschillende franchise systemen en actoren. Het lijkt belangrijk om de hoeveelheid 
ondersteuning en control af te stemmen op de gewenste positionering en het type 
zorg (bv. mate waarin maatwerk gewenst is), de eigendomsstructuur, de vaardigheden, 
attitudes en ervaring van actoren binnen vestigingen en de doelen die geprioriteerd 
worden. Ook is het belangrijk dat de hoogte van de contractuele betalingen aangepast 
worden aan wat de franchisegever qua business format aan de franchisenemer geeft, 
omdat franchisenemers de betalingen als relatief rechtvaardig moeten ervaren. Deze 
conclusies worden samengebracht in een nieuwe typologie van vier typen business 
format en in een model dat kan worden gebruikt door wetenschappers en de praktijk. 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de rol van de eigendomsstructuur. Hiertoe zijn eenzelfde 
onderzoeksdesign en methodologie gebruikt als in hoofdstuk 4. De studie laat zien 
dat verschillende eigendomsstructuren op systeemniveau en vestigingsniveau in de 
perceptie van franchisegevers en actoren binnen vestigingen verschillende effecten 
hebben. De analyses geven aan dat deze variatie in ervaren effecten verklaard kan 
worden door verschillen in onderliggende dynamieken tussen eigendomsstructuren 
wat betreft management, besluitvorming, control, sturing, ondersteuning, belangen, 
leren en aanpassen. Op basis van de analyses worden nieuwe typologieën van 
eigendomsstructuren ontwikkeld en wordt zichtbaar gemaakt hoe combinaties 
van structuren op systeemniveau en vestigingsniveau wederzijds verzwakkende of 
versterkende effecten kunnen hebben. De studie suggereert ook dat de bevorderende of 
belemmerende effecten van eigendomsstructuren in de praktijk niet per se tot negatieve 
of positieve resultaten hoeven te leiden. De individuele motivatie en bereidwilligheid 
van actoren binnen de vestigingen, de mate van control in het business format, de mate 
waarin zorgverleners hun autonomie claimen en nodig hebben en de leeftijd van het 
franchise systeem zijn andere factoren die de bevorderende en belemmerende effecten 
in de praktijk mogelijk kunnen neutraliseren of compenseren. 
Hoofdstuk 6 heeft tot doel inzicht te geven in de rol van de relatie tussen de franchisegever 
en de vestigingen. Hiertoe is een exploratieve sequentiële mixed methods studie 
uitgevoerd. De mixed methods studie bestond uit een kwalitatief vergelijkend ingebed 
case studie onderzoek in drie franchiseorganisaties, gelijk aan de methodologie 
hoofdstuk 4 en 5, gevolgd door een kwantitatieve cross-sectionele survey van negentien 
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franchiseorganisaties in vijf verschillende zorgsectoren. De studie suggereert dat 
het voor het succes van franchise in de zorg belangrijk is om open te communiceren 
en een coöperatieve relatie te hebben waarin professionele franchisenemers en 
vestigingsmanagers gevoelsmatig de mogelijkheid hebben hun ideeën in te brengen 
en hun behoeften kenbaar te maken aan de franchisegever. Daarnaast lijken vertrouwen 
en commitment van belang. Franchise relaties die deze kenmerken bezitten zijn 
waardevol omdat zij het mogelijk maken synergie in de samenwerkingsrelatie en lokale 
fit te bewerkstelligen. Ook verkleinen ze de kans op weerstand tegen implementatie 
en wordt vermeden dat verbeteringen, innovaties en waardevolle praktijken overal 
in het franchise systeem opnieuw worden uitgevonden. Middels deze onderliggende 
dynamieken helpen deze relatiekenmerken om tevredenheid onder actoren binnen 
vestigingen te creëren, continuïteit voor franchisegevers en/of actoren binnen 
vestigingen te realiseren en, voor de meeste kenmerken, een goede kwaliteit van zorg 
te garanderen. Enkele kenmerken zijn ook gerelateerd aan groei vanuit het perspectief 
van de franchisegever, alsmede aan competitief voordeel en efficiency van zorg en 
innovatie vanuit het perspectief van actoren binnen vestigingen. 
Gezamenlijk laten hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 zien welke vormgeving en handelingswijzen 
mogelijk gebruikt moeten worden binnen franchiseorganisaties in de zorg om te 
zorgen dat de gewenste resultaten worden behaald. De integratie en aggregatie van 
deze bevindingen mondt uit in een voorlopig aangepast raamwerk van succesfactoren 
van franchise in de zorg. 
Fase 3: Kwantitatieve exploratie van het raamwerk van succes factoren van 
franchising in de zorg middels een nationale cross-sectionele vragenlijst
De studie in hoofdstuk 7 beoogt om het voorlopig aangepaste raamwerk voor de zorg 
kwantitatief te exploreren. Hiertoe is een cross-sectionele survey uitgevoerd onder 
negentien operationele franchiseorganisaties in de 1e en 2e lijns GGZ, ziekenhuiszorg, 
gehandicaptenzorg en jeugdzorg, paramedische zorg en ouderen- en thuiszorg. 
Uiteindelijk zijn data van 41 franchisegevers (93% respons) en 349 actoren binnen 
vestigingen (67% respons) geanalyseerd. In tegenstelling tot wat was verwacht op 
basis van de bevindingen in fase 1 en 2, laat de studie zien dat vanuit het perspectief 
van de franchisegever alleen relationele cohesie en een sterke positionering, adequate 
ondersteuning en meer control van niet-zorg activiteiten in het business format 
gerelateerd zijn aan resultaten. Daarentegen zijn de resultaten die vanuit het perspectief 
van actoren binnen vestigingen worden behaald aan vele factoren gerelateerd. De door 
hen ervaren resultaten zijn, net als voor de franchisegever, gerelateerd aan het business 
format en relationele cohesie. Daarnaast spelen ook attitudes en vaardigheden, 
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rechtvaardige contractuele betalingen, eigendomsstructuren, het type franchise en de 
leeftijd van het franchise systeem een rol. 
Discussie en conclusie
Op basis van alle bevindingen wordt geconcludeerd dat er geen blauwdruk is om 
franchise in de zorg succesvol toe te passen; het vereist situationele fit. Diverse keuzes 
omtrent de ondersteuning en control in het business format en de mate van relationele 
cohesie zijn gerelateerd aan het behalen van verschillende typen resultaten omdat 
zij leiden tot een diversiteit aan overlappende, uiteenlopende en tegengestelde 
procesdynamieken. Dit geldt ook voor keuzes omtrent eigendomsstructuren en 
type franchise, in ieder geval vanuit het perspectief van actoren binnen vestigingen. 
Geschikte attitudes en vaardigheden en redelijke contractuele betalingen dragen 
in ieder geval vanuit het perspectief van actoren binnen vestigingen verder bij aan 
het behalen van positieve resultaten omdat zij helpen om potentiële voordelen van 
samenwerking binnen een franchise uit te nutten. De meest geschikte combinatie 
van procesdynamieken en structurele vormgevingselementen om franchise succesvol 
toe te passen hangt af van de gewenste positionering richting klanten, de gewenste 
resultaten, de externe context/markt, het type zorg/professional, leeftijd en grootte. 
Het lijkt onmogelijk om algeheel optimale situationele fit voor alle actoren en voor alle 
typen resultaten in één franchisesysteem te realiseren. Door de conclusies te abstraheren 
worden eerste ruwe schetsen van drie ideaaltypen van franchiseconfiguraties gemaakt 
die geschikt lijken om franchise in de zorg werkend te maken in verschillende situaties: 
een loosely coupled franchise, een back-office franchise en een full care franchise. 
 Bij het interpreteren van de conclusies moet rekening worden gehouden met enkele 
methodologische beperkingen van het onderzoek. Deze zijn onder meer gelegen in het 
niet kunnen vaststellen van oorzakelijke verbanden, het onderzoeken van heterogene 
franchiseorganisaties en het gebruik van één overall resultaat maat en percepties vanuit 
één databron in het kwantitatieve onderzoek. 
 In het licht van de bevindingen in dit proefschrift wordt bediscussieerd dat inzichten 
uit het bedrijfsleven aangepast en aangevuld moeten worden om bruikbaar te zijn voor 
de zorg. Tevens wordt gereflecteerd op de geschiktheid van franchise voor professionals 
en klanten, evenals op eventuele tegenstellingen tussen franchisegever en actoren 
binnen vestigingen. Het proefschrift besluit met implicaties en aanbevelingen voor 
zorgaanbieders en zorgverleners die al franchisen of dit willen gaan doen, alsmede voor 
zorgverzekeraars en (lokale) overheidsorganen. 
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Lang heb ik uitgekeken naar het moment van het schrijven van dit dankwoord; mijn 
proefschrift is af! Hoewel ik het solistische werken het lastigste van het gehele traject 
vond, had ik mijn proefschrift nooit kunnen voltooien zonder de hulp van heel veel 
mensen. Ik wil iedereen die een directe en indirecte bijdrage heeft geleverd dan ook 
heel graag bedanken. 
Allereerst mijn promotor Robbert Huijsman en co-promotor Isabelle Fabbricotti. Het 
is even wederzijds zoeken geweest naar een wijze van samenwerking en begeleiding 
die paste bij mijn behoeftes en mij ondersteunde in het zo goed mogelijk schrijven van 
mijn proefschrift. Uiteindelijk ben ik heel blij met jullie begeleiding en bijsturing aan het 
proefschrift tot wat het nu is. Jullie vormden een goede aanvulling op elkaar en wisten 
altijd de zwakke plekken uit mijn stukken en vaardigheden te halen. Zonder jullie 
volhardende pogingen om mijn uitvoerige ideeën en zijwegen in te perken was het 
proefschrift nog langer geworden. Robbert, jouw sturing op de grote lijnen, blik vanuit 
de praktijk, enthousiasme, sociale interesse en pragmatisme op de juiste momenten 
zijn van onmisbare waarde geweest voor mijn proefschrift en het afronden ervan. 
Isabelle, veel dank voor je altijd secure en uiterst kritische blikken, die al mijn stukken 
in dit proefschrift en mijn denken zoveel beter, scherper, meer gefocust en analytischer 
hebben gemaakt. Ik heb enorm veel van je geleerd. 
Veel dank ben ik ook verschuldigd aan Kees Sol, lid Raad van Bestuur van Het 
Oogziekenhuis Rotterdam en initiator van Het Oogzorgnetwerk. Kees, vanaf het moment 
dat ik als ‘groentje’ in Het Oogziekenhuis als trainee en afstudeerstagiair rondliep heb je 
mijn potentie gezien en ondersteund. Dank voor je vertrouwen in mij, de mogelijkheid 
om dit proefschrift te kunnen schrijven, de leerzame projecten die ik naast het schrijven 
van mijn proefschrift in Het Oogziekenhuis heb kunnen doen, en je vaak verrassende 
ideeën die de wereld er steeds weer anders uit doen zien. 
Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar Joris van de Klundert. Joris, veel dank voor je interesse in het 
onderwerp franchise in de zorg en je inspanningen om het schrijven van dit proefschrift 
binnen de sectie HSMO mogelijk te maken. Ik waardeer het mede daarom zeer dat je 
tijdens de promotiedag zitting neemt in de commissie. 
Alle leden van de promotiecommissie wil ik heel graag bedanken voor hun bereidheid 
mijn proefschrift te lezen en beoordelen en te opponeren tijdens de verdediging. 
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Het wetenschappelijke franchisebos werd een stukje overzichtelijker en aangenamer 
door Evelien Croonen, UD bij de RUG. Evelien, wat was het fijn om af en toe met jou te 
kunnen sparren over franchisevraagstukken, definities, literatuur en wat dan ook meer. 
Ook bedankt voor je introductie van mij bij verschillende collega-wetenschappers 
tijdens mijn eerste congres van de International Society of Franchising in Boston en de 
gezellige daaropvolgende trips naar Fort Lauderdale en Zhuhai, China. 
De kletspraatjes, stimulans en interesse van mijn HSMO collega’s hebben een belangrijke 
rol gespeeld in het succesvol afronden van mijn proefschrift. Zonder iemand tekort te 
doen wil ik enkele collega’s in het bijzonder bedanken. Benjamin, mijn kamergenoot, we 
hebben elkaar meegetrokken in diepe dalen, maar daarna ook versterkt in de pieken. 
Bedankt voor het delen van onze kamer! Carien, dank voor je interesse en het delen van 
zoveel herkenbare ervaringen. Jeroen, bedankt voor jouw ontelbaar vele ‘uitslover!’ en 
‘maak je het niet te laat’ kreten naar mij aan het einde van de werkdag. Die gaven me 
soms net dat zetje iets eerder de laatste punt te typen, al was het maar een minuut. Alle 
collega’s van de schrijfclub, bedankt voor de altijd leerzame meetings en jullie feedback 
op mijn stukken. 
Mijn meer praktische werk en samenwerking met collega’s in Het Oogziekenhuis 
Rotterdam zijn onmisbaar geweest in het volhouden van mijn promotietraject. René 
Baljon en alle Oogzorgnetwerk collega’s: bedankt voor jullie medewerking aan mijn 
onderzoek, jullie gastvrijheid en het bieden van mogelijkheden om mijn kennis 
praktische toepassing en waarde te geven. Ilse en Jolanda, onze trip naar China voor 
het OOGbus project was enorm vermoeiend, maar onvergetelijk en zinvol. Het is super 
de kennis uit mijn onderzoek samen met jullie te kunnen benutten. Dames van het 
stafbureau, bedankt voor de gezellige en fijne werkplek op de vele maandagen in Het 
Oogziekenhuis. Els, wat is het fijn en inspirerend met jou samen te werken. René Z., 
Ron en Christine, bedankt voor jullie samenwerking en vertrouwen. Ook alle andere 
collega’s: bedankt voor de fijne en inspirerende werkomgeving. 
Dit proefschrift had niet tot stand kunnen komen zonder de medewerking van heel veel 
zorgformules en hun respondenten in het kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoek. 
Iedereen die heeft meegewerkt: ontzettend bedankt voor jullie openheid, tijd en 
vertrouwen in mij als onderzoeker om jullie ervaringen, kennis en documenten mee 
te delen. Ik hoop dat mijn bevindingen een goede basis vormen om met franchise(-
achtige) principes de zorg beter en efficiënter te maken. 
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Alle zorgorganisaties en adviseurs die mij in de loop der tijd hebben uitgenodigd om 
over franchise in de zorg van gedachten te wisselen: bedankt voor de interessante 
discussies, prikkelingen die mijn gedachten hielpen aanscherpen en het geven van het 
gevoel dat mijn onderzoek van waarde is voor de praktijk.
Mijn vriendinnen wil ik bedanken voor alle gezellige momenten, ontspanning, interesse 
en begrip voor mijn afwezigheid soms. Charlotte en Marjon, alsmede Marjolein, Tirza en 
Toke: door jullie heb ik me vanaf moment één thuis gevoeld in Rotterdam. Bedankt voor 
alles. Mijn jaarclubgenootjes van Dez Amados, wat is het super dat we nog steeds leuke 
dingen samen doen. Onze lustrumreis naar Dubai zorgde voor een goede break en was 
een reis om nooit te vergeten. Mijn GW-studievriendinnen uit Maastricht, bedankt voor 
de gezellige etentjes en uitjes. Dat we dat nog maar lang mogen voortzetten. Alle oud-
ZoMa dames: het is altijd weer leuk jullie te spreken. Ik heb nooit spijt gehad van mijn 
keuze bij de ZoMa vooral schakel-studenten op te zoeken. Last but not least, Irene. Al 
vanaf de brugklas zijn we vriendinnen. Hoewel we na de middelbare school alleen maar 
ver van elkaar vandaan hebben gewoond, voelt het altijd weer vertrouwd. Ik ben dan 
ook heel blij dat jij tijdens de grote spannende dag als paranimf naast mij staat.
Pap en mam, jullie hebben me altijd gestimuleerd om het beste uit mezelf te halen qua 
opleiding en ontwikkeling. Dank ook voor jullie nooit aflatende interesse in hoe het met 
mijn proefschrift ging, ook al vond ik dat soms heel irritant en beantwoordde ik dat met 
een ‘ander onderwerp’. Nienke en Petra, wat is het fijn om jullie als zus en schoonzus 
te hebben. Nienke, super bedankt dat je als ‘supportende’ zus als paranimf naast me 
staat. Mijn schoonouders Nel en Cas, bedankt dat ik me bij jullie altijd welkom voel. Ook 
andere familieleden, bedankt voor jullie interesse en steun. 
En tenslotte Robert. Nog elke dag prijs ik me gelukkig dat we die ene avond in precies 
dezelfde kroeg een biertje dronken. Jij hebt mijn promotietraject bijna van voor tot 
achter meegemaakt en aan jou ben ik misschien nog wel de meeste dank verschuldigd 
dat ik het tot een goed einde heb weten te brengen. Bedankt voor alle zetjes om drempels 
over te stappen die ik zelf niet durfde over te stappen en om meer te vertrouwen op 
mezelf en mijn eigen kracht. Jouw rust en relaxtheid hebben voorkomen dat ik mezelf 
overwerkte. Dat jij de mooie voorkant van mijn proefschrift hebt ontworpen vind ik 
daarom extra speciaal. En bovenal is het leven met jou zoveel fijner en leuker. Nu gaan 
we lekker genieten van alle vrije tijd en leuke dingen in het leven, eindelijk zonder 
proefschrift! 
-  Karlijn
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Theme workshop patient perspective, iBMG 2009
Academic writing in English 2010
Ready in four years 2010
Qualitative interviewing, Kwalon 2010
Workshops project management and networking, PhD career day, EPAR 2010
Workshop successful presenting, NWO 2010
Qualitative research (interviewing, focus groups, analyzing, writing), 
Kwalon and iBMG
2011
Evidence-based management, expertise centre healthcare logistics, iBMG 2011
Personal Effectiveness, ICM opleidingen en trainingen 2012
Mindmapping, Mindmap Nederland 2012
iBMG PhD career event 2013
Media training Eva Kuit, jBMG 2013
Attended seminars and conferences
Symposium improving chronic care 2009
Research colloquia HSMO 2009-2012
Conference ‘Customer relations in healthcare. The return of healthcare 
marketing in cure and care’
2010
25th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, Boston, USA 2011
Lustrum symposium iBMG, March 2012 2012
26th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, Fort 
Lauderdale, USA
2012
Lustrum symposium iBMG, October 2012 2012
27th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, Zhuhai, China 2013
Conference ‘Elderly care 2040. A future-proof elderly care through research 
and practice!’
2013
Opportunities in healthcare by franchising – meeting ING and 
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2013
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Presentations and participation in meetings
Presentation ‘Franchising in healthcare: design, application and value 
creation’, BZO research colloquium
2009
Presentation ‘Making franchising work: a framework based on a systematic 
review’, HSMO research colloquium
2011
Presentation ‘Exploring franchising in healthcare’, research seminar Faculty 
of Economics and Business, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
2011
Presentation ‘Is Franchising in healthcare valuable? A systematic review’, 
HSMO research colloquium
2011
Paper presentation ‘Is franchising in healthcare valuable? A systematic 
review’, 26th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, 
Fort Lauderdale, USA
2012
Paper presentation ‘Exploring the role of ownership structures in the 
results of professional healthcare franchises from a multi-actor 
perspective’, Zhuhai, China (awarded with the International Society of 
Franchising Best PhD Student Paper Award)
2013
Presentation ‘Is franchising in healthcare successful?’, Come in and look 
around, expert meeting, Customer Factory Franchise Consultants
2013
Presentation ‘Effectively designing and managing of franchise 
organizations in healthcare: what should you do?’, Flevum – Rotterdam 
Eye Hospital meeting about franchise in healthcare
2013
Presentations about effectively designing and managing healthcare 
franchises for a variety of healthcare franchises
2012-2013
Participation in various brainstorm meetings and round table meetings of 
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2012-2014
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Reviewer of papers for the International Society of Franchising 
Conferences 
2012-2013
Chairing a paper presentation session, International Society of Franchising 
Conference
2013
Reviewer for the International Journal of Management Reviews 2013-2014
Organizing meetings and participation in working groups
Working group jBMG; PhD portfolio, IOBO, overviews of courses and 
workshops
2009-2010
Co-Organizing meeting ’10 year Eye Care Network’, Eye Care Network in 
cooperation with Flevum
2011
Organizing meeting ‘Franchise in Healthcare’, in cooperation with Flevum 2013
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Teaching activities
Co-evaluating bachelor theses (BMG) 2010-2011
Co-evaluating master thesis (ZoMa) 2010
Co-evaluating master thesis (HEPL) 2011
Workgroups traineeship ‘working in healthcare’ 2010
Workgroup kwaliteitskunde, schakel 2010
Lecture ‘franchising’, course healthcare marketing (ZoMa) 2011
Lecture ‘research into franchising as a form of cooperation in the 
healthcare sector’, course strategy and innovation (ZoMa)
2012
Additional activities
Business consultant and researcher The Rotterdam Eye Hospital 2008-now
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